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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that investigate the role and 
importance of corporate governance in public and private firms. Chapter 1, 
investigates the role of governance characteristics in determining the probability of a 
firm undergoing a going private transaction. Firms with greater board control are 
more likely to go private while firms with strong anti-takeover provisions are more 
likely to be acquired by other public companies. The positive relationship between 
greater board control and the likelihood of going private is driven by private equity 
backed deals. Shareholder voting restrictions do not affect firms‟ survival status 
while a higher number of state antitakeover laws reduces the likelihood of being 
acquired. Abnormal returns to shareholders are much lower for going private 
transactions than for acquisitions by public firms. The results suggest that 
governance provisions affect shareholder wealth during change of control 
transactions by playing an important role in determining the type of acquirer. 
Chapter 2 presents new empirical evidence on the agency costs which emerge from 
the vertical (ownership versus control) and horizontal (majority versus minority) 
agency problems. Agency costs increase as firms move from a single owner/single 
manager ownership structure to more complicated ownership structures. Within each 
ownership structure, agency costs are significantly higher when firms are not 
managed by owners. Agency costs are lower in firms with shared control of 
ownership. Horizontal agency costs are lower in firms where control is contestable. 
Chapter 3 examines the determinants of cash holdings in private firms. Cash 
xi 
 
holdings in private firms support both the trade-off theory and the financing 
hierarchy theory. Cash holdings in private firms decrease significantly with size, firm 
age, net working capital and leverage. Private firms that pay dividends hold more 
cash and that cash holdings increase significantly with capital expenditures and cash 
flow volatility. Better governed private firms hold significantly more cash than 











































WHAT DO PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS LOOK FOR IN AN INVESTMENT? 




After cooling off in the 1990s, going private transactions (GPs) have once 
again become a significant part of the U.S. corporate acquisition landscape in recent 
years.
1
 Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) note that the total value of U.S. going private 
transactions announced in 2006 and 2007 amounted to $450 and $410 billion, 
respectively. A significant fraction of these buyouts involve financial buyers such as 
private equity firms. Boone and Mulherin (2009) report that private equity firms 
accounted for 30 percent of the winning bids in the U.S. corporate takeover market 
in 2007. Further, Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) report that total equity capital 
commitments to U.S. private equity funds reached $228 billion in 2007, or 1.57% of 
total U.S. stock market capitalization.  
The sharp increase in going private transactions (GPs) in recent years and the 
role of private equity firms (PE) in these deals have attracted increasing attention. 
Empirical evidence on GPs suggests that these transactions are typically associated 
with significant improvements in corporate performance.
2
 The observed changes in 
                                                          
1
 When a listed company is acquired and subsequently delisted, the transaction is referred to as a 
going-private transaction. Such transactions are usually financed by borrowing substantially (60%-
90%) against target firm‟s assets and are called leveraged buyouts (LBOs). 
2
 See for example DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984),  Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989),  
Kaplan (1989), Lehn and Poulsen (1989),  Lee (1992),  Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004), Guo, 
Hotchkiss and Song (2010) among others. 
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performance are generally attributed to buyout sponsors' active involvement and 
better governance in the post-buyout firm. Rational buyout sponsors will in principle 
target firms with financial and governance characteristics which maximize their 
chance of success. In fact, several studies find that firms that go private are 
associated with distinctly different financial characteristics compared to those 
targeted by public acquirers.
3
 Along the same lines, rational buyout sponsors will in 
principle target firms with governance structures that facilitate a smooth deal 
completion process and post-buyout changes. However, surprisingly little attention 
has been given to the role of the governance characteristics of public firms that go 
private. In this paper, I focus on the crucial, but as yet little understood, role of target 
corporate governance characteristics on the choices made by buyout sponsors when 
allocating resources.   
The objective of this paper is to provide evidence on the relationship between 
ex-ante corporate governance characteristics and the likelihood of a firm going 
private.  With the exception of managerial and institutional ownership measures (see 
for example Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg, 1999; Cressy, Munari and 
Malipiero, 2007), there is little evidence on how governance provisions affect a 
firm's likelihood of going private. The paucity of evidence is rather striking because 
one of the most prominent arguments for going private is that these transactions 
create value by making governance improvements in target firms (see for example 
                                                          
3
 The literature is extensive. Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) summarize the results of various studies by 
noting that firms targeted in going private transactions are generally characterized by strong cash 
flows and a history of profitability. In addition, these firms belong to a mature industry with low 
growth opportunities and limited need for additional capital expenditures.  
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Cornelli and Karakas, 2008). Such arguments suggest that firms that engage in GPs 
are associated with distinctly different, often weaker governance characteristics than 
other firms prior to the transaction. 
This paper is also aimed at enhancing our understanding of the role played by 
private equity firms in GPs. As mentioned above, the recent buyout wave is 
characterized by the predominance of private equity firms, unlike the merger wave of 
the 1980s which was dominated by management buyouts (MBOs). Private equity 
firms have come under increased scrutiny and are the subject of an on-going heated 
debate over the role they play in the optimal allocation of resources.
4
 While 
proponents argue that private equity firms help create value in target firms by 
mitigating the agency costs of free cash flow as well as making operating 
improvements, skeptics argue that major sources of gains to private equity firms are 
unrelated to real improvements and include activities such as securing funds at 
favorable terms (Demirogulu and James, 2010) and expropriation of target 
shareholders through lower premiums (Phalippou 2010; Officer, Ozbas and Sensoy, 
2010). This paper adds to the literature by examining target characteristics that drive 
the choices of private equity firms to become sponsors of going private deals. More 
specifically, I examine the relation between a target firm‟s governance characteristics 
and the probability of the firm undergoing a private equity sponsored going private 
                                                          
4
 For example, the U.S. Department of Justice started an informal investigation into the 
anticompetitive role of private equity firms in 2006. See Andrew Sorkin, New York Times, October 
16, 2005 for more details.  
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transaction (GP) as opposed to undergoing a merger with another public company, 
undergoing a non private equity backed GP or continuing as an independent entity.   
There is now widespread recognition, as well as growing empirical evidence, 
that governance provisions affect firm behavior in complex ways. Consequently, 
interest in corporate governance has been rapidly growing, both inside and outside 
academia, together with recognition of its importance.
5
 In an influential article, 
Gompers, Ishi and Metric (2003) note that a broad index based on 24 governance 
provisions (commonly referred as G-Index) was negatively correlated with firm 
value. A few more recent studies construct alternate governance indices consisting of 
fewer provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009) or more provisions (Brown and 
Caylor, 2006; Aggarwal and Williamson, 2006) and examine their affect on various 
firm related issues. In spite of a large number of papers focusing on corporate 
governance, no single measure has been universally accepted that captures the 
quality of governance provisions in firms.  
Building on extant literature, I consider a firm‟s governance to be determined 
by its board characteristics, anti-takeover provisions, voting restrictions, and the state 
corporate governance related laws to which it is subject. Consequently, I create 
measures of each of these provisions. Board Control Index (hereafter BCI) measures 
a board‟s ability to make internal governance changes without shareholder approval. 
In other words, a large value of BCI means the board has more control over the 
                                                          
5
 For instance, Bebchuk & Wiesbach (2010) note that “the term “corporate governance” appears as a 
key word in the abstract of 987 papers over the past year on SSRN, and, given the huge amount of 
research being done in the area, SSRN in 2009 started the Corporate Governance Network (CGN) 
with 21 different subject-matter electronic journals”. 
5 
 
decision making process. Takeover Restrictions measure the level of takeover 
protection adopted by firms. These provisions act as layers of defense against 
takeovers and discourage hostile buyers from making an offer. The right to vote on 
various firm-related issues is an important source of power to shareholders. Voting 
Restrictions measure the degree to which restrictions on shareholder voting rights 
have been instituted. Finally, State Provisions measure the number of state takeover-
related laws that a firm is subject to.
6
  
 I examine the relation between a target firm‟s governance characteristics and 
the probability of the firm undergoing a going private transaction (GP) as opposed to 
undergoing a merger with another public company or continuing as an independent 
entity using governance data on more than 8,000 small and large listed companies in 
the U.S. during 2002-2009. I then differentiate between private equity and non 
private equity backed GPs in order to gain further insights into the choices made by 
private equity firms when allocating resources.  
 I find that several governance characteristics are important in determining 
firms' survival status. First, I document a positive relationship between the board 
control index (BCI) and the probability of a firm undergoing a GP. This positive 
relationship is entirely driven by a subset of deals that are backed by private equity 
firms. That is, firms where boards are dominated by insiders and have greater ability 
to make decisions without the consent of shareholders are more likely to undergo a 
private equity backed GP. As mentioned earlier, private equity firms typically initiate 
                                                          
6
 Please refer to Section 2 for more details on the rationale and construction of these indices.  
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several changes in target firms after a GP has been completed. While the target‟s 
management team is generally retained, outside board members are replaced with 
individuals employed by private equity sponsors (Cornelli and Karakas, 2008). Other 
significant changes include the introduction of high-powered managerial incentives 
and the pressures resulting from high leverage. The results presented here indicate 
that private equity firms maximize the chances of the deal going through  by 
engaging in friendly buyouts of firms where boards are more immune to shareholder 
oversight. Furthermore, recent research argues that insider dominated boards are a 
sign of management's skill level (see for example Bhagat and Black, 2002; Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 2010). To the extent this is the case, 
the results indicate that private equity firms pay particular attention to target 
management skill set.  
Second, I find that firms with strong anti-takeover provisions are less likely 
to undergo a GP and are more likely to undergo a merger. Existing evidence suggests 
that anti-takeover provisions are primarily used by firms to enhance their bargaining 
position in the event of a takeover attempt (Comment and Schwert 1995) and that 
private acquirers pay lower premiums compared to public acquirers (Bargeron, 
Schlingemann, Stulz, Zutter 2009). My results suggest that buyout sponsors are, at 
least in part, able to pay lower premiums and yet complete deals by not targeting 
firms with strong anti-takeover provisions in place. Furthermore, the negative 
relationship between takeover restrictions and the likelihood of going private is 
primarily driven by non private equity backed deals. This finding makes intuitive 
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sense as private acquirers other than private equity buyers are mostly comprised of 
private operating companies. Compared to private equity firms who are in the 
business of buying firms, private operating companies are less likely to devote a 
large fraction of their resources to acquisitions. As such, they may be reluctant to 
pursue targets with strong anti-takeover provisions given the bargaining power such 
provisions provide to target firms.  
Third, I find that voting restrictions on shareholders do not affect firms‟ 
survival status. This result is contrary to the findings of Bebchuk, Coates and 
Subramanian (2002, 2003) who note that such restrictions play an important role in 
determining whether a firm is acquired or stays independent. A possible explanation 
for the difference in  results is that Bebchuk et al examine the effects of voting 
restrictions in deals involving hostile bids. The deals examined in this study do not 
involve hostile takeovers. To sum, my results suggest that even though voting 
restrictions on shareholder impact factors such as firm value (Bebchuk and Cohen 
2005), and shareholder returns (Faleye 2007; Guo, Kruse and Nohel 2008), they do 
not play a role in determining the likelihood of a firm undergoing a GP as opposed to 
undergoing a merger with another public company or continuing as an independent 
entity. My results also suggest that when a firm is subject to a larger number of state 
takeover-related laws there is a reduction in the likelihood of being acquired by any 
type of acquirer.  
Finally, I examine the wealth implications to shareholders of the GPs in the 
sample. Consistent with the findings of extant research (see for example Bargeron, 
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Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter 2009), average abnormal returns to target 
shareholders are much lower for GPs than for acquisitions by public firms. The mean 
abnormal return of target shareholders is 25% if the acquisition is by a public firm 
whereas it is 21.4% if the acquisition is by a private firm. There is no systematic 
difference in abnormal returns between buyouts sponsored by private equity firms 
and other private acquirers. I find that governance provisions do not affect 
announcement period abnormal returns after controlling for the probability of 
undergoing a GP. In sum, the results suggest that governance provisions affect 
shareholder wealth in going private transactions (GPs) by playing an important role 
in determining the type of acquirer.  
This paper contributes to two streams of literature. First, it adds to the body 
of research that examines the interaction between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm value or behavior, (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2009), investment 
decisions (John and Knyazeva 2006) and payout policy (Officer 2010) among others. 
Second, this paper enhances our understanding of the choices made by private equity 
firms. The role of private equity firms in our economy has skyrocketed along with a 
wave of research on the returns earned by private equity investment firms.  However, 
little is known about the factors that drive the choices of private equity investors.  By 
examining whether there are any fundamental differences between firms taken over 
by private equity firms and other types of acquirers, this paper sheds light on this 
issue.   
Perhaps the paper closest in spirit to this study is a working paper by Goktan, 
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Kieschnick and Moussawi (2008). Those authors examine the impact of select 
governance characteristics on firms‟ survival and note that some aspects of 
governance influence whether a firm is acquired or goes private. My paper differs 
from, and extends their work in several important ways. First, unlike Goktan et al, I 
examine GPs backed by private equity firms separately. This distinction is important 
given the increasing role played by private equity firms in the current wave of going 
private transactions (GPs). I show governance characteristics that affect the odds of a 
private equity backed GP are different from those that affect the odds of a non 
private equity backed GP. Second, I examine all merger and GP activity through 
2009 whereas Gotkan et al end their sample period in 2004. My sample therefore 
includes the period 2005 – 2007 which is considered the peak of the latest buyout 
wave. Third, I utilize governance data on nearly 8,000 publicly traded companies in 
the U.S. unlike the IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Center) data used by 
Gotkan et al which contains governance data only on major U.S. corporations. 
  The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background and rationale for the governance provisions used in the study. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 addresses potential 







II. Target Governance Provisions  
A. Board Control Index (BCI) 
 The board of directors has long been considered an important governance 
institution (Gillan, 2006), however the empirical literature casts doubt on board 
importance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Bhagat and Black, 2002). Shivdasani 
(1993) examines whether differences in the structure of the board contribute to the 
incidence of hostile takeovers and finds that neither board size nor composition have 
any explanatory power. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) find that board 
independence has no significant effect on bid failure rates at companies with poison 
pills. In a more recent paper, Bates, Becher and Lemmon (2008) note that target 
board classification does not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is 
ultimately acquired. However, there are no papers examining how target board 
composition influences the likelihood of being targeted by different types of 
acquirers. 
Two recent papers examine changes in board structure after firms undergo a 
GP. Cornelli and Karakas (2008) examine the board structure of 88 U.K. buyouts 
sponsored by a private equity firm over the 1998–2003 period and find that, on 
average, board size decreases after the buyout. Moreover, individuals representing 
the buyout sponsor generally replace outside directors. Acharya, Hahn and Kehoe 
(2010) document similar findings using deal level data from 110 private equity 
transactions in Western Europe. However, to my knowledge, there is no research 
examining the relation between ex-ante target board characteristics and the 
11 
 
likelihood of being acquired by different types of acquirers. I examine whether board 
independence plays a role in the likelihood of a firm being acquired. I create a board 
control index (BCI) to measure the degree of control the board of directors have over 
shareholders in the decision making process. The components of this index are 
dummy variables indicating whether, a) the board is controlled by insiders b) the 
board is authorized to change the board size without shareholder approval and c) the 
board can amend bylaws without shareholder approval. By construction, this index 
lies between zero and three, with zero representing open and transparent boards. A 
larger BCI measure indicates a board has more control over decision making. 
Whether more board control benefits or hurts shareholder is an empirical issue and 
depends in part on what Fama (1980) calls the market for directors.    
 
B.  Anti-takeover Provisions 
Research examining mergers during the 1980s suggest that these provisions 
help deter the occurrence of takeover bids (Pound, 1987). However, Comment and 
Schwert (1995) find that poison pills do not significantly influence the likelihood of 
firms being acquired. The defense offered by these provisions is often repealed by 
target boards when potential acquirers increase the offer price. Hence, anti-takeover 
provisions may increase the bargaining power of target firms. Reinforcing these 
findings, Georgeson and Co. (1997) argue that there is no evidence that the presence 
of a pill decreases the likelihood of being acquired. Other anti-takeover provisions 
include super majority requirements to approve mergers and incorporation in a state 
12 
 
with strong anti-takeover provisions. These provisions act as an extra layer of 
defense against takeovers and discourage hostile buyers from making an offer. I 
create an index (Takeover Restrictions) to measure the presence of anti-takeover 
provisions adopted by firms. The components of this index are dummy variables 
indicating whether, a) there is a poison pill in place b) the poison pill has a sunset 
provision, c) the poison pill has a qualified offer provision
7
 d) there is a super 
majority requirement to approve mergers and e) the firm is incorporated in a state 
with anti-takeover provisions. By construction, this index lies between zero and five, 
with zero representing firms with weak or no anti-takeover provisions in place.   
 
C. Voting Restrictions and State Laws 
  The right to vote on various firm-related issues is generally granted to 
shareholders. For instance, shareholders typically have the right to vote on bylaw 
amendments and charter amendments. However, this right can be constrained. 
Limitations, such as super majority voting requirements for the approval of charter 
amendments and bylaws, make it more difficult for shareholders to approve changes 
(Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2009). In addition to the power to vote on charter and 
bylaw amendments, shareholders may vote to replace the board of directors. 
                                                          
7
 A sunset provision in this context requires shareholders to approve the poison pill and hence, can be 
viewed as a stronger anti-takeover provision. A qualified offer provision allows potential acquirers go 
forward without board‟s approval. However, for an offer to be considered a qualified offer, stringent 
restrictions apply. Generally, it has to be all cash, usually made to all shareholders, contain a firm 
financing commitment, get a fairness opinion from an investment bank and the offer should result in 
acquiring a majority of outstanding stock. Given these restrictions, I consider it as an anti-takeover 
provision. Sunset and qualified offer provisions are only present in about 3% of total firms and are 
unlikely to influence the results. Nevertheless, I include them for completeness.  
13 
 
However, this right is weakened when a staggered board is present, becuase only one 
class of directors is elected each year. As a result, in the presence of a staggered 
board shareholders cannot replace a majority of the directors in any given year. 
Lastly, shareholders‟ voting rights may be limited if the firm has dual class shares 
with unequal voting rights. I create an index (Voting Restrictions) to measure degree 
of voting restrictions shareholders are subject to. The components of this index are 
dummy variables indicating whether, a) firm has a staggered board b) there is a 
supermajority requirement for charter amendments, c) firm has dual class shares d) 
there is a super majority requirement to amend bylaws. By construction, this index 
lies between zero and four, with zero representing firms where shareholders‟ voting 
power is unobstructed.  
 Lastly, I construct an index to measure state takeover-related laws a firm is 
subject to,  namely, control share, cash out, freeze out and fair price provisions.
8
 
GIM and other studies note that state laws do not appear to be highly correlated with 
the adoption of firm-level provisions and might have explanatory power by 
themselves. By construction, this index (State Provisions) lies between zero and 
                                                          
8
 Control share acquisition statutes are intended to prevent potential acquirers from building up their 
ownership stakes in the target company. These statutes function by stripping potential acquirers of 
their voting rights in the event their ownership exceeds a previously set threshold. Voting rights are 
restored only by the approval of a majority or supermajority of disinterested shareholders 
(shareholders who are not related to the acquirer). Cash out statutes give dissident shareholders the 
right to sell their shares to the controlling shareholder at the highest acquiring price. Therefore, an 
acquirer seeking partial control of a company must be prepared to purchase significantly more shares 
that she anticipated should the remaining shareholders exercise their option to sell. Freeze out 
provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a 
specified period of time before gaining control of the company. Fair price provisions require that at 







III. Data and Description of Variables 
A. Governance data  
I use the Riskmetrics Group governance data on all publicly traded 
companies during 2002 – 2009 to construct the governance indices Board Control 
Index (BCI), Takeover Restrictions, Voting Restrictions, and State Provisions.
9
 This 
dataset provides governance data for approximately 8,000 small and large public 
companies trading in the U.S. Most papers use governance data for the 
approximately 2,500 largest firms in the U.S. provided by Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC). It is likely that the variation in governance characteristics 
in this subset of firms is limited. Furthermore, firms undergoing GPs are generally 
smaller and a majority of them are not included in the data provided by IRRC. It 
could be one of the reasons for the lack of evidence on the role played by governance 
provisions in determining the probability of undergoing GPs elsewhere in the 
literature. 
There are 8,313 distinct firms and 39,433 firm-years in the corporate governance 
dataset. Table I  presents summary statistics of the important governance provisions 
available in the dataset. The proportion of boards controlled by insiders and affiliated 
outsiders has increased slightly from approximately 25% in 2002 to 33% in 2009. 
During the same time, the proportion of firms with small boards has increased from 
                                                          
9
 I thank Carol Bowie of Riskmetrics Group for providing access to their dataset. 
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8% to 17.4%. Statistics also reveal that boards have become more powerful as 
evidenced by the increase in the proportion of boards that can change board 
characteristics or amend bylaws without shareholder approval. The proportion of 
firms with staggered boards has decreased to 46% in 2009 from 60% in 2002. Along 
the same lines, the incidence of poison pills has also decreased to 42% in 2009 from 
60% in 2002. These statistics are comparable to those reported by Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrell (2009) who examine governance data during 1990-2002 and document a 
60% incidence of staggered boards and poison pills in 2002.  
**** Insert Table I here **** 
B.  Takeover Sample 
I collect the sample of takeovers from Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) 
U.S. Merger and Acquisition Database. I restrict the sample to all completed 
acquisitions with announcement dates between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 
2009. I require that the acquirer own 51% or more of the target after the deal. I limit 
the sample to going private transactions and acquisitions made by publicly traded 
firms in the U.S. I exclude REITs from the sample. I further require that financial 
information from COMPUSTAT and stock price information from CRSP be 
available for each target firm for the entire sample period or until it is acquired. 
Finally, I require that governance data of the target firms be available for the period 
prior to the deal.   
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These criteria result in a sample of 795 target firms out of which 581 firms 
underwent a merger with another public firm and 214 firms which went private.
10
 I 
code indicator variables for whether a private equity firm is involved in the deal. I do 
this coding by reading through the deal synopsis provided by SDC for each event 
and checking whether the acquirer or the acquirer‟s ultimate parent is a private 
equity firm. Of the 214 GPs, 126 are backed by at least one private equity firm. The 
remaining 88 transactions represent buyouts by other investor groups and private 
operating companies. Table II  presents the distribution of these transactions over 
time. Consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009; Guo, 
Hotchkiss and Song, 2010), there is an increased level of takeover activity between 
2005 and 2007.  
  **** Insert Table II here **** 
B. Variable Description 
I control for several firm characteristics found to affect the likelihood of a 
firm being acquired. Prior studies (see for example Mehran and Peristiani, 2010) 
show that the odds of a firm being acquired or going private are negatively correlated 
with its size. I calculate firm size (Size) as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Similarly, firm profitability measures have been shown to be negatively related to the 
likelihood of being acquired. I measure firm profitability (Profitability) as the ratio 
of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization to total assets. Pre-
offer financial leverage may enable the transfer of wealth from bondholders to equity 
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 It is important to note the actual number of deal might be higher. However, I require that 
governance data be available for all target firms and this reduces the sample size significantly.  
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holders in a GP or merger (Asquith and Wizmann 1990). I calculate leverage (Debt) 
as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Along the same lines, potential financial 
distress may also affect a firm‟s decision to engage in change of control transactions 
(Opler and Titman, 1993). I also include the Altman Z-Score (Z-Score) as a proxy 
for potential financial distress.
11
 
Implications of agency conflicts and information asymmetries between 
principals and agents are important issues in going private transactions (GPs). A 
central motivating hypothesis for why GPs occur is to reduce managerial discretion 
over the use of free cash flow (Jensen 1986). A GP reduces free cash flow that could 
be abused by managers and also increases pressure on managers to operate the 
reorganized firm efficiently. Most empirical studies employ a variety of cash flow 
variables as measures of the extent to which free cash flow is available (see, for 
example, Lehn and Poulsen 1989; Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg 1999). I 
calculate free cash flow as net income after taxes plus depreciation and change in 
working capital less capital expenditures scaled by total assets (FCF). Another 
argument for why firms go private is that they generate tax benefits from debt 
financing (see for example Kaplan 1989). I include the variable total income taxes 
divided by sales (Tax Ratio).  
The extant literature suggests that firms going private have fewer growth 
opportunities on average (see for example Opler and Titman 1983; Eckbo and 
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 This measure is calculated as 3.3*(earnings before interest and tax/sales) + sale/assets + 
1.4*(retained earnings/total assets) + 1.2*(working capital/total assets) + 0.6*(market value of 
equity/book value of liabilities). 
18 
 
Thorburn 2009). I measure the market‟s assessment of a firm‟s future growth 
prospects by Tobins Q (Tobins Q) measured as firm market value divided by the 
book value of assets (as of latest fiscal year).  Firm risk (Firm Risk) is measured as 
the volatility of the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization to total assets based on up to 10 years of history, with a minimum of 5 
years. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) document a positive relationship between a 
firm‟s percentage of total assets accounted for by tangible fixed assets and the 
likelihood of it being acquired. I measure a firm‟s asset mix (Asset Mix) by the ratio 
of its net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. All variables are calculated 
using data from the latest fiscal year prior to the deal year.  
  In addition to the governance indices described in Section 2, I also collect 
information on institutional and managerial ownership. I obtain data on institutional 
ownership (Institutional Ownership) from Thomson Financial‟s 13F Holdings 
database, which contains stock level holdings of institutional money managers 
collected from quarterly filings with the SEC. I compute the fraction of a target 
firm‟s outstanding shares owned by all institutions at the end of every quarter and 
compute an annual measure by averaging over the previous four calendar quarters. I 
obtain data on insider ownership (Executive Ownership) from Form 4 of TFN insider 
filings data. I compute the fraction of a target firm‟s shares held by insiders by 
adding the shares held by all insiders at the end of the fiscal year and dividing by the 




IV. Results and Discussion 
A. Univariate analysis 
Panel A of Table III compares financial characteristics of firms that went 
private with a sample of firms that underwent a merger with other public companies 
and with a sample of firms that remained public. The predominantly statistically 
significant p-values presented in the last two columns of the table show that firms 
that go private are very different from both of the other groups. These firms are 
smaller with average total assets of $1,372.9 million. On the other hand, average 
total assets of merger firms and survivors are $1,797 million and $3,812.6 million 
respectively. Further, firms that underwent GPs tend to have lower growth 
opportunities as evidenced by lower Tobins‟ Q and a higher book to market ratio.
12
 
These firms exhibit larger free cash flows, a higher debt ratio and a larger tax ratio. 
In addition, firms that went private tend to be less risky as evidenced by lower 
volatility of operating income. These observations are consistent with results 
presented elsewhere (Eckbo and Thorburn 2009; Mehran and Peristiani 2010).    
Going private firms have lower (higher) institutional ownership than firms 
acquired by public companies (survivors). Managerial ownership of GP firms is only 
marginally higher than survivors and is not significantly different from merged 
firms. Aggregate governance indices such as G-Index and E-Index are lower for GP 
firms suggesting that these firms have better overall governance mechanisms in place 
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 The majority of surviving firms are profitable, as the median profitability measure of survivors is 




compared to the other groups. However, individual governance provisions are 
significantly different across these groups. More specifically, GP firms have 
significantly lower takeover and voting restriction indices but a high BCI when 
compared to firms that are acquired. When compared with survivors, GP firms have 
a higher BCI and are subject to fewer state takeover laws.  
**** Insert Table III here **** 
Panel B of Table III presents pairwise correlation coefficients among the 
governance indices used in the study, firm size and the two traditional governance 
indices, the G-Index and the E-Index. BCI, Voting and Takeover restrictions are 
positively correlated with each other with the magnitudes ranging from 0.11 to 0.32. 
State provisions are negatively correlated with the remaining three governance 
indices used in the study. Overall, colleanarity doesn't appear to be an issue.   
 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
B.1 Regression Methodology 
 I use an unordered multinomial logistic regression methodology in which 
multiple observations on a sample firm are included. That is, I include all firm-years 
for which data are available during the sample period. The dependent variable equals 
0 if a firm is a going concern in a given year, 1 if a firm is acquired by another public 
company in a given year, 2 if a firm goes private in a given year. In tests where GPs 
are split into two groups, dependent variable equals 2 if a firm undergoes a PE-
backed going private transaction and equals 3 if a firms undergoes a non private 
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equity backed GP in a given year. In this setting, data on a particular firm ceases to 
exist when it undergoes a merger or a GP (i.e., when the dependent variable takes a 
value other than 0). Estimated coefficients indicate the change in the log of the ratio 
of the two probabilities [i.e., P(event x|x = 1,2,3)/P(base-case)] for a one unit change 
in the independent variable. I correct the standard errors of the estimated coefficients 
for possible firm-level clustering effects using a robust-variance estimation 
methodology (Petersen 2009).  
 This regression methodology is adapted to address two econometric problems 
that are common in governance and corporate control studies. The first concern is the 
potential sample selection problem that arises from using a non-random, outcome 
based sample. Identifying and using firms that engage in a specific type of 
transaction, say GPs, leads to incorrect results and erroneous inferences. The second 
concern is the need to recognize that undergoing a merger with a public company or 
going private with or without the backing of a private equity firm are relevant 
alternatives. This concern is more relevant in recent years where hostile takeovers 
are virtually non-existent. Estimating a simple logistic regression leads to excluding 
one or more relevant alternatives and results in biased coefficient and standard error 
estimates.  
  
B.2  Examining the Role of Financial Characteristics 
I begin my analysis by estimating a regression in which I examine the effect 
of firms' financial features on their survival status. This phase is helpful in 
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reassessing the findings in the extant literature and it also establishes a useful 
baseline for examining the additional explanatory power of various governance 
provisions. Model I of Panel A, Table IV presents the regression results of a 
specification that examines the likelihood of a firm being acquired by another 
publicly traded company or going private against continuing as a surviving entity 
(base-case).  
The results indicate that small firms are more likely to be targets in change of 
control transactions. This result suggests there are inherent impediments to acquiring 
larger, more complex companies. The results reveal a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities proxied by Tobins Q and the likelihood of being acquired. 
There is a positive relation between the probability of short-term financial distress 
proxied by the Z-score and the likelihood of being acquired. There is a negative 
(positive) relationship between firm profitability and the likelihood of undergoing a 
merger (GP). Higher institutional ownership increases the likelihood of being 
acquired by another publicly-traded company but it does not affect the likelihood of 
going private. There is a positive relationship between the proportion of tangible 
assets and the likelihood of going private. The coefficient on the tax ratio is positive 
but insignificant for GPs.
13
 These results confirm earlier findings firms that go 
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 Several earlier studies highlighted various tax benefits. Tax deductibility of interest payments on 
corporate debt is the most direct tax benefit. Kaplan (1989) also presents evidence that many of the 
earlier deals sought to take advantage of a favorable tax code allowing for certain depreciation 
deductions related to the fair value of the buyout premium. Most of these tax advantages were 




private are generally small, profitable firms with limited growth opportunities 
(Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009).  
**** Insert Table IV here **** 
Model II of Panel A, Table IV presents results for a broader specification 
where GPs are separated into private equity and non-private equity deals. The latter 
category includes GPs primarily undertaken by private operating companies and 
other investor groups.  This categorization helps uncover financial characteristics 
that differentiate private equity backed deals from other GPs. There are two notable 
differences. First, there is a strong positive relationship between free cash flows and 
the likelihood of being targeted by a private equity firm. This result demonstrates 
that firms with large undistributed cash flows are more likely to undergo a private 
equity backed GP. Second, firms with higher levels of tangible assets are more likely 
to undergo a non private equity backed GP. These results suggest that private equity 
firms and private operating firms target firms with different characteristics. This may 
arise because of differing sources of gains from the acquisition. In the private equity 
backed case, the source of gains are likely driven by increases in operating efficiency 
and better monitoring by the buyout sponsors. In the private operating company case, 
operating synergies are likely to be an important source of gains. Hence, asset mix is 
more likely to be an important factor for private operating acquirers rather than for 
private equity firms.  
Coefficient estimates presented in Panel A of Table IV measure the 
likelihood of each outcome relative to the base-case, i.e., relative to continuing as a 
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surviving entity. Next, I examine whether the coefficient estimates are different 
among possible outcomes. Panel B of Table IV presents the differences in the raw 
coefficients and the associated p-values for z-test of differences. These differences 
can be interpreted as follows. For instance, the estimate of 0.327 for FCF in the 
column 'PE backed GP - Merger' indicates that, holding all other factors constant, the 
percent increase of relative risk (or loosely, the odds) of undergoing PE-backed 
going private transaction over merger is about 38% (exp(0.327)=1.38) for a one unit 
increase in FCF. The results presented in this Panel show that financial 
characteristics that affect the likelihood of undergoing a PE backed GP over merger 
and the financial characteristics that affect the likelihood of undergoing a PE backed 





B. 3 Examining the Role of Traditional Governance Indices 
To analyze the effects of target governance characteristics in determining the 
likelihood of firms being acquired by specific acquirer groups, I include governance 
characteristics in the base-line regression model discussed above. I begin by 
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 Several tests were conducted to further confirm the validity of the unordered multinomial regression 
methodology used in this study. These are a) Wald test for combining outcomes, b) LR and Wald tests 
for significance of independent variables and c) Small-Hsiao tests of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption. 
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examining the relevance of traditional governance indices widely used in the 
literature, specifically the index constructed by Gompers, Ishi and Metric (2003).
15
 
Model I of Table V reports parameter estimates for a multinomial logit model 
that measures the odds of undergoing a merger or a GP. The coefficient estimate on 
the G-index is insignificant implying that on average, ex-ante governance 
characteristics do not influence the likelihood of being acquired or going private. 
Model II of Table V reports results for two subgroups, where GPs are split into 
private equity backed and other GPs. The results show that higher G-index measures 
are associated with a reduction in the likelihood of undergoing a non private equity 
backed GP. However, it is unclear which components of the G-Index are driving this 
result.  Given these general results I now focus on a more disaggregated approach by 
employing the three individual governance indices discussed earlier, BCI, takeover 
restrictions and voting restrictions.  
**** Insert Table V  here **** 
 
B.4 Examining the Role of Governance Provisions 
In the analysis that follows, I replace the G-Index with the individual 
governance indices described in section 2. Model I of Panel A, Table VI presents 
results of a multinomial logistic regression which measures the likelihood of a firm 
undergoing a merger or a going private transaction (GP). First, there is a positive 
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 A substantial amount of subsequent research has used this index. A few more recent studies (see for 
example Cremers and Nair, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009) argue that not all 24 governance 
provisions have explanatory power and came up with alternate governance indices usually comprising 
of a fewer provisions. 
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relationship between BCI and the probability of going private. This result is 
consistent with the argument that GPs create value by changing how the firm is 
governed, and governance usually starts with boards.
16
 As mentioned earlier, high 
BCI measures are more likely to be associated with weak governance measures.  
Second, the results indicate that firms with strong anti-takeover provisions 
are less likely to go private and are more likely to undergo a merger. Extant literature 
suggests that given the absence of hostile offers in recent years, anti-takeover 
provisions are primarily used to enhance the bargaining position of firms in the event 
of a takeover offer. For instance, Comment and Schwert (1995) document that 
antitakeover provisions such as poison pills are associated with an increased bid 
premium of about 13%. Others have found that public acquirers pay higher 
premiums for acquisitions than their private counterparts (Bargeron, Schlingemann, 
Stulz and Zutter 2009).  The estimation results reported in Table VI are consistent 
with these findings.  The results show that voting restrictions on shareholders do not 
affect the odds of undergoing a merger or a GP while a higher number of state 
provisions reduces the likelihood of being acquired in the first place. Firms with 
higher institutional ownership are more likely to undertake a merger. The 
significance levels for all of the variables examined in Table IV are largely 
unchanged.   
**** Insert Table VI here **** 
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 For instance, Jensen (1989) and a host of later studies argue that active governance by buyout 
sponsors provides a corporate governance system and incentive structure that is superior to that of 
widely held public firms. 
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Next, I examine whether governance characteristics are important in 
determining the involvement of private equity firms in going private transactions 
(GPs). Model II of Panel A, Table VI reports results for GPs split into two groups 
based on whether or not private equity firms back them. A subset of deals backed by 
private equity firms drives the positive association between BCI and the likelihood 
of going private. This result makes sense because the objectives and skill set of 
private equity firms are likely to be different from those of other private acquirers. It 
is often argued that among private acquirers, private equity firms are more likely to 
buy relatively profitable firms with poor growth opportunities and weak governance 
characteristics and to then implement improvements with the intent of exiting at a 
future date. On the other hand, private operating firms are unlikely to buy firms with 
the intention of selling them off at a future date. Rather, operating synergies are more 
likely to be an important reason behind a buyout involving a private operating 
company. The importance of asset mix in non private-equity backed deals as 
documented in section IV.B.2  provides additional support for this line of thought. 
An additional explanation for this result is the evidence that target management is 
more likely to be retained after a private equity backed GP when compared to other 
types of acquisitions (see for example Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter 
2009). It is therefore possible that target management chooses a private equity 
backed deal in order to increase the odds of retaining their jobs.  
The results also indicate a strong negative association between takeover 
restrictions and the likelihood of undergoing a non private equity backed GP. This 
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finding makes intuitive sense as private acquirers other than private equity firms are 
mostly comprised of private operating companies. These companies may be 
financially constrained when compared to public acquirers and private equity firms. 
As such, they are reluctant to pursue targets with strong anti-takeover provisions 
given the improved bargaining capacity such provisions provide to target firms. 
Next, I examine whether the coefficient estimates are different among possible 
outcomes. Panel B of Table VI presents the differences in the raw coefficients and 
the associated p-values for z-test of differences. Results suggest that a higher BCI 
increases the likelihood of undergoing a private equity backed GP not only relative 
to the base-case (i.e., continuing as a surviving entity), but also relative to the 
undergoing a merger or a non private equity backed GP.  
Another way to interpret the results is to calculate predicted probabilities for 
the variables of interest. Panel A of Table VII  presents the predicted probabilities of 
possible outcomes for various values of BCI holding the values of all other 
explanatory variables at their means. The results show that the probability of 
undergoing a private equity backed GP increases as BCI increases from 0 to 3. 
Panels B through D present similar statistics for the three other governance indices - 
takeover restrictions, voting restrictions and state provisions, respectively. Overall, 
results presented in Table VII support earlier findings.  





B. 5 Governance Provisions and Shareholder Wealth Effects 
I now examine shareholder the shareholder wealth effects associated with the 
GPs in the sample and the association between value change and target corporate 
governance.
17
 Panel A of Table VII presents summary statistics of event period 
abnormal returns. Consistent with the findings of previous research, average 
abnormal returns are much lower for going private transactions than for acquisitions 
by public firms. The difference in means is 3.62%. Another way to look at the 
difference is that the mean abnormal return of target shareholders is nearly 17% 
higher if the acquisition is by a public firm rather than by a private firm.
18
 There is 
no systematic difference in abnormal returns between buyouts sponsored by private 
equity firms and other private acquirers.  
**** Insert Table VIII here **** 
Next, I examine the impact of governance characteristics on shareholder 
wealth in a multivariate setting. Results presented so far suggest that the choice of 
acquirer is endogenously determined. Therefore, coefficient estimates obtained from 
an ordinary least squares regression of cumulative abnormal returns on various 
governance provisions will be biased and inconsistent. To correct for this problem, I 
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 To calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), I follow Schwert (1996) by estimating market 
model parameters, using CRSP value-weighted index as the market proxy, for each target firm using 
daily returns from day -379 to day -127 relative to the deal announcement date. I calculate CARs for 
the following windows: (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) where day 0 is the announcement date. 
18
 A legitimate concern is that two-day abnormal returns may understate the abnormal returns 
associated with private firm acquisitions compared to public firm acquisitions. Since targets of private 
firm acquisitions are smaller than those acquired by public firms, it is likely that they are treaded 
infrequently or they trade in less efficient markets. However, longer window abnormal returns (CAR(-
5,5)) also show a similar trend.  
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use the Heckman two-step estimation procedure (Greene, 2002).  The selection 
equation captures the probability of a firm going private. Results of various 
specifications are presented in Panel B of Table VIII. The results indicate that 
governance provisions do not have a direct impact on shareholder wealth. In 
addition, the coefficient estimate on the private equity term is insignificant 
suggesting that the presence of private equity firms in GPs does not have an adverse 
impact on shareholder wealth.   
Overall, these results suggest that while governance provisions do not have a 
direct impact on abnormal shareholder returns, they affect shareholder wealth in an 
indirect way. That is, these provisions affect shareholder wealth not only during the 
life of a publicly listed company, but also during its death by playing an important 
role in determining the type of acquirer. 
 
V. Robustness checks 
A. Do firms change their governance characteristics? 
It is possible that firms change their governance characteristics prior to 
engaging in a change of control transaction in order to increase the odds of 
transitioning to their desired status. However, the empirical evidence suggests that 
firms rarely change their governance characteristics and in fact, this is a common 
assumption in the empirical literature (see for example Gompers, Ishi and Metric 
2003).  I examine the annual changes in each firm‟s governance characteristics for 
the sample examined.  
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Table IX  presents average annual changes in governance characteristics. The 
results indicate that on average there are no significant differences in governance 
changes between firms that go private and firms in the control groups (i.e., survivors 
and firms acquired by other public companies). Median annual change in governance 
provisions is zero across all groups of firms. Overall, the results suggest that it is 
unlikely that firms willfully change their governance characteristics in order to 
influence the odds of achieving their preferred status.  
**** Insert Table IX  here ****  
 
B. Managerial incentives 
  There are two avenues through which target management involvement might 
influence the findings of this paper. First, target management might want to take the 
firm private in a management buyout (MBO) but are short on resources to sponsor 
the deal entirely by themselves. In such cases, they are more likely to partner with 
private equity firms who have fewer financial constraints compared to other private 
acquirers. To the extent that firms that undergo MBOs have a high BCI prior to the 
transaction, this creates a selection bias. Second, even if target managers have no 
intention of being a part of the bidding group, they have an incentive to choose a 
private equity firm over other types of acquirers. This is because private equity firms 
are more likely to retain target management compared to other private acquirers. To 
the extent managerial incentives are proportional to their ownership stake, I control 
for this effect in all regression specifications. Nevertheless, to remove any 
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confounding effects of management involvement, I exclude deals where target 
managers are a part of the bidding group (either by themselves or in association with 
private equity firms) and re-examine the effects of governance characteristics on the 
likelihood of undergoing a merger or going private with or without private equity 




This paper provides a comprehensive investigation of the relationship 
between ex-ante corporate governance characteristics and the odds of a firm going 
private. Using a custom dataset provided by the Riskmetrics group which contains 
governance information on more than 8,000 small and large listed companies in the 
U.S., I find that several governance characteristics play an important role in 
determining the likelihood of a firm undergoing a merger or going private. More 
specifically, I document a positive relationship between greater board control and the 
probability of going private. In addition, I find that firms with strong anti-takeover 
provisions are less likely to go private and are more likely to undergo a merger. 
Among other findings, I note that voting restrictions on shareholders do not affect 
firms‟ survival status while strong state provisions reduce the likelihood of being 
acquired by any type of acquirer. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more 
likely to undergo a merger.  
I examine whether governance characteristics are important in determining 
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the involvement of private equity firms in going private transactions (GPs). I find 
that the positive association between greater board control and the likelihood of 
undergoing a GP is entirely driven by a subset of deals backed by private equity 
firms. This result provides support to the view that the objectives and skill set of 
private equity firms are different from those of other private acquirers. In addition, I 
find that a subset of deals not backed by private equity firms‟ drive the strong 
negative association between takeover restrictions and the likelihood of undergoing a 
GP. This finding makes intuitive sense as private acquirers other than private equity 
firms mostly comprise of private operating companies. These companies are more 
likely to be financially constrained when compared to other types of acquirers. As 
such, they are reluctant to pursue targets with strong anti-takeover provisions given 
the improved bargaining capacity such provisions provide to target firms.  
Lastly, I examine the wealth implications to shareholders. Consistent with the 
findings of previous research, I note that average abnormal returns are much lower 
for GPs than for acquisitions by public firms. Target shareholders receive 
approximately 17%  more premium if the acquisition is by a public firm rather than 
by a private firm. There is no systematic difference in abnormal returns between 
buyouts sponsored by private equity firms and other private acquirers. Results 
suggest that while governance provisions do not have a direct impact on event period 
returns, they affect shareholder wealth in an indirect way. That is, these provisions 
affect shareholder wealth not only during the life of a publicly listed company, but 




EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT 




I.  Introduction 
This study presents empirical tests of the central hypotheses regarding the 
relation between agency costs and the structure of ownership and control in an 
organization.  We make use of an extensive data set on ownership and control which 
includes details on over 250,000 private as well as publicly traded companies. Our 
sample has the additional feature that the private companies and the publicly traded 
companies in the sample are required by law to file information compiled using the 
same guidelines.   
The „agency problem‟ is now an ingrained part of the vocabulary used when 
discussing the ownership, management and operation of an organization and the 
expropriation of resources by those who control a corporation  (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, 2003; 
Becht, Bolton and Roell, 2003; Dennis and McConnell, 2003; Hermalin, 2005; 
Gillan, 2006; Tirole, 2006; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2008).
20
 Yet little direct evidence exists on the magnitude and extent of the actual 
costs associated with the problem assessed across the entire spectrum of ownership 
and control. The literature generally argues that firms face two types of agency 
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 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Scott C. Linn and Pradeep K. Yadav. 
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 Of course this stream of thought stems ultimately from the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) 




problems: vertical agency problems that exist between owners and managers (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), and horizontal agency problems that exist between majority 
and minority owners (Shliefer and Vishny, 1997, Gilson and Gordon, 2003).
21
   
Our study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, we focus on the 
entire ownership and management spectrum, from single owner, single manager 
firms through diffusely held publicly traded corporations.
22
 While providing 
important insights, most studies focusing on the valuation effects of agency problems 
concentrate on publicly-traded companies and so are not able to address how agency 
costs associated with the vertical agency problem behave over the complete 
ownership spectrum. We present such evidence.  
We find that private firms in which the owner is also the sole manager exhibit 
evidence of lower agency-related costs when compared to public firms as well as 
compared to private firms with other ownership and management structures, 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976). These 
results are robust to various control variables as well as statistical methods.   
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 The vertical agency problem emerges from the view of the firm as a nexus of contracts, where 
contracts are costly to enforce (Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Ross, 1973; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b). The literature on vertical agency problems deals with the 
causes and consequences of separation of ownership and control. In contrast, the literature on 
horizontal agency problems has focused on the exploitation of minority shareholders by a controlling 
shareholder (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Stulz, 1988; Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997, 1998; Gilson 




 The literature is extensive. See the survey articles of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Dennis and 
McConnell, (2003), Gillan (2006) as well as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Coles, et. al 
(2008).  In related work Yermack (2006) , Andrews, Linn and Yi (2010) and Grinstein, Weinbaum 
and Yehuda (2010) conclude perquisite consumption is at least in part due to vertical agency 
problems.     
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We also find that among private firms, agency costs increase as firms move 
from simple ownership structures such as being owned by a single individual or a 
family to more complicated ownership structures such as being owned by multiple 
families or holding companies. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that as 
the number and types of shareholders increase the incentive for any individual 
shareholder to incur the costs of monitoring managers  decreases because the 
benefits associated with monitoring are proportional to the shareholder‟s ownership 
stake (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Holderness, 2009).  This in turn results in less 
monitoring than would arise in the case of a single owner.  
The second contribution of this paper is an investigation of the costs 
associated with the horizontal agency problem. While both vertical and horizontal 
agency problems exist in private firms, legal scholars and practitioners argue that the 
horizontal agency problem, which manifests itself in the exploitation of minority 
shareholders by a controlling shareholder, is a major concern in close corporations 
(Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997, 1998; Roe, 2005; 
Laeven and Levine, 2008). Exploitation of minority shareholders can take several 
forms including higher compensation to majority shareholders, appropriation of 
corporate assets, and dilution of minority shareholders‟ interests through issuance of 
stock or dividends. In order to attract minority investors, the majority shareholder 
has an incentive to credibly convey that minority shareholders will not be exploited. 
Theory suggests that the controlling shareholder should transfer some control to 
minority shareholders as a means of providing a credible promise that minority 
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owners will not be exploited (Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000; Gomes and Novaes, 2005; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002).  
We find that firms with shared control (i.e., those where the largest 
shareholder owns less than 50% of the equity) have lower agency costs than firms in 
which the largest shareholder has enough power to extract private benefits from 
minority shareholders (i.e., where the largest shareholder owns between 50% and 
75% of the equity). Furthermore, we find that the presence of multiple large 
shareholders also results in lower agency costs.  We document an inverse relation 
between the ownership stake of the second largest shareholder and agency costs, 
providing support for the view that minority expropriation is lower in companies 
where control is more contestable.
23
 
The absence of audited and verified information on close corporations is the 
primary reason for the lack of empirical evidence on agency costs measured across 
the entire ownership spectrum. A firm owned and managed by a single individual 
has zero agency costs.  The zero agency cost firm serves as the baseline case when 
measuring the agency costs incurred by firms with different organizational and 
ownership structures. However, no publicly traded firm can be classified as a zero 
agency cost firm because, by definition, such firms are characterized by a separation 
of ownership and control. While it is relatively easy to obtain audited and verified 
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 These results are consistent with the findings of Lehmann and Weigand (2000).  Those authors 
show that the existence of a second large owner is positively associated with profitability of German 
firms. In the context of publicly traded companies, Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) find that the 
existence of multiple large shareholders increases dividend payouts in Europe, but lowers them in 
Asia. Maury and Pajuste (2005) show that among Finnish firms, the holdings of large shareholders 
have a positive effect on corporate valuations. In a related study, Berkman, Cole and Fu (2010) 




financial information about public companies, such information is typically 
unavailable for private companies which could be classified as zero agency cost 
firms, in particular private U.S. companies. 
We examine a unique data set composed of U.K. private and public 
companies. Three principal features of the financial reporting regulations for U.K. 
companies are substantially equivalent for private and public firms. First, the U.K. 
Companies Act requires all private and public companies to file annual financial 
statements that comply with the same accounting standards. Second, financial 
statements filed by both U.K. private as well as public companies must be audited.
24
 
Third, private and public companies are subject to the same tax laws. These 
standards therefore provide us with a set of comparably measured data for both 
public and private companies. Our dataset includes firms with a wide array of 
ownership structures ranging from firms with a single owner-manager to firms with 
multiple owners and outside managers.  
  Our paper is close in spirit to the work of Ang, Cole and Lin (2000). Ang, 
Cole and Lin examine self-reported data on small businesses collected via telephone 
survey methods as part of the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF). 
Using a sample of 1,708 domestic U.S. companies for 1992, Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) find that their proxy for agency costs is significantly higher when an outsider 
manages the firm and is inversely related to the manager‟s ownership share. Using 
data from the same survey, Nagar, Petroni and Wolfenzon (2010) find that firms with 
shared ownership are associated with a larger return on assets. Our study differs from 
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 There is an exemption for very small companies which we return to in section IV.  
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these two papers in several important ways. First, the data we employ are based upon 
the constituent firms following a common set of audited reporting guidelines. The 
companies represented in our sample are all domiciled in the U.K. and must comply 
with government mandated reporting requirements. Second, our sample includes 
over 250,000 private as well as public companies and the data examined cover the 
multiyear period 2006-2009. The cross-section of companies we examine is diverse 
across both industries as well as company size. Third, the NSSBF data used by the 
abovementioned papers contains limited measures of ownership. In contrast, our 
dataset contains detailed information on ownership and because we have multiyear 
observations we are able to utilize lagged data on ownership and management as a 
precaution against joint determination of these variables and agency costs.
25
  We 
construct and use  an agency cost index (ACI) based on data reported following 
formal reporting requirements.  In defense of the index we show that for the publicly 
traded companies in our sample the index is related to two commonly referenced 
indices designed to characterize weak versus strong corporate governance in publicly 
traded companies (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009) and which have been 
shown to be correlated with various measures of value. 
 Section II presents a discussion of the nature of vertical agency costs and 
outlines testable hypotheses. Section III presents a companion discussion on the 
nature of horizontal agency costs. Section IV provides a description of the sample. 
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 The NSSBF data provides four measures of ownerships structure: a) the ownership share of the 
primary owner; b) an indicator for firms where a single family controls more than 50 percent of the 
firm‟s shares; c) the number of non-manager shareholders and d) an indicator for firms managed by a 
shareholder rather than an outsider. 
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Section V contains a description of how we measure agency costs. Section VI 
describes the statistical methods and control variables used in the study. Sections VII 
and VIII discuss empirical results related to vertical agency costs and horizontal 
agency costs respectively.  Section IX presents a discussion of various robustness 
checks. Section X presents a summary of the paper and our conclusions. 
 
II. Vertical Agency Costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when an owner-manager reduces his 
equity stake below 100%, incentives increase for the manager to consume or waste 
corporate resources for personal benefit because she does not bear the full cost of 
such excesses. Thus, if agency costs are material, these costs should vary inversely 
with the manager‟s fractional ownership.  Agency costs are therefore predicted to be 
higher among firms that are not managed by owners compared to those managed by 
owners. 
The simplest ownership structure is one where a single individual owns and 
manages the firm. Such firms represent the zero-agency cost base case. If the owner 
hires an outsider as the manager, it may lead to costs in the form of lost revenues or 
reduced profits resulting from misalignment of interests and monitoring problems. It 
follows that agency costs are predicted to be larger when the manager is not the 
owner of the enterprise.  Likewise the problem is expected to worsen when there are 
multiple owners and the manager holds little or no equity ownership. When the sole 
owner bears 100 percent of any agency costs, she also receives 100 percent of the 
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resulting benefits from monitoring and disciplining management. This has force 
because she holds the right to hire or fire managers. As we move from a single 
owner-manager setting to structures where firms are owned by multiple shareholders 
we expect the magnitude of vertical agency costs to increase. As the number of 
shareholders increases the incentive for any shareholder to incur all of the cost of 
monitoring the managers decreases because the benefits associated with monitoring 
are limited by the shareholder‟s proportional ownership stake, which is less than 
100%. The reduced incentive to monitor in turn may lead to higher agency costs.  A 
potential remedy to this problem is to have simpler and more concentrated ownership 
structures. Shareholders with a larger stake will have a greater incentive to monitor 
managers and see that agency costs are kept low.  Agency costs are therefore 
predicted to increase as firms move from the single-owner structure to more complex 
ownership structures.  Likewise, the magnitude of vertical agency costs are predicted 




III. Horizontal Agency Costs 
 A fundamental feature of close corporation ownership structures is that 
shareholders are typically few in number, are knowledgeable about firm operations, 
and are involved in management. In particular, when a controlling shareholder is 
present, that person generally takes an active interest in running the company by 
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 Empirical evidence on the monitoring role of large shareholders while extensive is limited to 
publicly traded companies.  Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Wruck (1989), Franks, Mayer and 
Renneboog (2001) and references cited in footnote 2. Research on the impact of the number and type 
of shareholders in mitigating agency costs in closed corporations is so far limited to theoretical 
models (for example Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedson and Wolfenzon (2000). 
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choosing the management and directly holding an executive position. While 
concentrated ownership helps mitigate the vertical agency problem, it is possible that 
a controlling shareholder will extract private benefits of control by forcing decisions 
which expropriate minority shareholder wealth (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004; Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Roe, 2005).  
Pagano and Roell (1998) suggest that by monitoring the controlling 
shareholder other large shareholders play an important role in reducing horizontal 
agency costs. Gomes and Novaes (2005) speculate that the presence of a large 
number of blockholders improves firm governance in closed corporations because 
disagreement among shareholders prevents them from expropriating minority 
shareholders. In a model developed by Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) no 
individual shareholder has sufficient votes to control the firm and consequently must 
form a coalition of shareholders to achieve control. Coalition formation minimizes 
the chance of expropriation since no individual shareholder is able to take any 
actions without the consent of the other coalition members. A result is that fewer 
choices expropriating minority shareholders are implemented and firm performance 
is better relative to the single controlling shareholder case. The main shareholder 
surrenders some control to minority shareholders in order to improve overall firm 
performance.  The prediction is that shared control of firms helps decrease the 
magnitude of horizontal agency costs. 
27
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 Empirical evidence on the role of large shareholders is limited and the few studies that examine this 
issue focus on listed firms. Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) examine the effect of multiple large 
shareholders on dividends. They find that the presence of large shareholders dampens expropriation in 
Europe (due to monitoring), but exacerbates it in Asia (due to collusion). Lehmann and Weigand 
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  Pagano and Roell (1998) specify conditions under which multiple large 
shareholders will cross-monitor each other, reducing expropriation and improving 
firm performance. In their model expropriation of minority shareholders by a 
controlling shareholder is likely to be less severe when the ownership stake of non-
controlling shareholders is more concentrated. The intuition behind the conclusion is 
that large non-controlling shareholders are more effective in monitoring the 
controlling shareholder. In a related analysis, Bloch and Hege (2001) conclude that 
minority expropriation will be lower in firms where control is more contestable, that 
is in firms where the difference in the stakes of the controlling shareholders and that 
of minority shareholders is smaller. An empirical implication of these theories is that 




IV. Data and Empirical Methods 
We obtain company data from the FAME database produced by Bureau Van 
Dijk. Each yearly installment contains the latest available ownership and 
management structure data and 10 years of financial statement data for all public and 
private companies registered in the U.K. and Ireland. The data we examine are from 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(2000) show that the existence of a second large owner is positively associated with the profitability 
of listed German firms. Maury and Pajuste (2005) investigate a sample of listed Finnish firms and 
conclude that a more equal distribution of votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on 
firm value. Gutierrez and Tribo (2008) examine Spanish firms and find that firms whose 
characteristics make them more vulnerable to minority expropriation tend to have controlling groups 
with ownership stakes that are far removed from a 50% threshold.  
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 Lehman and Weigand (2000), in a study of publicly traded German companies, report that the 
presence of a second large shareholder enhances profitability. In a related paper, Volpin (2002) 





   
We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership 
and management data in our analysis.    
 The U.K. Companies Act of 1967 (and subsequent revisions to the act) 
requires all private and public companies to file annual financial statements that 
comply with the same accounting standards. All accounts submitted to the 
Companies House must be audited and certified by an independent accountant. Some 
small and medium sized companies can claim exemptions from either or both of 
these requirements and are also allowed to file abridged financial statements.
29
 We 
restrict our analysis to firms that are classified as private limited, public quoted, 
public quoted AIM, public quoted OFEX, and public not quoted.
30
  
For each of the years 2006 to 2009, we identify all firms with total assets of 
at least £5,000 and revenues of at least £1,000 during each year. These criteria enable 
us to identify a broad cross-section of ownership and management structures and 
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 The definition of a “small” or “medium” company has changed over time. For accounting periods 
ending after 30 January 2004, a company is considered small (medium) if one of the following 
requirements are met: i.) annual revenues are less than 5.6 (22.8) million, ii) balance sheet total is 2.8 
(11.4) million or less and iii.) number of employees is less than 50 (250). Small companies are exempt 
from both auditing and accountant‟s report requirement whereas medium companies are exempt from 
auditing requirements but should contain an accountants report. For more details please refer to 
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/gbhtml/gba3.shtml#three. Since it is possible that different 
types of exemptions might affect accounting quality, we control for accounting types in our 
multivariate analysis. In addition, we repeat our analysis using a sub-sample of firms that are not 
exempt from auditing requirements. Results are qualitatively similar and are available on request.  
 
30
 Firms belonging to the public quoted category are those that are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). Firms belonging to the public quoted AIM group are those that are listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM). OFEX is an independent public market specializing in smaller 
companies who do not wish to incur the expense of listing with AIM. Finally, public not quoted firms 
are those which have public debt outstanding but not equity. Firms with different ownership structures 
might differ in their accounting practices such as recognition and timing of revenues and costs 
because of tax considerations. All U.K. firms, both public and private, are subject to the same tax laws 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; and Bell and Jenkinson, 2002) so tax code driven ownership structures 




industry affiliations.  Likewise, the criteria mitigate concerns of possible sample 
selection bias from imposing the size threshold implied by the auditing requirements 
of the Companies House. Such a restriction might result in a sample that includes 
only large, successful, single owner-managed firms. The tradeoff is that our sample 
contains some very small firms.   We show that our findings are not influenced by 
these size criteria.   
Appendix B presents a detailed description of the sample construction. The 
final sample consists of 612,449 firm-year observations. More specifically, the 
sample consists of 161,177, 161,571, 154,739 and 134,962 firms for the years 2006, 
2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. This dataset is an unbalanced panel with 259,893 
unique firms.
31
 There are 89,729 firms with one observation, 56,607 firms with two 
observations, 44,722 firms with three observations and 68,835 firms with four 
observations. Table X presents the distribution of ownership structures for the 
sample. Column 1 of Table X lists the seven different ownership structures into 
which firms are categorized; (1) private firms that are owned by a single individual, 
(2) private firms that are owned only by a single family, (3) private firms that are 
owned by multiple families only, (4) private firms that are owned jointly by a 
combination of families and private companies including investment funds, (5) 
private firms that are owned exclusively by private holding companies, (6) firms that 
are registered as public companies but not listed on a stock exchange, and (7) public 
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 Among these, 90,855 firms are subject to mandatory auditing requirements of the Companies 
House. These firms represent 192,839 firm-year observations. 
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firms that have equity securities  listed on a stock exchange.
32
 The even-numbered 
columns of Table X present the number of firms that are owner-managed. Our 
classification scheme enables us to examine how the magnitude of agency costs 
changes as we move from one end of the ownership spectrum to the other. Of 
particular interest are the firms that are owned and managed by a single individual. 
There are approximately 30,000 such firms covering a wide-array of industries in 
each of the sample years. We define this group as the zero-agency cost group.   
**** Insert Table X here **** 
The classifications shown in Table X denoted “One Family” and “Multiple 
Families” contain firms that are owned by a single family and multiple families 
respectively. We expect little difference between firms that are owned by a single 
individual and those owned by a single family but separate the two groups for 
completeness.  
 The classifications denoted “Families & Companies” and “Holding 
Companies” contain firms that are partly and wholly owned by private industrial 
entities such as holding companies. These cases do not include situations in which 
the holding company is owned by the single individual or family. Such cases really 
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 Firms can be registered either as private companies or public companies. The most important 
distinction between these companies relates to their ability to raise funds in capital markets. Public 
companies have unrestricted right to offer shares but some public firms choose not to do so. These 
companies are classified as Public, Not Quoted. Such firms, though technically private firms, are 
larger, more transparent and have to adhere to additional legal regulations compared to firms 
registered as private companies. There are no private companies owned outright by public companies 
or public holding companies.  
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just amount to the firm having one-owner or being owned by one-family, and were 
so classified. 
**** Insert Table XI here **** 
 Table XI presents information on the industries to which the sample firms 
belong. There are significant variations in how private and public firms are 
distributed among industry sectors. While only 6% of one owner firms belong to the 
manufacturing sector, nearly 32% of public quoted firms belong to this sector. On 
the other hand, we observe that the proportion of firms belonging to the construction 
and real estate sectors decrease monotonically as we move from one owner firms to 
public firms. Note also that a larger proportion of private firms belong to the retail 
trade sector and the „other services‟ sector compared to public firms. In sum, these 
differences highlight the importance of controlling for industry effects in the 
analyses to follow.  
**** Insert Table XII here **** 
Table XII presents company-level summary statistics for firms belonging to 
the ownership structure groups. Private firms are typically smaller than public firms.  
One owner firms have average   assets of £0.29 million. Median assets increase 
monotonically as the number of owners increases. Private firms on average are more 
levered consistent with the findings reported by Brav (2009) for private and public 
firms in the U.K. While private firms are smaller and more levered than public firms, 
they are associated with higher turnover and profitability ratios as measured by asset 
turnover (AT) and earnings before interest taxes and depreciation scaled by assets 
48 
 
(EBITD) respectively. Profitability decreases as ownership becomes more diffuse 
(moving left to right across the table).   CRIF Decision Solutions Ltd. constructs a 
measure of the probability of company failure labeled Quiscore computed using a 
proprietary model and variables similar to those employed in the computation of the 
Altman Z-score.
33
  A Quiscore can take any value within the range 0 to 100 where 
the following interpretations apply:  0-20 (high risk band), 21-40 (caution band), 41-
60 (normal band), 61-80 (stable band) and 81-100 (secure band). The distribution of 
Quiscores across ownership classifications indicates the index values for the sample 
firms tend to fall in the normal or better regions.  Firms owned by a single individual 
or a single family are on average younger.  Finally, to mitigate the effect of outliers, 
we winsorize the top 1 percent and bottom 1 percent of all financial variables.  
 
V. Measures of Agency Costs 
A.  A Multivariate Measure of Agency Costs 
Tirole (2006) suggests that two important manifestations of agency problems 
are 1) inefficient investment choices, and, 2) inefficient or insufficient effort being 
expended by managers. The magnitude of any agency costs should therefore depend 
on factors such as inefficient asset utilization (in the form of poor investments), 
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 Quiscore is produced by CRIF Decision Solutions Ltd. Quiscore is a measure of the likelihood of 
company failure in the year following the date of calculation. In determining a Quiscore value for a 
company, a number of separate calculations are performed using various combinations of financial 
characteristics including turnover (revenue), pre-tax profit, working capital, intangibles, cash and 
bank deposits, creditors, bank loans and overdrafts, current assets, current liabilities, net assets, fixed 
assets, share capital, reserves, shareholders funds.  The Altman Z-score requires the ratio of the 





excessive and unwanted production costs and perks (resulting in higher expenses), 
and insufficient effort exerted by management (resulting in lower revenues and 
earnings).   As already noted, we take the position that the single-owner single-
manager firm has zero agency costs.  We therefore estimate a proxy for agency costs 
by computing the difference between a specific characteristic for a firm that is 
predicted to be influenced by the presence of an agency problem    and the average of 
the same characteristic for the zero agency cost firms in the sample.  
We measure he efficiency of asset utilization using the asset turnover ratio 
(sales to assets, AT) which reflects how management uses the assets under control 
for revenue generation (Ang, Cole and Lin 2000; Singh and Davidson III 2003).  We 
measure production cost efficiency using operating expenses divided by sales 
(OPEXP) (Ang, Cole and Lin 2000; Nagar, Petroni and Wolfenzon 2010).
34
  The 




We compute a proxy for the agency costs of a firm by subtracting an 
efficiency variable‟s value for the firm from the average value of the efficiency 
variable for the zero agency cost firms operating in the same industry. We scale this 
difference by the average value of the variable for the zero agency cost firms. For a 
firm j belonging to industry group i, the agency cost proxy is calculated as follows.  
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 Singh and Davidson (2003) examine SG&A expenses. 
35
 Studies examining publicly traded companies use market-based measures such as a pseudo- 
Tobins‟Q measure or Return on Equity to infer agency costs. We chose to use accounting 
performance measures as a majority of our sample includes privately held firms for which market 
performance measures are unavailable.  
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         (1) 
We recognize that each of the three agency cost proxies has some unique 
limitation. Therefore, we also calculate an index of agency costs based upon a 
multivariate factor analysis of the three proxy variables. We find a single dominant 
factor explains most of the non-unique variance for each agency cost proxy 
variable.
36
  We then compute the factor score for this dominant factor for each firm 
in the sample for each year.  These measures serve as our index of agency costs 
(hereafter labeled ACI).
37
 More positive values of ACI represent larger agency costs.   
In order to establish the credibility of the ACI index we next examine the 
relation between the index and measures of corporate governance that have been 
found to differentiate publicly traded companies.  Because the corporate governance 
data is available only for publicly traded companies we must restrict ourselves to that 
subset of the sample.  Extant theory tells us that firms with weaker corporate 
governance should be associated with higher agency costs, ceteris paribus.  
Gompers, Ishi and Metric (2003, GIM) find that a broad corporate governance index, 
for which a higher value of the index indicates weaker governance (shareholder 
rights), is negatively correlated with firm value as well as stockholder returns for 
public companies.  Cremers and Nair (2005) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) 
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 See Seber (1984, Ch. 5) for a discussion of methods for identifying the number of common factors 
present in a covariance matrix.   
37
 Factor scores are the estimated values of the unobservable common factor. For details on the 




argue that not all the provisions reflected in the GIM Index have explanatory power 
and suggest an alternative governance index made up of a subset of the factors used 
in the construction of the GIM index.  Bebchuk et al. label the revised index the 
entrenchment (E) index. The findings of these studies suggest that weak governance, 
as reflected by weak shareholder rights, is associated with lower firm value or 
performance, implicitly because it reflects a situation in which greater agency costs 
are present. 
We examine the relationship between the ACI index and the GIM and E 
indices for the publicly traded firms in our sample. We use the RiskMetrics 
governance data for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange to construct the GIM 
Index and the E Index for the U.K. publicly listed companies in our sample.
38
 Our 
indices are not perfect matches for those computed for U.S. companies because some 
of the measures used to construct the U.S. indices are not available for U.K. 
companies, but they are nevertheless close substitutes.  The results are presented in 
Table XIII.  In all specifications, some of which include control variables, coefficient 
estimates on the governance indices are positive and statistically significant 
indicating that the agency cost index ACI is increasing in the two computed 
governance indices.  Recalling that greater values of the governance indices 
represent weaker governance and that larger values of the ACI index indicate greater 
agency costs, we conclude that the ACI index is capturing agency costs for the 
publicly traded firms in our sample.  While a corresponding analysis for private 
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companies is not possible we feel comfortable concluding the ACI index is a 
legitimate proxy for agency costs. 
**** Insert Table XIII here *** 
VI.  Statistical Methods and Controls 
A.  Statistical Methods 
Our data constitute an unbalanced panel spanning 2006-2009.  The agency 
cost index ACI is our dependent variable for the results presented in Panels A and B 
of Tables XIV through XIX. Panel C of Tables XIV through XIX presents results 
using alternate proxies for agency costs as the dependent variable .  We control for 
company-level characteristics, industry affiliation and time, all of which are 
discussed more fully in the next section.  All of the models are estimated using 
ordinary least squares.  We present standard errors for tests of the hypothesis that 
estimated coefficients equal zero that account for heteroscedasticity and, following 
the recommendations in Petersen (2009), also compute coefficient standard errors 
based upon a clustering method to account for residual dependencies.  Robustness 
checks including tests based upon matched samples constructing using non-
parametric matching methods are discussed in Section VIII. 
B.  Company Ownership  
An important issue in studies focusing on ownership structure is whether 
company ownership structure and firm performance are endogenous relative to one 
another. Put simply, while ownership structure may affect performance, it is possible 
that performance may also be one of the determinants of ownership structure. We 
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address this issue by first examining whether ownership for our sample is sticky, that 
is, we examine whether ownership tends to vary over time for our sample 
companies.
39
  Constant ownership levels would  be a sufficient condition to motivate 
its use as an independent variable in a performance-type regression (Smith and Watts 
(1992)). We first examine the private companies in our sample for changes in 
ownership structures and find that only 4.7% of the private firms in the sample (i.e., 
12,036 out of 255,541) were associated with an ownership change between 2006 and 
2009.
40
  Even though we find that ownership does not tend to vary over time, we use 
lagged ownership and management classification data in our analysis to minimize 
any possibility of contemporaneous jointly determined effects.   
C.  Controls  
We control for company-level characteristics, industry membership and time.   
Appendix B describes how the control variables are measured.   
The company-level controls include a measure of firm size, firm age, bank 
borrowing, general leverage, default risk and an indicator of accounting disclosure.  
Company size may be associated with the extent or lack of an agency problem. 
Williamson (1967, 1985) for instance suggests economies of scale and other related 
factors influence the size of the firm but that decreasing returns to managerial 
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 While it might be possible for an owner to increase her equity investment, she will be constrained 
by her own personal resources (Berger and Udell, 2002; Cole, Wolken and Woodburn, 1996). In most 
private company settings, especially those cases involving a single owner, most of the owner‟s wealth 
is likely to already be tied up in the company she owns. As a result of this resource constraint and the 
fact that such ownership interests are not easily transferable investors in close corporations cannot 
easily adjust their ownership positions as conditions change.  
 
40
 We also note that the proportion of firms that moved from simple to complex ownership structures 
(i.e., from one owner to multiple families) is approximately equal to the proportion of firms that move 
from complex to simple structures (i.e., public quoted to wholly owned subsidiary). 
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efficiency, span of control issues, may emerge in larger firms. Conversely, large 
firms may be those which have survived and grown due to operating efficiently.  We 
control for the size of the firm using the log of annual sales and its square to account 
for any non-linear size-related effects. Older firms may be more efficient than 
younger firms and the fact that they have survived may suggest the agency costs for 
such firms are smaller.  On the other hand older firms may reflect situations where 
investment opportunities have been largely exhausted and excess cash flow permits 
greater abuse of resources. We therefore also control for firm age. We calculate firm 
age as the number of years between the incorporation date and financial statement 
date.    
In the absence of access to public equity markets, private firms rely on debt 
provided by owners and external institutions such as banks as their primary source of 
financing.
41
 The role of monitoring has long been recognized as an important 
ingredient of bank lending (Diamond, 1991; Tirole, 2006). We assume that a bank‟s 
monitoring incentives are directly proportional to the level of loans they make to a 
firm. We include bank debt scaled by total assets as an independent variable. We 
also include total liabilities scaled by total assets as a control. We also control for the 
likelihood of company failure in the subsequent year by including dummy variables 
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 Berger and Udell (2002) and Cole, Wolken and Woodburn (1996) find that financial institutions 
provide roughly 27% of the dollar amount of small business credit in the US with 16% additionally 




for four of the five bands (high risk, normal, stable and secure) into which the 
Quiscore of a company falls with the „caution‟ band being the excluded group.
42
   
Small and medium firms are eligible to submit abridged financial statements 
under UK law.  We assign the firms in our sample to one of seven groups based on 
the type of financial statements they file: a) small company statements b) medium 
company statements, c) total exemption small, d) total exemption full, e) partial 
exemption f) full accounts and g) group accounts. We include dummy variables to 
control for the effects of the different levels of reporting requirements with small 
company statements being the excluded group. Finally we include the number of 
subsidiaries and number of holding companies associated with a firm as control 
variables.
43
  We group the measures described in the preceding paragraphs together 
under the umbrella Company Specific Controls. 
We include dummy variables to control for industry affiliation.  The industry 
dummies are based upon the industry sectors presented in Table II with the 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded industry and are 
grouped under the umbrella Industry Affiliations.
44
  Lastly, we control for time using 
dummies for each year, with the first year indicator (2006) being the excluded 
dummy variable. 
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 Please refer to the discussion in Section IV and Appendix B. 
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 We redo our analysis by excluding all subsidiaries. Results do not vary significantly and are 
available on request.   
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 Separately we also follow the methodology of Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) and include a set of 
dummy variables, one for each two-digit SIC classification that accounts for more than one percent of 





VII. Results – Vertical Agency Costs 
A.  Owner-Managed and Non-owner-managed Firms 
First, recall that more positive values of ACI represent greater agency costs.  
The results presented in Table XIV emphasize the difference in agency costs 
between owner-managed and non owner-managed firms. We define a dummy 
variable NOM which equals 1 for a non-owner-managed firm and 0 otherwise. Panel 
A presents three models which each include the dummy variable NOM along with 
various sets of control variables.  Models (1) and (2) of Panel A account for 
heteroscedasticy in the computation of coefficient standard errors using the methods 
proposed by White (1980).  All models which indicate „Firm Level Clustering‟ use 
standard errors computing using the methods proposed by Petersen (2009) to account 
for residual dependencies.   
**** Insert Table XIV here **** 
The coefficient estimate on NOM measures the incremental agency cost 
associated with non-owner-managed firms relative to owner-managed firms.  The 
coefficient estimate on NOM is positive and significant in all model specifications 
indicating that on average, non-owner-managed firms are associated with greater 
agency costs relative to owner-managed firms, accounting for the controls.  The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that agency costs increase as firms move 
from the single-owner structure to more complex ownership structures. These 
results, along with those presented by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), indicate that the 
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hypothesis is supported for firms domiciled in both the U.K. and the U.S.    The 
results are robust to the controls we include as well as the methods we employ in the 
computation of coefficient standard errors. 
We provide two additional sets of tests to further examine the robustness of 
our conclusions.  Panel B presents estimated coefficients for two sub-samples. As 
discussed in Section IV some companies are exempt from auditing requirements or 
accountant certification or both when they file financial statements with the 
Companies House. To address potential concerns about how these exemptions might 
influence the quality of the financial data reported we identify sample firms that are 
not exempt from the aforementioned requirements. These companies constitute the 
first sub-sample examined.  The second sub-sample includes firms that have the 
highest probability of financial distress as indicated by a Quiscore less than 20. 
These firms are selected as an extreme case as they may behave differently because 
of their financial status. The estimation results based upon the sample defined by the 
accounting quality restriction are presented as model specification (1) of Panel B.  
The estimation results based upon the sample defined by a higher probability of 
distress are presented as model specification (2) of Panel B.  The dependent variable 
in these specifications is the agency cost index (ACI).  The results presented in Panel 
B are similar to those presented in Panel A.  The coefficient estimate on NOM is 
positive and significant for both models (1) and (2) of Panel B, indicating that on 
average, non-owner managed firms are associated with greater agency costs relative 
to owner-managed firms. 
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Panel C presents estimation results using two alternate measures of agency 
costs. First, we replace ACI as the dependent variable with an agency cost measure 
computed using only  the ratio of operating expenses to sales.  The agency cost 
estimate is computed using equation (1) where the „Efficiency Variable‟ is the ratio 
of operating expenses to sales.  The operating expenses to sales ratio has been used 
as a proxy for agency costs elsewhere in the literature (Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), 
Nagar, Petroni and Wolfenzon (2010)). Second, we construct an alternate agency 
cost index (ACI-2) and use this new variable as the dependent variable.. The 
difference between ACI and ACI-2 is that the operating expenses measure used in 
calculating ACI-2 includes the cost of goods sold.. Model specifications (1) and (2) 
of Panel C present the new results.  The coefficient estimate on NOM is positive and 
statistically significant for both models (1) and (2), providing further corroboration 
for the results presented in Panels A and B. 
We conclude from the results presented in Table XVI that agency costs are 
significantly greater for non-owner managed firms and that this conclusion is robust. 
 
B.  Ownership Structure and Agency Costs 
While the results presented in Table XIV lead to the general conclusion that 
agency costs are larger in non-owner managed firms, the hypothesis also suggests 
that as we move away from the single-owner firm structure to more diffuse 
ownership structures that we should observe increasingly larger agency costs.  We 
now examine how agency costs change as firms move from simple to more complex 
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ownership structures. We define six dummy variables. ONE FAM, MUL FAM, 
INDI_FAM, WO, PUBLICNQ and PUBLICQ which equal 1 if a firm is owned by a 
single family, owned by multiple families, owned by a combination of families and 
firms, owned by holding companies, firm is categorized as public, not quoted and 
public, quoted respectively and zero otherwise respectively, and zero otherwise. 
Table XV presents estimation results for models replacing the non-owner managed 
dummy (NOM) with the ownership dummies just mentioned.  The structure of Table 
XV is otherwise the same as Table XIV, including the use of ACI as the dependent 
variable in Panels A and B, agency costs based upon the ratio of operating expenses 
to sales in model (1) of Panel C and ACI-2 in model (2) of Panel C.  The controls are 
the same as those in Table XIV. 
The coefficient estimates for these ownership dummy variables measure how 
agency costs vary across firms with complex ownership structures when compared to 
firms with the simplest ownership structure (i.e., firms that are owned by a single 
individual). In all specifications, we observe that the coefficient estimates on all 
dummy variables are positive and significant and generally increase monotonically 
from ONE FAM to PUBLICQ. The results presented in Panel B reflect the same 
pattern in the estimated coefficients as those presented in Panel A.  However, the 
sizes of the estimated coefficients for model (1) of Panel B indicate that private 
companies exhibiting high „accounting quality‟ in general tend to have lower agency 
costs however this does not appear to be true for public quoted companies (compare 
with the results for model (3) of Panel A).  Likewise, firms in the high probability of 
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financial distress sub-sample tend to exhibit larger coefficient values than those 
presented for model of (3) of Panel A, except for the cases where there is a single 
owner or where multiple family ownership is present.  The results presented in Panel 
C again corroborate the findings in Panel A.  Overall, these results provide support 
for the hypothesis that the magnitude of agency costs increase as firms move from 
simple to complex (generally more diffuse) ownership structures.  
**** Insert Table XV here **** 
 
C.  Further Multivariate Evidence 
We have documented that agency costs are higher among non-owner-
managed firms and in firms with complex (more diffuse) ownership structures. We 
conclude our analysis of vertical agency costs in private firms by now controlling for 
whether a firm is owner-managed or non-owner-managed.. We define the following 
dummy variables: ONE OWNER - NOM, ONE FAM – OM, ONE FAM – NOM, 
MUL FAM - OM, and MUL FAM – NOM which respectively equal 1 if a firm is 
owned but not managed by a single individual, owned and managed by a single 
family, owned but not managed by a single family, owned and managed by multiple 
families and owned but not managed by multiple families, respectively, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient estimates on these dummy variables reflect the agency 
costs associated with the respective firm classifications relative to a firm that is 
owned and managed by a single individual (i.e., the zero agency cost firm).  
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The estimation results presented in Table XVI include the full set of dummy 
variables just defined.  The control variable specifications are as in the prior tables. 
The dependent variable for model specifications 1 through 3 in Panel A  is ACI. 
Firms that are owned and managed by a single individual have lower agency costs 
than firms with any other ownership and management structure. The presence of a 
non-owner manager consistently results in larger agency costs as reflected in the 
positive and significant coefficients on the variables ONE OWNER – NOM, ONE 
FAM – NOM, MUL FAM – NOM.  Interestingly the coefficient on the variable  
MUL FAM – NOM is less positive than  the coefficient on the other two variables 
suggesting that the presence of multiple families may reflect more efficient 
monitoring of non-owner managers. 
We have so far relied on binary variables to indicate whether or not firms are 
managed by owners. In order to gain further insight into the effects of alignment of 
ownership and management, we introduce the continuous variable, Concentration, 
calculated as the ratio of shareholders who are also directors to the total number of 
directors. A Concentration measure of 1 indicates that a firm is entirely managed by 
its owners and a Concentration measure equal to 0 indicates that the firm is managed 
by outsiders.  We estimate an alternative specification (model specification 4 of 
Table XVI, Panel A) substituting the variable Concentration for the dummy 
variables used heretofore to identify ownership/management differences. The 
coefficient estimate on Concentration is negative and significantly different from 
zero. The result confirms that if Concentration is more positive, indicating that 
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shareholders have a greater representation as directors, then agency costs are smaller.  
Results using the subsamples and alternate agency cost proxies defined earlier are 
presented in Panels B and C and are qualitatively similar.  
**** Insert Table XVI here **** 
 
D.  Summary 
The results presented in this section indicate: 1) companies managed by a 
non-owner exhibit larger agency costs, 2) companies which exhibit more diffuse 
ownership exhibit larger agency costs, 3) the marginal effect on vertical agency costs 
of the presence of a non-owner manager, conditional on the level of ownership, is 
positive.  These results are broadly consistent with the basic propositions of the 
economic theory of agency articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others. 
 
VIII. Results – Horizontal Agency Costs 
A.  Ownership Concentration 
Horizontal agency costs arising from the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by a majority shareholder are likely to be more severe in close 
corporations (Roe, 2005; Gillan, 2006). In this section, we focus exclusively on 
private firms with multiple shareholders in our examination of this issue.  We first 
test the proposition that horizontal agency costs are lower in firms with shared 
control. We classify firms into three categories based on the ownership stake of the 
largest shareholder: low concentration firms, medium concentration firms and high 
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concentration firms if the ownership stake of the largest shareholder is less than 
50%, between 50% and 75% and above 75% respectively. Unlike public firms where 
owners can exert decision control with a relatively low ownership stake (Gillan, 
2006), private firms can be controlled only by owning at least 50% of the firm.
45
  
Private firms are owned by few shareholders (the average number of shareholders in 
our sample of private firms is 2 and therefore, it would be relatively easy for 
shareholders to block the decisions of any owner who owns less than a 50%stake.
46
 
We define two dummy variables, LOW CONC equals 1 if the ownership 
stake of the largest shareholder is less than 50% and HIGH CONC equals 1 if the 
ownership stake of the largest shareholder is greater than 75%. When included in a 
model with an intercept, the coefficient estimates on these dummy variables measure 
the agency costs of the diffusely held and highly concentrated firms relative to 
medium concentration firms. The intercept therefore reflects the agency costs of 
medium concentration firms.  
We begin by testing whether greater shared control is associated with smaller 
horizontal agency costs. Firms in which the largest shareholder owns less than 50% 
of the shares in principle will be firms where control is shared to a greater extent 
than firms in which the largest shareholder owns more than a 75% stake.  Dominant 
large shareholders in the high concentration category have more complete control 
and, thus, have a greater opportunity to engage in decisions that allow them to 
extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.  That is, to consume 
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 For evidence consistent with this view see Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and La Porta, Lopez-
di-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), but also see fn 17 and the references cited therein.   
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 Dyck and Zingales (2004) also use a 50% cutoff threshold. 
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resources whose value exceeds the personal loss they incur as a result. Model 
specification 1 of Table XVII, Panel A, presents estimation results which include the 
dummy variables LOW CONC and HIGH CONC.
47
  The results indicate that low 
concentration firms are associated with lower agency costs relative to medium 
concentration firms and this difference is significant at the 1 percent level. On the 
other hand high concentration firms are associated higher agency costs than medium 
concentration firms.  The results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and 
accounting for residual dependencies through clustering (not reported).   
**** Insert Table XVII here **** 
As the results for model 1 may be influenced by whether the manager is also 
an owner we next define a dummy variable OM that is set to 1 if firms are entirely 
managed by owners and 0 if not. We then compute an interaction variable by 
multiplying OM times HIGH CONC.  We include this interaction variable in model 
specifications 2 and 3 of Table XVII, Panel A.  The results indicate that the greater 
agency costs of high concentration firms relative to medium concentration firms is 
driven by the subset of firms that are not entirely managed by owners. Results using 
the subsamples and alternate agency cost proxies examined earlier are presented in 
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 The model was also estimated including all control variables, with and without clustering.  The 
results were qualitatively the same as those presented.  
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B.  Shareholder Monitoring and Control Contestability  
As discussed earlier, a complimentary hypothesis is that the magnitude of 
horizontal agency costs decreases as control becomes more contestable. The agency 
costs associated with the horizontal agency problem are predicted to be smaller when 
a large, non-controlling, shareholder is present to monitor and contest decisions of 
the controlling shareholder.  We test this hypothesis using two different measures 
defined to capture the impact of the second largest shareholder on the level of agency 
costs.  The first measure is the ownership stake of the second largest shareholder 
(SECOND) and the second is the difference between the stakes of the largest and the 
second largest shareholders (DIFF). Model specification 1 of Table XVIII, Panel A, 
presents results from a regression in which the ownership stake of the second largest 
shareholder (SECOND) is included as an additional explanatory variable.  The 
dependent variable proxying for agency costs is ACI. The results reported indicate 
that the estimated coefficient on SECOND is negative and significantly different 
from zero. This result is consistent with non-controlling shareholders acting as 
monitors as well as acting to contest decisions which would be detrimental to 
minority shareholders, thus, making private benefit extraction more costly for the 
controlling shareholder.  
**** Insert Table XVIII here **** 
The extent to which the second largest shareholder can prevent private benefit 
extraction by the majority shareholder might depend on the size of the ownership 
stake of the latter. That is, if the majority shareholder has absolute control (i.e., 
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owning more than 75% of the firm), it is easier for him to extract private benefits 
from minority shareholders if he chooses to do so. On the other hand, if the majority 
shareholder does not have a controlling interest (i.e., owning less than 50% of the 
firm), expropriation of minority shareholders is more difficult. To further investigate 
the impact of the second largest shareholder on the level of agency costs, we interact 
the stake of the second largest shareholder with the dummy variables LOW CONC, 
MED CONC and HIGH CONC defined earlier, and include these interaction terms 
in the model.  Model specifications 2 and 3 of Table XVIII, Panel A, present the 
results. The results indicate the estimated coefficients on the interaction variables are 
all negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.  These results suggest 
that the presence of a large non-controlling shareholder acts to reduce horizontal 
agency costs independently of ownership concentration.  Results using the 
subsamples and alternate agency cost proxies are presented in Table XVIII, Panels B 
and C and are qualitatively similar. 
**** Insert Table XVIII here **** 
Contestability may also be a function of the difference in the sizes of the 
respective holdings of the largest and next largest shareholders. If the share of the 
largest shareholder is much larger than all other owners, the ability of smaller owners 
to prevent expropriation may be limited. Put differently, horizontal agency costs may 
be positively related to the difference in the ownership stakes of the largest and the 
second largest shareholders. We test this prediction by including DIFF as an 
explanatory variable and present the estimation results in model specification 1 of 
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Table XIX, Panel A.  The variable DIFF equals the ownership stake of the largest 
shareholder minus the ownership stake of the next largest shareholder.
48
  We find 
that the estimated coefficient on DIFF is positive and statistically significant. That is, 
the larger the difference between the stakes of the top two shareholders of the firm, 
the higher the agency cost.  
**** Insert Table XIX here **** 
We next define three interaction variables defined by multiplying the 
ownership concentration variables with DIFF.  The interaction variables are included 
in model specification 2 of Table XIX, Panel A.  Results indicate that the impact of 
DIFF decreases monotonically as we move form low concentration to high 
concentration firms. Overall the results are consistent with the model proposed by 
Bloch and Hege (2001). That is, minority shareholder expropriation is lower in 
companies where control is more contestable, companies where the difference 
between the stakes of the majority and minority shareholders is smaller.   Results 
using the subsamples and alternate agency cost proxies are presented in Table XIX, 
Panels B and C, and are qualitatively similar. 
  
IX. Robustness Tests 
 We have tested the robustness of our results in several additional ways.  We 
first reexamine the results using a comparison of agency costs between non-owner 
managed firms and a matched sample of owner-managed firms.  We first construct a 
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 Model estimation results (not reported) for models including all control variables and accounting 
for residual dependencies using clustering do not lead to qualitatively different results.  
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matched sample of non-owner managed firms and owner-managed firms following 
the non-parametric matching methods developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).. We start with a “treatment group” 
of firms that are not owner-managed and identify a “control” group of firms that are 
owner-managed with identical or very similar observable characteristics for each 
firm in the treatment group.  The final step is to compute the difference in the 
dependent variable between the treatment and control firms.  
 Propensity-score matching of the „5-nearest neighbors‟ (Leuven and Sianesi, 
2003) is the basis for identifying the control firms. The independent variables used 
for matching are firm age, sets of dummy variables indicating industry affiliation, 
sets of dummy variables indicating firm riskiness and sets of dummy variables 
indicating the type of accounts submitted by firms. For all practical purposes we 
match exactly on these independent variables. One of the requirements for the 
successful implementation of the matching method is a sufficiently large overlap 
between the distribution of the observable characteristics of the treated and control 
firms – the “common support” condition. The unique cross-sectional richness and 
detailed ownership coverage of our data ensures that this condition is met for most of 
the sub-sample tests we perform. Results, not reported for the sake of brevity, are 
consistent with the results presented in Tables V through X. 
In addition to examining the agency cost proxy based (equation (1)) based 
upon the operating expenses to sales ratio, we also examined t two additional agency 
costs proxies (again see equation (1)) based upon  the asset turnover ratio and 
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separately operating profit scaled by total assets individually and found results 
consistent with those reported in the tables.   
Further, we constructed a more conservative sample by  by excluding firms 
for which book value of assets changed by over 30% from the previous year 
(following Ball and Shivkumar, 2005). Results based upon this restricted sample 
were again qualitatively the same as those presented in the tables.  We also repeated 
the analysis by eliminating firms that experienced an ownership change during the 
four sample years. The results based on this restricted sample are again similar to 
those reported in the tables.   
 
IX. Summary and Conclusions 
The economic theory of agency differentiates between vertical agency 
problems and horizontal agency problems. The vertical agency problem is 
characterized by situations in which the managers of a firm may have incentives to 
use or consume resources in a fashion that is at odds with the objectives of the firm‟s 
owners. The horizontal agency problem on the other hand arises when the owners 
themselves vie for resources, and importantly situations in which a controlling owner 
has incentives to exploit minority owners. This study presents empirical tests of the 
central hypotheses regarding the relation between agency costs and the structure of 
ownership and control in an organization.  We present tests of predictions regarding 
vertical agency costs as well as horizontal agency costs and find support for the basic 
tenets of both theses.  Our results are based upon a unique data set containing 
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information on the ownership and management of private as well as publicly traded 
companies.  
We find that private firms experience lower agency costs when compared to 
public firms. More importantly, we document that a firm that is owned and managed 
by a single individual has lower agency costs than firms with other ownership and 
management structures, thus providing direct confirmation of the prediction first laid 
out by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  We also find that among private firms, agency 
costs increase as firms move from simple ownership structures such as being owned 
by a single individual or a family to complicated ownership structures such as being 
owned by multiple families and holding companies. This result provides direct 
confirmation of the free-rider hypothesis which states that as the number and type of 
shareholders increase, the incentive for each shareholder to incur all of the 
monitoring costs decreases because the benefits associated with monitoring are 
limited and are proportional to their ownership stake.   
We present new empirical evidence on horizontal agency problems, a major 
concern in close corporations. We find that firms with shared control (i.e., those 
where the largest stakeholder owns less than 50%) have lower agency costs than 
firms where the largest shareholder has enough power to extract private benefits 
from minority shareholders (i.e., where the largest shareholder owns between 50% 
and 75%). Furthermore, we find that the presence of a large shareholder outside the 
controlling group leads to lower agency costs. We also document an inverse 
relationship between the ownership stake of the second largest shareholder and 
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agency costs, providing support for the view that minority expropriation will be 










It is an empirical fact that companies hold cash balances. Why companies hold cash 
and why they select the levels observed have long intrigued academic researchers as 
well as practitioners alike. Early research on these issues tended to focus on 
normative prescriptive advice. Several recent studies have alternatively addressed 
these questions from a positive descriptive angle, focusing on the empirical 
determinants of cash holdings predicted by extant financial theory. While providing 
important insights, a common feature of extant studies on cash holdings is that the 
analysis is restricted to publicly traded companies, in large part due to data 
availability. As a result, little is known about the cash holdings policies of privately 
held firms. The knowledge about the cash holdings policies of private companies and 
company policies in general is especially important as private firms internationally 
outnumber publicly traded firms, employ a larger proportion of work force and are 
considered an indispensible part of any economy. For example, it is estimated that 
more than 99% of American businesses and over 95% of firms in the U.K. are 
privately owned businesses and account for more than half of each country‟s GDP. 
Further, in 2004, small firms with fewer than 500 employees accounted for all of the 
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 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Scott C. Linn and Pradeep K. Yadav. 
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net new jobs created in the U.S.
50
  This study examines the cash holdings of more 
than 40,000 U.K. based private firms for the 2000-2009 period. We investigate the 
determinants of cash holdings in private firms and explore the relation between cash 
holdings and agency costs in private firms.  
 Existing research on cash holding can be traced back to Keynes (1936), who 
indicates two main benefits from holding cash: to avoid transaction costs that arise 
while trying to raise funds externally (the “transactions cost” motive) and to finance 
new and existing projects if other sources are unavailable or too expensive (the 
“precautionary” motive). Miller and Orr (1966) develop a trade-off model of cash 
holdings according to which companies determine the optimal level of cash holdings 
by balancing the costs and benefits of holding liquid assets. The trade-off model is in 
contrast to the pecking order or financing hierarchy theory developed by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and does not necessarily predict an optimal cash holdings level. The 
pecking order theory suggests that information asymmetry induced financing 
constraints result in firms stocking up on liquid assets to finance future investment 
opportunities with internal funds.  The third line of inquiry examines cash holdings 
within a framework that takes as given that managers may be prone to pursue their 
own self-interest over than the interests of security holders, an agency perspective. 
Research in this area considers the hypothesis that managers who do not act in the 
best interests of shareholders will tend to amass liquid assets as such balances are 
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 Sources: U.S. statistics: The 2006 Small Business Economy Report published by The Small 
Business Administration. U.K. statistics: Ball and Shivakumar (2005). 
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relatively easy to expend on managerial excesses.
51
 This line of thought stems in 
large part from the arguments put forward by Jensen (1986).  
 The empirical analysis of the determinants of firms' cash holdings has 
received growing attention in the last few years.
52
 However, to the best of our 
knowledge, little attention has been given to the determinants of cash holdings in 
private firms.
53
 The findings presented in the extant literature, which are based on 
examining publicly traded companies, cannot be applied to private firms as private 
firms differ from publicly traded corporations in several important ways. For 
instance, a fundamental difference between private and public firms is their 
ownership structure and hence the degree to which control is valued by their 
shareholders. Public firms have thousands of shareholders while private firms 
                                                          
51
 See for example, Jensen (1986), Blanchard,Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), and Myers and 
Rajan (1998). 
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 Existing empirical literature mainly refers to U.S. listed companies (Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 
1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008; Mello, 
Krishnaswami and Larkin, 2008), to the evolution of their cash holdings (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 
2009), to U.S. multinational firms (Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007) and to cross-country 
comparisons (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson, 2006). Some empirical evidence has also been reported for European Monetary 
Union (EMU) listed firms (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004) or EMU large firms (Pal and Fernando, 2006). 
European single country evidence is limited to the influence of managerial ownership on cash 
holdings of U.K. listed firms (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004), the adjustment of large Dutch firms to long-
run liquidity targets (Bruinshoofd and Kool, 2004), the role of inter-group relations in the cash 
reserves of Belgian firms (Deloof, 2001), cash holdings in Italian firms (Bigelli and Vidal, 2009) and 
the determinants of cash levels for Spanish SME firms (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2007). 
53
 Bigelli and Sanchez-Vidal (2009) examine cash holdings in Italian private firms. Our paper is an 
improvement on their work in several aspects. First, the data we employ are based upon the 
constituent firms following a common set of audited reporting guidelines. The companies represented 
in our sample are all domiciled in the U.K. and must comply with government mandated reporting 
requirements. Second, we explore the relationship between agency costs and cash holdings in private 
companies. Lastly, our sample period extends until 2009 and therefore provides us an opportunity to 
examine the cash holdings of private companies during the recent financial crisis. 
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typically have one or few shareholders. Another important distinction between 
private and public firms is the level of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. Private firms are more opaque to outsiders and the information asymmetry 
is compounded by heterogeneous expectations. That is, an assumption implicit in the 
Myers and Majluf's (1984) financing hierarchy model is that the manager of a firm 
(insider) knows the true value of new projects and she is expected to credibly convey 
this information to outsiders. However, the management team in private firms may 
not be complete and may lack the necessary skills and sophistication to estimate and 
convey the true value of new projects. Other differences include access to capital 
markets and potential costs of under/over investment (Ang, 1991). All these factors 
are likely to be important in shaping the cash policy of private firms. 
 We examine a unique data set composed of U.K. private companies. Three 
principal features of the financial reporting regulations for U.K. companies are 
substantially equivalent for private and public firms. First, the U.K. Companies Act 
requires all private and public companies to file annual financial statements that 
comply with the same accounting standards. Second, financial statements filed by 
both U.K. private as well as public companies must be audited.
54
 Third, private and 
public companies are subject to the same tax laws. These standards therefore provide 
us with a set of comparably measured data for both public and private companies. 
Our dataset includes firms with a wide array of ownership structures ranging from 
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 There is an exemption for very small companies which we return to in section IV.  
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firms with a single owner-manager to firms with multiple owners and outside 
managers.  
 This paper proceeds in three steps. We first assess the success of the trade-off 
and the financing hierarchy models in explaining changes in cash holdings of private 
firms. We find that the cash holdings of private firms revert to the mean indicating 
that these firms  have target cash levels. In fact,  the rate of mean reversion is higher 
in private companies when compared to the rate of mean reversion in publicly traded 
firms. Finding that private firms do have target cash levels, we attempt to distinguish 
more directly between the trade-off model and the financing hierarchy models. The 
results indicate that both these models are relevant in explaining cash holdings of 
private firms. It seems the two models capture different aspects of the change in cash 
holdings of private firms.    
 In our second step, we empirically test the determinants of cash holdings in 
private firms. The results suggest that smaller firms, which are younger, riskier and 
presumably more financially constrained, hold significantly more cash and less cash 
substitutes than bigger firms. Reported evidence of a panel data analysis supports 
both the trade-off model and financing hierarchy model. With respect to the former 
model, we find that firms with more growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold 
more cash. In addition, we document a negative relation between leverage and cash 





 Private firms that pay dividends hold more cash. Evidence also shows that 
net working capital can be considered as a cash substitute.  
 In our third step, we investigate the relation between cash holdings and 
governance structures in private firms. We find in the cross-section and over time 
that private firms with high insider ownership have higher cash holdings, while firms 
that are not owner managed have lower cash holdings. Overall, firms with lower 




 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses and adapts 
previous theories to a private firm context. Section 3 describes the dataset and the 
variables. Section 4 discusses empirical results related to the determinants of cash 
holdings in private firms. Section 5 discusses empirical results related to cash 
holdings and agency costs in private firms. Section 6 concludes.   
 
II. Theory and Hypothesis  
  In this section we review the main contributions on the determinants of firms' cash 
holdings  and  relate each to  a private firm context.  
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 The trade-off theory does not make clear predictions about the relation between cash holdings and 
leverage. 
56
 ACI is the agency cost index developed by Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2011). ACI is calculated 
based upon a multivariate factor analysis of several accounting variables widely used as agency cost 
proxies. The factor score of the dominant factor explaining the non-unique variance is used as the 
index of agency costs. Please refer to Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2011) for more details. 
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A. The trade-off theory of cash holdings 
 If capital markets were perfect in the strictest sense there would be no 
transaction costs associated with raising cash and holdings of liquid assets would not 
affect a firm's value. But markets are far from perfect and transaction costs 
associated with raising funds are positive. Companies must therefore determine the 
optimal level of cash holdings by trading-off the marginal costs of holding liquid 
assets such as lower returns on cash holdings with the marginal benefit of liquid 
assets such as minimizing transaction costs and underinvestment problems (Miller 
and Orr, 1966; Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998). The trade-off theory predicts a 
positive relation between the cost of external financing and investment in liquid 
assets. The trade-off theory gives rise to several predictions regarding specific 
company characteristics and the demand for cash holdings by firms.  We review 
these predictions next.  
 Size: Extant research shows that there are substantial fixed costs of raising 
external financing. Barclay and Smith (1996) and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes 
(2003) argue that the cost of external financing is smaller for larger firms because of 
the economics of scale resulting from a substantial fixed cost component of external 
financing. This argument should hold for both public and private companies and 
larger companies are expected to have easier and cheaper access to financing. In 
addition, raising cash by selling non-core assets in periods of financial distress 
(Lang, Poulsen and Stulz, 1995) should be easier for diversified companies, and 
larger companies tend to be more diversified (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). From the 
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above relationships, the trade-off model would predict that larger private companies 
should hold a lower proportion of their assets invested in cash.    
 Growth opportunities: Firms expecting an increase in the number of 
profitable investment opportunities tend to hold large cash balances in order to 
decrease the probability of foregoing these projects. In addition, the literature on real 
options emphasizes the value of waiting to invest in uncertain price and/or cost 
environments (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). For these 
reasons, holding liquid assets could be more valuable for firms with more investment 
opportunities especially if they are financially constrained (Denis and Sibilkov, 
2009). We argue that the tendency to invest in liquid assets for precautionary 
motives is much stronger among private firms. This is because the cost of foregoing 
profitable investment opportunities is much higher for private firms than publicly 
traded companies (Ang, 1991). 
 Risk or volatility of cash flows: The precautionary motive for cash holdings 
suggests that firms hold cash to absorb adverse shocks and to increase the odds of 
surviving through periods of poor business conditions. Therefore, one would expect 
firms with greater cash flow uncertainty to hold more cash, especially if they are 
financially constrained (Han and Qui, 2007). In private firms, the level of financial 
frictions should be higher and the access to external financing more difficult. We 
therefore expect such a relationship to be even stronger. Hence, more variable cash 




B.  The financing hierarchy theory and cash holdings 
 Firms with more severe information asymmetry between inside and outside 
investors face higher costs of external financing. Outsiders want to make sure that 
the securities they purchase are not overpriced and consequently discount them 
appropriately. The discount may at times be  large enough that a firm selects to not 
issue securities and consequently foregoes a valuable investment opportunity  
(Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Such losses are real. A solution to reduce the costs 
arising from information asymmetries is to build cash reserves as financial slack, 
using „stored‟ funds first when investment opportunities arise and then accessing 
debt and equity markets in that order once internal resources are used up.  
  The information asymmetry problem is likely to be accentuated in private 
companies because of heterogeneous expectations. An assumption implicit in the 
Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that the manager of the firm knows the true value 
of new projects. However, management teams in private firms may not be complete 
and may lack the necessary skills and sophistication to accurately estimate and 
convey the true value of new projects. In this case, there are optimistic 
owners/managers who overestimate the value of their projects as well as informed 
owners who are capable of accurately determining the value of projects. Lenders, 
aware of such behavior would make fewer funds available and make accessing 
external funds even more costly for private firms, ceteris peribus. The theory gives 
rise to several predictions about the demand for cash holdings and company 
characteristics.   
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 Financing deficit: According to the pecking order theory, there is neither an 
optimal debt level for the company nor an optimal level of cash holdings. It follows 
that when internal funds are not sufficient, companies will issue debt first followed 
by equity. A private firm's financing deficit, assuming no access to the equity 
market, would then lead either to a reduction of cash holdings or to an increase in 
debt, or both. We therefore expect that private firms with higher financing deficits 
have lower cash holdings. 
 Dividends: Publicly traded firms disperse a considerable portion of retained 
earnings by paying dividends. One hypothesis is that dividend paying firms use 
dividends to commit themselves to regular cash distributions thus increasing 
potential scrutiny of management by forcing the firm to return to the capital market  
more frequently for new capital to fund investment opportunities (Easterbrook, 
1984).
57
  The prediction is that firms that pay dividends tend to hold lower cash 
balances (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell, 2008).  
 The rationale and use of dividends in private companies are quite different 
from those of publicly traded firms. Owners of private firms integrate the firm's 
distributions, salary and bonuses, with personal incomes into a personal consumption 
function where dividends received is only one component. A firm‟s assets and the 
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 Financially constrained firms in need of cash may try to increase retained earnings by cutting 
dividends, especially when there are difficulties in raising more debt or issuing new equity (Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). However, doing so is prohibitively expensive for publicly traded firms 




owners‟ personal wealth are often perceived as a being the same (Ang, 1992). In 
most private firms there is only one shareholder, often the founder or the founding 
family (Corbetta and Montemerlo, 1999; Brav,2009). It follows that the choice to 
pay out dividends depends mostly on the firm‟s needs for cash to finance new 
investments or to fund a financing deficit. Brav(2009) finds dividend payments in 
private firms are much more sensitive to the firm‟s operating performance compared 
to dividend payments in publicly traded firms.  Given these observations, we argue 
that dividend payments in private firms should be correlated with excess generation 
of cash flows, and lower or no dividends associated with a cash shortage. We 
therefore expect that private firms that pay dividends have higher cash balances.  
 Net working capital: Current assets that can be easily transformed into cash 
are considered cash substitutes. Receivables, for example, can be easily cashed out 
through factoring in private firms or by securitization processes in larger firms.
58
 Net 
working capital (excluding cash) can therefore be considered a cash substitute 
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999) both in public and private firms. It 
follows that private firms with a higher net working capital should have lower cash 
balances.  
 
C.  Agency costs of managerial discretion and cash holdings: 
We now turn to agency costs of managerial discretion. Agency theory 
suggests that in the presence of agency costs of managerial discretion, management 
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may prefer to hold cash to pursue its own objectives since cash reserves are easily 
accessible by management with little scrutiny and much of their use is discretionary 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986).
59
 While there is considerable literature 
examining the relation between cash holdings, agency problems and corporate 
governance, the evidence is inconclusive. 
Harford (1999), and Opler Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) do not 
find strong evidence for agency based explanations of cash holdings. Along the same 
lines, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that agency costs do not explain operating 
performance differences among high cash firms. On the other hand,  Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) show that the value of cash can in part be determined by how 
investors expect cash to be used when there are potential managerial agency 
problems. Klacheva and Lins (2007) find that cash levels are generally higher in 
countries with poor investor protection, which reflects likely agency problems. 
Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) report that firms with expected poor governance 
actually hold less cash.  
While studies to date have focused on agency explanations for cash holdings 
in publicly traded firms, the presence of agency problems in private firms suggests 
the explanations should in principle apply in that setting as well.  Recent empirical 
evidence shows that there are large variations in  the ownership and governance 
structures of private companies and that agency costs are real and of economic 
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 On the other hand, it could also be the case that management may hold cash simply because 
managers are risk averse and wish to avoid market discipline or do not want to make payouts to 
shareholders in order to build up slack (Myers and Majluf 1984).  
84 
 
significance in private companies (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000; Nagar, Petroni and 
Wolfenzon, 2010; Gogineni, Linn and Yadav, 2011) 
 The conflicting evidence on the role of agency costs in publicly traded firms‟ 
decisions to hold liquid assets and the lack of research pertaining to private 
companies motivates us to examine the relation between agency costs and cash 
holdings in private companies. Private companies are largely shielded from market 
scrutiny and governance mechanisms. In this context, we believe that even in 
countries like the U.S. and the U.K. where external governance mechanisms are 
strong, agency costs play an important role in how private firms deal with their cash 
balances. On the other hand, since owners of private firms are in a better position to 
monitor external managers, it could be the case that agency related arguments are 
irrelevant in explaining cash holdings in private firms. This issue warrants empirical 
investigation.   
 
III. Data  
We obtain company data from the FAME database produced by Bureau Van 
Dijk; each installment contains the latest available ownership and management 
structure data and 10 years of financial statement data for more than 2.5 million 
firms registered in the U.K. and Ireland. The U.K. Companies Act of 1967 (and 
subsequent revisions to the act) requires all private and public companies to file 
annual financial statements that comply with the same accounting standards. All 
accounts submitted to the Companies House must be audited and certified by an 
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accountant. However, certain small and medium companies can claim exemptions 
from either or both of these requirements. In addition, such companies are allowed to 
file abridged financial statements in order to simplify reporting requirements.
60
 We 
restrict our analysis to private companies.   
The data we examine are from the period 2000-2009 extracted from update 
260 (February 2011) release of the FAME data base.
61
  We include all private firms 
with total assets of at least £5,000, revenues of at least £1,000 and non-missing cash 
data for each of the years between 2005 and 2009. These criteria enable us to 
identify a broad cross-section of ownership and management structures and industry 
affiliations.  Likewise, the criteria mitigate concerns of possible sample selection 
bias from imposing the size threshold implied by the auditing requirements of the 
Companies House. Such a restriction might result in a sample that includes only 
large, successful single owner-managed firms. The tradeoff is that our sample 
contains some very small firms.  We screen out observations that are likely to be 
erroneous by excluding those firm-year observations for which book value of assets 
changed by over 50% from the previous year (Ball and Shivkumar, 2005; Almeida, 
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 The definition of a “small” or “medium” company has changed over time. For accounting periods 
ending after 30 January 2004, a company is considered small (medium) if one of the following 
requirements are met: i.) annual revenues are less than 5.6 (22.8) million, ii) balance sheet total is 2.8 
(11.4) million or less and iii.) number of employees is less than 50 (250). Small companies are exempt 
from both auditing and accountant‟s report requirement whereas medium companies are exempt from 
auditing requirements but should contain an accountants report. For more details please refer to 
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/gbhtml/gba3.shtml#three. Since it is possible that different 
types of exemptions might affect accounting quality, we control for accounting types in our 
multivariate analysis.  
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 For analysis involving ownership and management structure data, we restrict our sample period 
from 2006-2009. Lagged governance data are extracted from updates 196, 208, 221 and 233 
corresponding to October 2005, October 2006, November 2007 and October 2008 respectively.  
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Campello and Weisbach, 2004; and Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2007). The 
final sample consists of 284,082 observations. The dataset is an unbalanced panel 




A. Measures of liquid asset holdings 
We follow Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999) in our construction of variables measuring cash holdings.  . We 
measure liquid assets (Cash) as cash plus bank deposits divided by total assets. 
While not reported in this paper, we also measure liquidity by replacing total assets 
in the denominator with total assets minus cash. This alternative measure does not 
affect our main conclusions. We measure firm size (Size) as the natural logarithm of 
the book value of assets in 2005 pound sterling. Leverage (Total Debt) is defined as 
the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by total assets. We use the ratio of 
capital expenditures (Capex) defined as the change in total assets plus depreciation 
scaled by total assets as an alternate measure of growth opportunities.  
We measure cash flow riskiness using two measures. First, we measure firm 
risk using the standard deviation of cash flows for the prior three years of operation 
relative to the year in which cash holdings is measured (CF Volatility). Second, we 
measure industry cash flow volatility as the average across the industry group of the 
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 Among these, 90,855 firms are subject to mandatory auditing requirements of the Companies 
House. These firms represent 192,839 firm-year observations. 
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standard deviations of firm cash flow (Industry Sigma).
63
 Cash flow (CF) is defined 
as profit after tax plus depreciation and amortization less common dividends scaled 
by total assets. To distinguish the effects of a firm's dividend payouts, we define a 
dummy variable (Div Dummy) that equals 1 in years where a firm pays a dividend or 
0 otherwise. The duration of cash conversion cycle (CCC) is obtained from the 
inventory conversion period plus receivables' collection period minus the payment 
period for the accounts' payable.
64
 In order to reduce the possible influence of 
extreme observations, all financial variables have been winsorized at the 1% level on 
both sides of the distributions. The FAME database contains a measure of the 
probability of company failure labeled Quiscore.
65
  
Figure I shows the median cash-to-assets ratio for the 2000-2009 period. The 
figure indicates that there is a moderate upward trend in the amount of cash held by 
U.K. private firms over the sample period. In addition, the figure reveals that the 
cash holdings of private companies are less volatile than those of publicly listed 
companies.  
                                                          
63
 We divide the sample into 19 industry groups based on the 2003 U.K. industry classification. These 
groups are presented in Table 2.  
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 CCC is calculated using the following formula: 365*[(inventory/cost of goods sold) + (accounts 
receivables / sales) - (accounts payable / cost of goods sold)] 
65
 Quiscore is produced by CRIF Decision Solutions Ltd. Quiscore is a measure of the likelihood of 
company failure in the year following the date of calculation. A Quiscore can take any value within 
the range 0 to 100 where the following interpretations apply:  0-20 (high risk band), 21-40 (caution 
band), 41-60 (normal band), 61-80 (stable band) and 81-100 (secure band). In determining a score, a 
number of separate calculations are performed using various combinations of financial characteristics 
including turnover (revenue), pre-tax profit, working capital, intangibles, cash and bank deposits, 
creditors, bank loans and overdrafts, current assets, current liabilities, net assets, fixed assets, share 




**** Insert Figure I here **** 
Table XX reports univariate statistics for the main variables used in the 
analysis over the whole sample period. Summary statistics for publicly listed 
companies over the sample period are presented for comparison purposes. The mean 
and median cash balances for private firms are 0.23 and 0.12 respectively and are 
much higher than the mean and median cash balances for publicly listed firms. On a 
pound sterling basis, the median firm has cash holdings of £136,762, a relatively 
small amount. This statistic reflects the size distribution in our sample. The median 
firm in the sample has an asset base of £1,121,000.  In terms of other financial data, 
the average firm in the sample has a cash flow to asset ratio of 3.6%, leverage ratio 
of 40% and has capital expenditures equal to 1.5% of assets. The mean and median 
quiscores indicate the sample firms tend to fall in the normal or better regions for the 
index. 
**** Insert Table XX here **** 
Table XXI reports cash holdings by industry. Industries are defined according 
to the subsections defined in the publication U.K. standard industrial classification of 
economic activities - 2003.
66
 Firms belonging to manufacturing industries hold 
between 5% - 8% of their total assets as cash while firms in the wholesale and retail 
trade invest close to 10% of their assets in cash holdings. Statistics for the years 2001 
and 2009 indicate a general trend of increase in cash-to-assets ratio of all industries 
between 2001 and 2009. We treat the year 2001 instead of the year 2000 as the 
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starting point because there are far fewer observations (approximately 3,000) 
available for the year 2000 as opposed to more than 20,000 observations each year 
starting 2001. Since all our main regressions are estimated with industry dummy 
variables, time in-variant industry effects are not a concern.
67
  
**** Insert Table XXI here **** 
 
 
IV. The determinants of cash balances 
 We start with testing whether firms have target cash levels. We then estimate 
linear regression models where the cash holdings variable is treated as a function of 
several firm characteristics identified by extant theory as determinants of cash 
holdings.   
 
A. Do firms have target cash levels? 
 In a world of perfect capital markets there would be no transaction costs for 
raising cash, and holdings of liquid assets would not affect a firm's value. But 
markets are far from perfect and transaction costs are never irrelevant. The trade-off 
theory suggests that companies must determine the optimal level of cash holdings by 
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 The industry dummies (Industry Affiliations) are based upon the industry sectors presented in Table 
II with the Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded industry. Small and medium 
firms are eligible to submit abridged financial statements under UK law.  Firms in our sample are 
categorized into seven groups based on the type of financial statements they file: a) small company 
statements b) medium company statements, c) total exemption small, d) total exemption full, e) partial 
exemption f) full accounts and g) group accounts. We include dummy variables (Accounting Quality)  
to control for the effects of different types of financial statements on accounting quality with small 




trading-off the marginal costs and marginal benefits of holding liquid assets (Miller 
and Orr, 1966; Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998).  
 A testable prediction of the trade-off theory is that any firm has  a target level 
of cash holdings. To test this prediction, we first examine whether cash holdings of 
private firms revert to the mean. If they do not, we can reject the hypothesis that 
firms have target cash levels. However, predictions of the financing hierarchy model 
are not entirely inconsistent with mean reversion in cash holdings. According to the 
latter, changes in cash are a function of changes in a firm's growth in internal 
resources. Therefore, any autocorrelation in internal resources will lead to similar 
autocorrelation in cash holdings (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999). We 
test the hypothesis that cash holdings are mean reverting by estimating a first order 
autoregressive model for each private firm using equation (1) 
                          (1) 
where        is calculated as cash holdings in year t minus cash holdings in year t-
1. Figure II shows the distribution of the autoregressive coefficients (   from this 
regression for all U.K. private firms with more than five years of data in the 2000-
2009 period. The median of the estimated coefficients is negative (-0.300), indicating 
that cash balances are mean reverting in private firms. We repeat this analysis for a 
set of publicly traded firms in the U.K. with more than five years of data in the 2000-
2009 period the median coefficients is -0.250 respectively.
68
 The rate of mean 
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 The median coefficient for publicly traded U.K. firms closely resembles the findings of Opler et al 
(1999) who conduct a similar analysis using publicly traded U.S. firms and report a median 
coefficient of -0.242.  
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reversion is higher for private firms indicating that private firms adjust their cash 
holdings quicker than public companies.  
**** Insert Figure II here **** 
 We next examine whether the trade-off model and the financing hierarchy 
model are relevant in explaining the changes in cash holdings of firms. Target 
adjustment models suggest that difference between actual and 'target' cash holdings 
in year t-1 determines the changes in cash holdings in year t.  We use the average 
cash holdings of a firm during the three previous years as the firm's target cash 
holdings. This model is similar to the models tested in the capital structure literature 
discussed in Syam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Results are presented in Table XXII, 
column 2. The coefficient estimate on target cash is negative and significant at the 
5% level suggesting that target adjustment models explain some of the change in 
cash holdings. As a robustness check, we use a smaller sample for which cash 
holdings data are available for at least 8 years. Results using this sub-sample are 
presented in Table XXII, column 3 and are qualitatively similar. 
**** Insert Table XXII here ****  
We next turn to the financing hierarchy model. We test this model by 
assuming that changes in cash holdings are given by the flow of funds deficit. The 
flow of funds deficit is calculated as dividends plus capital expenditures plus the 
change in net working capital less cash minus operating cash flow. Results of 
regressions using the flow of funds deficit are presented in Table 3, columns 4 and 5. 
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The coefficient estimate on the flow of funds deficit is negative and significant in 
both regressions providing support for the financing hierarchy model.  
 We test the significance of both the target adjustment and financing hierarchy 
models in a multivariate setting by including both the target cash and the flow of 
funds deficit measures as independent variables. Table XXII, columns 6 and 7 
present results of these regressions. Coefficient estimates on both these variables are 
significant suggesting that the two models capture different aspects of the change in 
cash holdings of firms.  
 
B. Univariate analysis 
 We construct quartiles based on cash holdings and test whether the 
characteristics of companies which hold low cash balances, such as those in the first 
quartile, differ from those with high cash balances, such as those companies in the 
fourth quartile. Table XXIII presents the statistics. The ranges of the cash-to-assets 
ratio overlap across quartiles as we construct the quartiles each year. Table XXIII 
shows that firms in the first and fourth quartiles differ significantly from each other. 
These differences are significant at the 10% level or better, for all variables. 
Significance levels are determined by employing t-tests for differences in mean and 
Wilcoxon tests for differences in medians. Test statistics are not presented for the 
sake of brevity.  
 **** Insert Table XXIII here **** 
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 There is an inverse relationship between firm size and cash holdings. Firms 
with the most cash are smaller than the ones with the least cash. Further, firms with 
most cash are younger by almost 8 years on average when compared to firms with 
low cash holdings. With respect to financial characteristics, firms in the fourth 
quartile are less levered than those in the first quartile. Median cash flow to assets 
ratio increase monotonically from the first quartile to the fourth quartile. Average 
capital expenditures and the length of cash conversion cycle decreases monotonically 
as we move from the first quartile to the fourth quartile, except for the second 
quartile. The ratio of net working capital to total assets follows a similar pattern.     
  
C.  Determinants of liquidity 
 The dependent variable in Table XXIV is  defined as cash plus bank deposits 
scaled by total assets in all models. The first column of the table lists the independent 
variables. Table XXIV, column 2 reports coefficient estimates computed using the 
method presented in Fama and MacBeth (1973). In this approach, a cross-sectional 
regression is estimated each year. The results suggest that cash holdings decrease 
significantly with size, firm age, net working capital and leverage. Cash holdings 
increase significantly with the capital expenditures to total assets ratio, industry 
volatility, tax rate and whether a firm pays dividends. Column 3 presents results of a 
two way clustered regression where the standard errors are clustered by firm and 
year. Column 4 presents results of a cross-sectional regression estimated using the 
average of the variables over the sample period. The results appear robust, as the 
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signs and significance of the main explanatory variables tend to remain stable over 
the three different models with just one exception: the coefficient estimate on capital 
expenditures variables changes sign in the cross-sectional regression.  
**** Insert Table XXIV here **** 
 Overall, there is support for both the trade-off model and the financing 
hierarchy theory: The coefficient estimates on size, capital expenditures and cash 
flow volatility (industry sigma) suggest that smaller firms and those characterized by 
more growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold more cash, whilehe 
coefficient estimate on total debt variable is negative and significant indicating that 
highly levered firms carry less cash. Similarly, firms with higher net working capital 
hold significantly less cash. Positive and significant coefficient estimates on the 
dividend dummy suggest private firms that pay dividends hold more cash.
69
    
 Results presented in Table XXIII show that firms with high cash holdings 
(i.e. in the fourth quartile of cash-to-assets ratio) are significantly different from 
firms with low cash holdings (i.e., those in the first quartile of cash-to-assets ratio). 
To address the possibility that the results are driven by firms with large cash 
holdings, we estimate the clustered regression presented in Column 3 after 
eliminating from the sample the firms that are in the fourth quartile of cash holdings. 
Results using this subsample are presented in Table XXIV, column 5 and are 
qualitatively similar.  
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 We include financial variables such as flow of funds deficit measure used in Table 3, and cash 
conversion cycle as independent variables. Inclusion of these variables do not change our results. 
Results are not reported for the sake of brevity.   
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 Table XXV presents regressions with alternate specifications to ensure the 
robustness of results presented in Table XXIV. First, it is likely that cash holdings 
and some of the financial variables used as independent variables in Table XXIV 
may be jointly determined for each firm. The trade-off theory would suggest firms 
choose leverage, cash holdings and investment policy simultaneously. We estimate 
the regressions of Table XXIV omitting the capital expenditure, dividend and 
leverage variables. Results are presented in Table XXV, columns 2 through 4 and are 
robust to the exclusion of aforementioned variables. Table XXV, columns 5 through 
7 presents results of regressions with changes in cash holdings as an additional 
independent variable. The purpose of including this variable is to capture the 
transitory nature of cash holdings. That is, firms may accumulate cash holdings 
either because they are off their target level or to invest in the near future. Again, all 
our original findings remain unchanged. 
**** Insert Table XXV here **** 
                 
V. Ownership structures, management control and cash holdings 
Agency theory suggests that in the presence of agency costs of managerial 
discretion, management may prefer to hold cash to pursue its own objectives since 
cash reserves are easily accessible by management with little scrutiny and much of 
their use is discretionary (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). While there is 
considerable literature examining the relation between cash holdings, agency 
problems and corporate governance, the evidence is still inconclusive. Furthermore, 
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a common feature of extant studies is that the analysis is restricted to publicly traded 
companies.
70
 We examine the relation between cash holdings and governance 
characteristics in private companies. Extant literature examining agency costs in 
private companies, though small, suggests that these costs are real and have an 
economic impact on private companies (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000; Nagar, Petroni 
and Wolfenzen, 2010; and Gogineni, Linn and Yadav, 2011). 
 For this analysis, we use a subset of private firms for which detailed 
ownership and governance data are available. This dataset is constructed as follows. 
We restrict our sample to the 2006-2009 period and identify firms for which 
ownership data lagged by one year are available.
71
 That is, if financial data are taken 
for the year 2006, ownership data are taken from the year 2005. Table XXVI, Panel 
A presents the distribution of ownership structures for our sample of private firms. 
Column 1 lists the six different ownership structures into which firms are 
categorized; (1) firms that are owned by a single individual, (2) firms that are owned 
only by a single family, (3) firms that are owned by multiple families only, (4) firms 
that are owned jointly by a combination of families and private companies including 
investment funds, (5) firms that are owned exclusively by private holding companies 
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 When agency costs from ownership-control separation are relevant, cash-rich firms are more likely 
to engage in value destroying acquisitions (Harford, 1999), shareholders assign a lower value to cash 
holdings in diversified firms (Tong, 2011) and in firms with poor corporate governance (Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Klacheva and Lins, 2007), while firms with weaker corporate governance hold 
smaller cash holdings (Harford et al., 2008).  
71
 Each yearly installment of the FAME data produced by Bureau Van Dijk contains the latest 
available ownership and management structure data and 10 years of financial statement data. 
However, ownership data prior to 2005 is extremely sparse and unreliable.  
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and (6) firms that are categorized as public, not quoted. Even-numbered columns 
present the number of firms that are owner-managed.
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**** Insert Table XXVI here **** 
 Table XXVI, Panel B presents company level summary statistics for firms 
based on ownership structures. An average one owner firm is small and holds a 
larger proportion of its assets (37%) as cash. Median assets increase and median cash 
holdings decrease monotonically as we move away from the one owner firms 
increasing as the number of owners increases. Firms that are owned by a single 
individual or a single family are on average younger than firms that are owned by 
holding companies. The distribution of Quiscores' across ownership classifications 
indicates the sample firms tend to fall in the normal or better regions for the index.  
Firms owned by a single individual or a single family are younger.  
 
 A. Univariate analysis  
 Results presented so far suggest a strong relation between firm size and cash 
holdings. We examine whether a similar relation exists between firm size and 
governance characteristics. We sort firms into size quintiles each year. The mean and 
median cash holdings and governance variables within the 1st, 3rd and 5th size 
quintiles are reported in Table XXVII, Panel A. We perform t-tests for differences in 
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 These firms constitute a subset of firms examined by Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2011). Please 





mean and Wilcoxon tests for differences in medians to examine whether the reported 
means and medians are significantly different across the 1st and 5th quintiles. The 
results suggest significant differences between the 1st and 5th quintiles for all of the 
variables. Smaller firms have more cash, higher insider ownership and concentration 
(number of shareholders who are directors scaled by total number of directors) and a 
large majority are managed by owners.  
**** Insert Table XXVII here **** 
 Next, we examine the relation among the governance variables using a 
double sort. We sort using firm size quintiles and then using a proxy for agency 
costs. Prior studies examining publicly traded companies use indices such as the 
GIndex (Gompers, Ishi and Metric, 2003) or the EIndex (Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell, 2009) as proxies of agency costs.
73
 However, such indices are not available 
for privately held firms. Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2011) address this issue by 
creating an Agency Cost Index (hereafter ACI).
74
 Larger values of ACI indicate 
higher agency costs. They verify the validity of the ACI by showing that ACI is 
related to the GIndex and EIndex described above for publicly traded companies.  
 We use ACI as our proxy for agency costs. We sort the ACI into quartiles 
and examine the mean and median levels of the other governance variables between 
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 It has been argued that firms with higher agency costs are associated with weak corporate 
governance.  
74
 ACI is calculated based upon a multivariate factor analysis of several accounting variables widely 
used as agency cost proxies. The factor score of the dominant factor explaining the non-unique 
variance is used as the index of agency costs. Please refer to Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2011) for 
more details.  
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the 1st (lower agency costs) and the 4th (higher agency costs) quartiles within each 
of the five size quintiles. We only report the extreme quartiles within each quintile 
for the sake of brevity. To test for significance across the ACI quartiles, we perform 
t-tests for differences in mean and Wilcoxon tests for differences in medians. Results 
are presented in Table XXVII, Panel B. Within each size quintile, we find that firms 
with lower agency costs (1st quartile ACI) have insider ownership measures and a 
larger proportion of these firms are owner managed. The panel also provides 
evidence on the univariate relation between cash holdings and the governance 
variables while effectively controlling for firm size. We find large, statistically 
significant differences between cash holdings based on the ACI quartiles. For 
example, in the smallest size quintile, firms with lower agency costs have median 
cash holdings of 40% relative to 33% for firms with higher agency costs. Firms with 
lower agency costs hold significantly more cash across all size quintiles.  
 
B. Multivariate analysis 
 We next examine the relation between agency costs and cash holdings in a 
multivariate setting. The dependent variable in all regressions is Cash defined as cash 
plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. The independent variables are governance-
related variables and financial variables that are found to be determinants of cash 
holdings in private firms.  
An important issue in governance related studies is the endogenous nature of 
governance structures and firm performance measures. Put simply, while governance 
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structure may affect cash holdings, it is possible that cash holdings may also be one 
of the determinants of governance structures. Prior theory suggests that the causality 
between governance and cash holding is more likely to be influenced by the firm's 
governance structure than vice versa. For example, Kalcheva and Lins (2008) in their 
study of the relationship between cash holdings and governance measures rely on 
OLS regressions of cash holdings on governance proxies in a given year. One 
alternative approach to controlling for endogeneity is two-stage least squares 
estimation. However, the ability to identify exogenous variables in the first stage that 
are not related to the second-stage dependent variable determines the validity of 
2SLS models. Unfortunately, prior empirical and theoretical work on corporate 
governance and cash holdings use similar control variables, which leaves us with 
little insight in determining reasonable instrumental variables.  
We address this issue by first examining whether ownership is sticky and 
does not tend to vary over time for our sample companies.
75
  Constant ownership 
levels in companies would effectively make ownership an exogenous, predetermined 
variable which is a sufficient condition to motivate its use as an independent variable 
in a performance regression (Smith and Watts (1992)). Even though we find that 
ownership is indeed sticky and does not tend to vary over time, we use lagged 
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 While it might be possible for an owner to increase her equity investment, she will be constrained 
by her own personal resources (Berger and Udell, 2002; Cole, Wolken and Woodburn, 1996). In most 
private company settings, especially those cases involving a single owner, most of the owner‟s wealth 
is likely to already be tied up in the company she owns. As a result of this resource constraint and the 
fact that such ownership interests are not easily transferable, investors in close corporations cannot 
easily adjust their ownership positions as conditions change.  
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ownership and management classification data in our analysis to minimize any 
possibility of contemporaneous jointly determined effects.   
**** Insert Table XXVIII here **** 
 Table XXVIII, column 2 presents results of regression specification where 
the dependent variable is cash and the independent variables include financial 
variables and a proxy for agency costs, agency cost index, ACI. As expected, the 
coefficient estimate on this variable is negative and significant. All other financial 
variables retain the correct signs and significance from Table XXIV.  Next, we test 
for a non-linear relation between cash holdings and agency costs. We do this by 
sorting our sample firms into quartiles based on ACI and then create two dummy 
variables. ACI 1st Quartile dummy the equals 1 if a firm belongs to the first quartile 
(lower agency costs) and 0 otherwise. ACI 4th Quartile is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a firm belongs to the fourth quartile (higher agency costs) and 0 
otherwise. We replace ACI with these dummy variables and rerun the regression 
specification. The coefficient estimates on both these dummy variables are 
significant and similar in size, which suggests that a linear specification my indeed 
correctly capture the relation. We use two additional proxies for agency costs and the 
results of these specifications are presented in Table XXVIII, columns 4 and 5. The 
results are robust to these alternate governance measures and indicate a negative 
relation between cash holdings and agency costs.  Overall, the results suggest that 





 This study examines cash policy of more than 40,000 U.K. based private 
firms for the 2000-2009 period. We examine the determinants of private firms cash 
holdings.  
 We first assess the success of the trade-off and the financing hierarchy 
models in explaining changes in cash holdings of private firms. We find that the cash 
holdings of private firms revert to the mean indicating that these firms have target 
cash levels. In fact, the rate of mean reversion is higher in private companies when 
compared to the rate of mean reversion in publicly traded firms. Finding that private 
firms do have target cash levels, we attempt to distinguish more directly between the 
trade-off model and the financing hierarchy models. The results indicate that both 
these models are relevant in explaining the changes in cash holdings of private firms. 
It seems the two models capture different aspects of the change in cash holdings of 
private firms.    
 We then empirically test the determinants of cash holdings in private firms. 
The results suggest that smaller firms, which are younger, riskier and presumably 
more financially constrained, hold significantly more cash and less cash substitutes 
than bigger firms. Reported evidence of a panel data analysis supports both the trade-
off model and financing hierarchy model. With respect to the former model, we find 
that firms with more growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold more cash. In 
addition, we document a negative relation between leverage and cash holdings. This 
result is consistent with the predictions of the financing hierarchy theory. Private 
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firms that pay dividends hold more cash. Evidence also shows that net working 
capital can be considered as a cash substitute.  
 We also investigate the relation between cash holdings and governance 
structures in private firms. We find in the cross-section and over time that private 
firms with high insider ownership have higher cash holdings, while firms that are not 
owner managed have lower cash holdings. Overall, firms with lower agency costs 
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Chapter 1 Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 





board controlled by insiders + board authorized to change boards without shareholder 
approval + board can amend bylaws without shareholder approval 
CAR2 Cumulative abnormal returns measured over the (0, 1) period  
CAR3 Cumulative abnormal returns measured over the (-1, 1) period  
CAR5 Cumulative abnormal returns measured over the (-2, 2) period  
Debt ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
Executive 
ownership 
fraction of shares held by insiders 
FCF 
 
(net income plus depreciation and change in working capital less capital expenditures) 
/ total assets 
Firm Risk standard deviation of profitability 
Institutional 
ownership 
average quarterly institutional ownership over the previous four calendar quarters 
Profitability earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets 




incorporated in state with control share provisions + cash out provision + freeze out 




poison pill + sunset provision + qualified offer provision + super majority requirement 
to approve merger + incorporated in a state with anti-takeover provision 
Tax Ratio total income taxes scaled by sales 




staggered board + super majority requirement for charter amendment + dual class 




3.3*(earnings before interest and tax/sales) + sale/assets + 1.4*(retained earnings/total 





APPENDIX B:   
Chapter II Sample Creation 
 
Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 
2005, October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. We use current year‟s 
financial data and lagged ownership and management data. For example, financial data for year 2006 
come from the October 2006 update  and ownership and management data are extracted from the 
update dated October 2005.  
A.  Ownership Structures 
A.1.  Initial screening criteria for company selection  
Criteria Employed 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Include firms with Min. Assets of $5,000 and Min. Sales of $1,000 280,728 279,270 269,060 246,039 
Exclude firms with the following SIC codes: 10-14 (mining), 40 
(electricity), 64-70 (finance), 75 (social services), 80 (education) SIC = 
7415 or 7487 (management of holding companies category. These firms 
solely exist for the purpose of being a holding company and hence, 
financial information is often unavailable) 
200,019 192,651 182,996 168,233 
Exclude firms where account type is not available 199,500 191,259 181,716 167,133 
Restrict sample to private limited, public not quoted, public quoted firms 
on LSE, AIM and OFEX 
187,394 180,522 173,019 158,377 
Net after exclusions 187,394 180,522 173,019 158,377 
Of which 
    
Private firms where all owners  are individuals 128,527 123,053 116,109 103,168 
Private firms with at least one non-individual owner, such as a holding 
company 54,847 53,715 53,382 51,949 
Public, Not Quoted and Public, Quoted Firms 4,020 3,754 3,528 3,260 
 
A.2.  Stand-alone firms  
Firms in this category are classified as stand-alone firms as these firms do not have any subsidiaries 
and are not affiliated with any holding companies. The following table documents the steps taken to 
further categorize firms owned by individuals.  
Criteria Employed 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Private firms where all owners are  individuals (From Table A.1) 128,527 123,053 116,109 103,168 
Exclude private firms with unclear owner names76  124,241 118,612 111,866 99,025 
Exclude private firms where the stake of the identified owners is  less 
than 98% 
119,141 118,282 111,605 94,650 
Of which     
Net after exclusions 119,141 118,282 111,605 94,650 
Private firms in which a single individual owns 100% of the firm 46,674 46,598 45,254 40,247 
Private firms in which multiple individuals own 100% of the firm 72,467 71,684 66,351 54,403 
 
A.3.  Private firms with at least one non-individual owner 
The following table documents the steps taken to categorize firms where a non-individual such as a 
mutual fund, bank, or industrial company is present as a shareholder. 
Criteria Employed 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Private firms with at least one non-individual owner (From Table 
A.1) 54,847 53,715 53,382 51,949 
                                                          
76
 We search for characters such as „executors of‟, „family‟, „trustee‟, „committee‟, „foundation‟ etc., 
and for firms where multiple shareholders are listed on the same line. A complete list of search terms 




Criteria Employed 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Exclude private firms with unclear owner names     
Exclude private firms where the stake of the identified owners is less 
than 98% 
    
Net after exclusions 42,412 43,719 43,711 40,726 
Of which     
Private firms owned by a combination of individuals and other firms  4,577 5,354 5,173 3,580 
Private firms wholly-owned by other firms 37,835 38,365 38,538 37,146 
 
A.4.  Summary of ownership structures for firms in the sample 
Ownership Structure 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Private firms in which a single individual owns 100% of the firm 46,674 46,598 45,254 40,247 
Private firms owned by One Family 39,612 38,279 35,429 29,718 
Private firms owned by Multiple Families 32,855 33,405 30,922 24,685 
 Private firms owned by a combination of individuals and other firms 4,577 5,354 5,173 3,580 
 Private firms wholly-owned by other firms 37,835 38,365 38,538 37,146 
Public, Not Quoted and Public, Quoted Firms 4,020 3,754 3,528 3,260 
Total 165,573 165,755 158,844 138,636 
 
B.  Management Structures 
In order to categorize firms into owner-managed and non owner-managed groups, we match firms 
from the ownership file with those in the directors file using the company‟s registered number issued 
by Companies House. We examine the directors file carefully and remove all name duplications. We 
retain current directors and calculate their age and tenure as of the current year‟s financial statement 
date. We determine the presence of shareholders among directors through two methods. First, we 
identify cases where the directors file explicitly states that a particular director is a shareholder. Since 
it is possible that some directors who are shareholders are not stated as such, we complement the 
information provided by Bureau Van Dijk by a combination of programmable and manual searches to 
make sure we identify all shareholders among directors. The following table provides the distribution 
of firms based on owner-managed and non owner-managed categories. Owner-managed firms (OM) 
are those where the ratio of shareholders among directors to total number of directors is equal to 1, 
that is where the following ratio is equal to 1  The remaining companies in the sample are identified as 
non-owner-managed (NOM). 
“Concentration” measures the proportion of managing directors who are also shareholders of the 
firm. Concentration is calculated as follows: 
directorsmanagingofNumber
directorsmanagingamongstrsshareholdeofNumber
ionConcentrat     
 
   2006 2007 2008 2009 
  OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM 
One Owner 33,759 12,568 33,721 12,673 32,645 12,385 29,638 10,496 
One Family 35,190 4,174 34,190 4,037 31,619 3,752 26,683 2,993 
Multiple Families 24,957 7,609 25,148 8,040 23,103 7,665 18,715 5,919 



















Public, Quoted   1,207   1,196   1,147   1,075 




B.1. Final Sample 
As a final selection criteria, we require that all firms in the sample have non-missing values for AT 
(Total sales / Total assets), OPEXP (Operating expenses / Total sales), and EBITD (Earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization / Total assets) values, as defined in Appendix B. 
Application of these criteria results in the following sample: 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Row Total 
  OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM 
One Owner 33,542 12,416 33,519 12,534 32,444 12,235 29,440 10,353 176,483 
One Family 34,942 4,140 33,947 4,012 31,381 3,735 26,483 2,974 141,614 
Multiple Families 24,728 7,494 24,894 7,918 22,900 7,544 18,513 5,814 119,805 
Families & Holding Cos. 1,226 3,103 1,391 3,701 1,293 3,612 884 2,519 17,729 


















Public, Quoted   1,189   1,185   1,139   1,071 4,584 













Accounting Quality Set of 7 dummy variables representing the different types of accounts filed by firms.  
AGE Firm age measured in years from date of incorporation to statement date 
ASSETS Total assets, measured in thousands 
AT Asset turnover ratio, defined as Total sales / Total assets 
BANKLOAN Bank loans outstanding / Total assets 
Concentration No. of shareholders among directors /  No. of directors 
DIFF Difference between the ownership stakes of the largest and second largest shareholders 
EBITD Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization / Total assets 
E-Index Index of corporate governances constructed according to Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) 
G-Index Index of corporate governances constructed according to Gompers, Ishi and Metrick (2003) 
Financial Characteristics SIZE, SIZE2, AGE, BANKLOAN, T.LIABILITIES, NBRSUBS, NBRHOLD 
HIGH CONC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder owns more than 75% of the firm and 
zero otherwise 
ACI 
Agency cost index equal to the factor score calculated from a factor analysis of deviations of 
AT, OPEXP and EBITD from the respective averages for the zero agency cost firms, first 
principal factor 
ACI-2 
Agency cost index equal to the factor score calculated from a factor analysis of deviations of 
AT, OPEXP including cost of goods sold and EBITD from the respective averages for the zero 
agency cost firms, first principal factor 
INDI_FAM 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned by a combination of families and holding 
companies and zero otherwise 
Industry Controls Set of 19 dummy variables representing the 19 industry sectors presented in Panel B, Table 1 
Largest Stake Ownership stake of the largest shareholder 
LOW CONC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder owns less than 50% of the firm and zero 
otherwise 
MED CONC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder owns between 50% - 75% of the firm 
and zero otherwise 
MUL FAM Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned by a multiple families and zero otherwise 
MUL FAM - NOM 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned by multiple families and not managed by 
them and zero otherwise 
MUL FAM - OM 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned and managed by multiple families and zero 
otherwise 
NBRHOLD No. of holding companies (direct and indirect holding companies) 
NBRSUBS No. of subsidiaries (at least 50% owned) 
NS 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is classified either as INDI_FAM or WO and zero 
otherwise 
ONE FAM Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned by a single family and zero otherwise 
ONE FAM - NOM 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned by a single family and not managed by that 
family and zero otherwise 
ONE FAM - OM 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned and managed by a single family and zero 
otherwise 
ONE OWNER - NOM 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned by a single individual and not managed by 
him and zero otherwise 
OPEXP Operating expenses / Total sales 




PUBLICQ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is classified as public quoted and zero otherwise 
QUISCORE 
Credit score produced by CRIF Decision Solutions Ltd. This score is a measure of the likelihood 
of company failure in the year following the date of calculation 
Riskiness  Set of 5 dummy variables representing the five bands of Quiscore.  
SECOND Ownership stake of the second largest shareholder 
SIZE Log(Total Sales) 
T. LIABILITIES (Total Assets – Shareholders Equity)/ Total Assets 

























Figure I. Median Cash-to-Assets, 2000-2009 
The figure reports the evolution of cash holdings in the 2000-2009 sample period for the 42,036 
private firms and 284,082 firm-year observations. Cross-sectional median cash-to-assets ratios for 
private companies are presented. Similar statistics for 525 public companies and 3,817 firm-year 
observations are presented for comparison purposes. The time steps are annual. Cash-to-assets ratio is 































Figure II. Distribution of Coefficients on Lagged Change in Cash 
The figure presents the distribution of coefficients on lagged change in cash from the firm-wise 
regression: 
                          
where   is a first difference operator, and time steps are annual. Cash is defined as cash plus bank 
deposits scaled by total assets. The chart includes information on 34,946 U.K. private firms with at 
least five years of data on cash holdings in the 2000-2009 period. The mean and median coefficient 




















Regression Model Coefficients (beta)
Mean Reversion of Cash Holdings
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Table I.  Governance Characteristics  
This table provides summary statistics of various governance provisions available in the dataset 
provided by the Riskmetrics Group. The sample consists of all publicly traded corporations in the 
U.S. during 2002-2009. 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Board controlled by insiders & 
affiliated outsiders 
25.75% 22.76% 13.88% 30.12% 31.30% 31.61% 32.07% 33.35% 
Board size < 6 8.06% 17.67% 17.06% 16.60% 16.19% 16.66% 16.63% 17.42% 
The board is authorized to change size 
of board without shareholder approval 
. 70.51% 80.59% 80.68% 86.42% 87.35% 88.82% 89.70% 
Staggered Board 60.52% 54.64% 53.49% 51.89% 49.63% 48.79% 47.63% 46.64% 
Board can amend bylaws without 
shareholder approval 
87.45% 80.31% 83.48% 86.59% 88.72% 89.30% 91.52% 92.48% 
Chairman and CEO are combined 51.53% 51.33% 52.52% 49.55% 48.10% 45.82% 44.43% 43.76% 
A board approved CEO succession 
plan is in place 
4.32% 14.33% 34.82% 40.14% 53.55% 56.66% 59.97% 61.32% 
Poison Pill 59.63% 73.15% 73.89% 61.63% 60.30% 55.04% 47.01% 42.17% 
There is a  super majority vote 
requirement to amend charter/bylaws 
53.14% 44.73% 44.84% 46.26% 45.08% 45.42% 45.95% 47.26% 
There is a supermajority vote 
requirement to approve mergers 
36.55% 20.71% 21.68% 21.20% 22.48% 22.21% 20.57% 20.44% 
Dual class capital structure, super 
voting shares closely held by insiders 
10.73% 7.69% 5.88% 4.74% 4.86% 4.69% 4.30% 4.22% 
Incorporation in state with state anti-
takeover provisions 
96.83% 95.84% 96.12% 96.19% 96.32% 96.43% 96.65% 96.79% 
Incorporation in state w/ a control 
share acquisition statute 
20.08% 22.18% 21.49% 21.11% 20.48% 20.63% 19.60% 19.50% 
Incorporation in state with a control 
share cash-out statute 
2.21% 2.18% 1.90% 1.83% 1.70% 1.78% 1.56% 1.59% 
Incorporation in state with strong 
freeze-out provisions 
22.00% 22.91% 22.80% 22.79% 23.09% 22.55% 22.05% 22.26% 
Incorporation in state with a fair price 
provision 
29.89% 31.20% 31.49% 31.61% 31.61% 31.39% 30.53% 30.63% 
Officers + directors ownership as % of 
shares outstanding is >= 1% and <= 
5% 
27.85% 17.16% 19.70% 19.75% 21.62% 23.35% 23.55% 23.41% 
Officers + directors ownership as % of 
shares outstanding is > 5% and <= 
30% 
50.18% 51.82% 52.14% 50.34% 51.78% 49.29% 47.88% 47.69% 
No governance committee has been 
established 
74.00% 63.38% 38.01% 31.97% 28.73% 27.48% 25.87% 24.59% 
The governance committee met during 
the past year 
. 26.73% 46.34% 49.60% 63.57% 66.11% 66.63% 68.73% 
Governance details are publicly 
disclosed 
5.10% 19.44% 45.01% 49.87% 46.62% 48.67% 49.38% 51.11% 
Number of Firms 2,804 5,500 5,259 5,296 5,249 4,989 5,188 5,148 
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Table II.  Distribution of Number of Deals and Type of Bidder Over Time 
The sample comes from SDC and includes all completed mergers and going private transactions 
between 2002 and 2009 where the bidder acquires 51% or more of the controlling interest of the target 
firms. Column II presents the full sample distribution. Columns III through V present distributions of 
sub-samples based on different criteria. Merger refers to deals where acquirer is a publicly traded firm 
in the U.S. PE backed GP refers to deals where at least one private equity firm is involved as a bidder.  
 






I II III IV V 
2002 18 17 0 1 
2003 94 70 5 19 
2004 108 85 12 11 
2005 131 98 23 10 
2006 136 89 30 17 
2007 139 93 33 13 
2008 78 58 10 10 
2009 91 71 13 7 






Table III.  Summary Statistics  
Panel A compares firms that went private with a sample of firms that were taken over by other public 
firms and a sample of firms that remained public during 2002-2009. Please refer to Appendix for a 
description of variables. The last two columns present the p-value of differences in means calculated 
by employing t-tests for differences in means. Panel B presents pairwise correlations. Statistical 






 respectively.        
 
Variable 
Going Private  
Sample (GP) 
Merger Sample Survivors Test of Differences 
    
GP Vs. Merger GP Vs. Survivors 
Panel A 
     
Assets 1,372.9 1,797.0 3,812.6 0.027 0.000 
Market Value 1,302.4 1,864.5 2,432.8 0.003 0.000 
Tobins Q 1.596 2.082 2.010 0.000 0.000 
Book to Market 0.690 0.462 0.530 0.000 0.000 
Profitability 0.092 0.036 0.007 0.000 0.000 
FCF -0.020 -0.074 -0.141 0.004 0.000 
Debt 0.188 0.163 0.174 0.010 0.098 
Zscore 3.282 1.075 -1.683 0.000 0.000 
Asset Mix 0.276 0.215 0.204 0.000 0.000 
Tax Ratio 0.411 0.242 0.297 0.000 0.000 
Firm Risk 0.111 0.191 0.311 0.000 0.000 
Panel B 
     
Institutional Ownership 0.520 0.573 0.497 0.000 0.084 
Executive Ownership 0.125 0.118 0.110 0.458 0.093 
Takeover Restrictions 2.283 2.467 2.296 0.000 0.706 
BCI 1.341 1.275 1.270 0.048 0.020 
Voting Restrictions 2.395 2.499 2.407 0.004 0.720 
State Provisions 0.549 0.473 0.800 0.106 0.000 
G-Index 6.534 6.812 6.795 0.010 0.008 
Entrenchment Index 2.365 2.534 2.407 0.000 0.326 
Observations 765 2,150 19,978 
  
 
Panel  B: Pair-wise Correlations 
  BCI 
Takeover   Voting   
State Provisions Assets G-Index 
Restrictions  Restrictions  
Takeover  Restrictions 0.108**            
Voting  Restrictions 0.1493**  0.3292**  
    
State  Provisions -0.0897**  -0.0276**  -0.042**  
   
Assets -0.0409**  0.0217**  0.0226**  -0.0144*  
  
G-Index 0.1488**  0.6806**  0.5784**  0.5052**  -0.001 
 
E-Index 0.0942**  0.6144**  0.6685**  0.0002 0.031**  0.6586**  
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Table IV.  Baseline Regression Model 
Firm-year observations are treated as recurring censored events until the firm ceases to exist because 
of a going private transaction or a merger. Model I of Panel A presents results of a multinomial 
regression model where the probability of going private or a merger with another public company is 
measured against the probability of being a survivor. Model II of Panel A presents a specification 
where the going private sample is divided into private equity and non private equity backed deals. The 
regression model controls for time variation by including year dummy variables. Please refer to 
Appendix for a description of variables. Standard errors are corrected for firm-level clustering effects 
using a robust-variance estimation methodology. Panel B presents differences in coefficient estimates 











  Model I   Model II 
  Merger Sample GP Sample 
 
Merger Sample PE backed GP Non PE backed GP 
Constant -1.0832 -2.5097 
 




(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Size -0.3884 -0.2985 
 




(0.000)*** (0.086)* (0.000)*** 
FCF 0.0649 0.1707 
 




(0.414) (0.000)*** (0.776) 
Debt 0.2522 0.3432 
 




(0.158) (0.795) (0.117) 
Tobins Q -0.1022 -0.415 
 




(0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** 
Profitability -0.1214 0.6097 
 




(0.031)** (0.117) (0.660) 
Tax Ratio -0.0066 0.0001 
 




(0.046)** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** 
Z-Score 0.0015 0.0025 
 




(0.129) (0.498) (0.996) 
Asset Mix -0.3785 0.6391 
 




(0.137) (0.603) (0.000)*** 
Firm Risk -0.0236 -0.3141 
 




(0.473) (0.170) (0.641) 
Institutional Ownership 0.4005 0.0934 
 




(0.000)*** (0.087)* (0.336) 
Executive Ownership 0.4858 0.3138 
 




(0.363) (0.167) (0.560) 
Observations 22,893 22,893 
 












Table IV - (Continued) 
Panel B: 
 
  PE backed GP - Merger   
PE backed GP - Non 
PE backed GP 
  
Non PE backed GP - 
Merger 
  Δ beta  p-value  
 
Δ beta  p-value  
 
Δ beta  p-value  
























































Table V. Accounting for Governance Characteristics – Aggregate Governance Measure 
Firm-year observations are treated as recurring censored events until the firm ceases to exist. Panel A 
presents results of a multinomial regression model where the probability of undergoing an LBO or a 
merger with another public company is measured against the probability of being a survivor. Panel B 
presents a specification where the LBO sample is divided into private equity and non private equity 
backed deals. The regression model controls for time variation by including year dummy variables. 
Please refer to Appendix for a description of variables. Standard errors are corrected for firm-level 
clustering effects using a robust-variance estimation methodology. p-values are presented in 




  Model I   Model II 
  Merger Sample GP Sample   Merger Sample PE backed GP Non PE backed GP 
Constant -0.9496 -2.0199 
 




(0.018)** (0.000)*** (0.118) 
G-Index -0.0097 -0.052 
 




(0.553) (0.810) (0.065)* 
Size -0.3956 -0.3041 
 




(0.000)*** (0.068)* (0.000)*** 
FCF 0.1541 0.1099 
 




(0.079)* (0.000)*** (0.564) 
Debt 0.2649 0.3886 
 




(0.158) (0.793) (0.053)* 
Tobins Q -0.1017 -0.4448 
 




(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** 
Profitability -0.1653 0.6234 
 




(0.001)*** (0.173) (0.676) 
Tax Ratio -0.0064 0.0000 
 




(0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.006)*** 
ZScore 0.0021 0.0025 
 




(0.157) (0.593) (0.839) 
Asset Mix -0.2518 0.7005 
 




(0.347) (0.734) (0.000)*** 
Riskiness -0.0271 -0.3965 
 




(0.465) (0.171) (0.688) 
Institutional Ownership 0.4473 0.1063 
 




(0.000)*** (0.070)* (0.227) 
Executive Ownership 0.5084 0.274 
 




(0.543) (0.185) (0.758) 
Observations 20,962 20,962 
 








Table VI. Accounting for Governance Characteristics  
Firm-year observations are treated as recurring censored events until the firm ceases to exist because 
of a going private transaction or a merger. Model I of Panel A presents results of a multinomial 
regression model where the probability of going private or a merger with another public company is 
measured against the probability of being a survivor. Model II of Panel A presents a specification 
where the going private sample is divided into private equity and non private equity backed deals. The 
regression model controls for time variation by including year dummy variables. Please refer to 
Appendix for a description of variables. Standard errors are corrected for firm-level clustering effects 
using a robust-variance estimation methodology. Panel B presents differences in coefficient estimates 







statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A 
  Model I   Model II 
  Merger Sample GP Sample   Merger Sample PE backed GP Non PE backed GP 
Constant -1.8599 -3.0183 
 




(0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.108) 
Takeover Restrictions 0.09 -0.0752 
 




(0.138) (0.872) (0.023)** 
BCI -0.0893 0.2695 
 




(0.215) (0.009)*** (0.921) 
Voting Restrictions 0.0523 -0.0697 
 




(0.544) (0.899) (0.534) 
State Provisions -0.1855 -0.1548 
 




(0.001)*** (0.136) (0.568) 
Size -0.2038 -0.173 
 




(0.000)*** (0.065)* (0.000)*** 
FCF 0.1665 -0.0063 
 




(0.030)** (0.000)*** (0.597) 
Debt 0.1545 0.3563 
 




(0.234) (0.869) (0.063)* 
Tobins Q -0.0966 -0.3742 
 




(0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** 
Profitability -0.1538 1.1263 
 




(0.001)*** (0.151) (0.654) 
Z-Score 0.002 0.0037 
 




(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.010)** 
Tax Ratio -0.0056 0.0006 
 




(0.158) (0.315) (0.878) 
Asset Mix -0.5016 0.561 
 




(0.413) (0.911) (0.000)*** 
Firm Risk -0.0248 -2.0046 
 




(0.428) (0.144) (0.669) 
Institutional Ownership 0.3822 0.0758 
 




(0.000)*** (0.092)* (0.235) 
Executive Ownership 0.0151 0.0428 
 




(0.495) (0.189) (0.766) 
Observations 20962 20962 
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Table VII: Predicted Probabilities 
Panels A through D present predicted probabilities of possible outcomes for various values of BCI, 
Takeover restrictions, Voting restrictions and State provisions respectively. Values of all other 
variables are fixed at the respective means. Coefficient estimates from the regression results presented 
in Model II of Panel A, Table 6 are used to compute the probabilities. Merger Sample includes firms 
acquired by publicly traded firms. PE backed GP includes GPs backed by a private equity firm and 
Non PE backed GP includes GPs undertaken by private acquirers other than private equity firms. 
Basecase includes firms that remained public in a given year.  
 
Panel A 
  Merger   PE backed GP   Non PE backed GP   Basecase 
  Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob 





















BCI = 3 0.0165 -9.84%   0.0050 42.86%   0.0015 0.00%   0.9771 0.03% 
 
Panel B 
  Merger   PE backed GP   Non PE backed GP   Basecase 
  Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob 













































  Merger   PE backed GP   Non PE backed GP   Basecase 
  Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob 





























Voting Restrictions = 4 0.0199 4.19%   0.0025 -3.85%   0.0016 6.67%   0.9759 -0.09% 
 
Panel D 
  Merger   PE backed GP   Non PE backed GP   Basecase 
  Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob   Prob Δprob 









































Table VIII.  Wealth Effects to Target Shareholders 
The sample comes from SDC and includes all completed mergers between 2002 and 2009 where the 
bidder acquires 51% or more of the controlling interest of the target. Merger Sample refers to deals 
where the acquirer is a publicly traded U.S. corporation. GP sample refers to all going private 
transactions. PE backed GP refers to all GPs backed by a private equity firm and Non PE backed GP 
refers to going private transactions undertaken by private acquirers other than private equity firms. 
Please refer to Appendix for a description of variables. Panel A presents average event period returns 
for various types of acquisitions. The last column reports the p-values of differences in means 
calculated by employing t-tests for differences in mean. Panel B presents results of second step in a 
two-step Heckman estimation. Dependent variable is CAR(-1,+1). Selection equation estimates the 
probability of  a firm going private. Results of this step are not presented for the sake of brevity. p-
values are presented in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 












Merger Sample GP Sample PE backed GP Non PE backed GP Diff. of Means Merger vs GP 
CAR(-1,+1) 0.2503 0.2141 0.2126 0.2141 0.056 
CAR(-2,+2) 0.2571 0.2175 0.2143 0.2203 0.038 


































Table VIII - (Continued) 
Panel B: 
 
Model I Model II Model III 
Constant -0.472 -0.4735 0.0938 
 
(0.313) (0.312) (0.877) 
Takeover Restrictions -0.0184 -0.0189 -0.0253 
 
(0.617) (0.608) (0.481) 
BCI 0.0612 0.0686 0.0495 
 
(0.108) (0.212) (0.389) 
Voting Restrictions 0.0295 0.0289 -0.0034 
 
(0.396) (0.414) (0.925) 
State Provisions -0.0203 -0.0201 -0.0197 
 
(0.393) (0.398) (0.422) 
Size -0.0411 -0.0427 -0.0418 
 






















































   
(0.271) 
Endogeneity Correction 0.317 0.315 0.207 
 
(0.089)* (0.091)* (0.379) 
Observations 21,857 21,857 21,848 





Table IX.  Average Annual Changes in Governance Provisions 
This table presents average annual changes in governance provisions across various groups. Merger 
Sample includes firms acquired by publicly traded firms. PE backed GP includes GPs backed by a 
private equity firm and Non PE backed GP includes GPs undertaken by private acquirers other than 
private equity firms. Basecase includes firms that remained public in a given year.  Please refer to 
Appendix for a description of variables. The last three columns report the p-values of differences in 
means calculated by employing t-tests for differences in mean. 
 
 
PE backed GP Basecase 
Merger  
Sample 
Non PE  
backed GP 
Test of Means, p-values 
Provision I II III IV I vs II I vs III I vs IV 
BCI 0.07143 0.04668 0.06862 0.00483 0.4303 0.9361 0.6716 
Takeover Restrictions 0.01437 0.00059 0.01012 0.04348 0.6099 0.8855 0.4640 
State Provisions -0.00287 -0.01221 -0.00578 0.0791 0.0782 0.6704 0.1571 
Voting Restrictions 0.00575 0.00895 -0.00651 0.03955 0.8801 0.5911 0.5465 
BCF 0.00287 -0.02336 -0.03109 0.00483 0.4140 0.3408 0.9671 






Table X. Distribution of the Sample Across Owner/Manager Classifications 
This table presents the distribution of the sample based upon six different ownership structures. 
Owner managed firms are those where all directors are shareholders. Panel B presents industry 
patterns of various sub-samples. Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced by 
Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 
2009. We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and management data. Refer to 
Appendix A for details about the classification of firms.  
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Row 
Total   OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
One Owner 33,542 12,416 33,519 12,534 32,444 12,235 29,440 10,353 176,483 
One Family 34,942 4,140 33,947 4,012 31,381 3,735 26,483 2,974 141,614 
Multiple Families 24,728 7,494 24,894 7,918 22,900 7,544 18,513 5,814 119,805 



















Public, Quoted   1,189   1,185   1,139   1,071 4,584 





Table XI. Industry Classification and Ownership Classification (Fractions of Sample) 
This table presents industry patterns of various sub-samples. Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated 
October 2005, October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. 














Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 1.10% 1.71% 0.98% 1.77% 1.08% 1.09% 1.07% 
Fishing 0.05% 0.07% 0.12% 0.11% 0.14% 0.05% 0.04% 
Manufacture of Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 0.29% 0.48% 0.52% 1.33% 1.68% 1.14% 3.18% 
Manufacture of Textiles and Textile Products 0.38% 0.39% 0.48% 0.55% 0.78% 1.03% 1.61% 
Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products 0.03% 0.06% 0.05% 0.08% 0.08% 0.06% 0.24% 
Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products 0.27% 0.40% 0.45% 0.34% 0.41% 0.18% 0.11% 
Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products Publishing 1.46% 1.53% 2.54% 2.61% 3.29% 2.94% 3.47% 
Manufacture of Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic products 0.28% 0.40% 0.61% 1.13% 3.11% 2.09% 5.63% 
Manufacture of Metallic and Non-metallic Mineral Products 1.59% 2.41% 2.67% 2.79% 5.75% 3.92% 5.91% 
Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.56% 0.77% 1.17% 1.30% 3.37% 3.63% 9.01% 
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 0.27% 0.30% 0.29% 0.49% 1.01% 0.75% 0.89% 
Manufacturing Not Elsewhere Classified 0.87% 1.13% 1.40% 1.25% 2.08% 2.20% 1.94% 
Total Manufacturing 6.00% 7.87% 10.17% 11.86% 21.56% 17.94% 32.00% 
Construction 15.05% 17.37% 14.25% 8.31% 7.09% 8.54% 3.88% 
Wholesale Trade 4.72% 5.87% 6.58% 9.52% 11.21% 13.77% 5.50% 
Retail Trade 7.65% 8.91% 7.99% 5.65% 3.89% 3.53% 5.17% 
Hotels and Restaurants 4.64% 4.37% 6.00% 4.17% 3.68% 2.34% 2.68% 
Transport, Storage and Communication 4.88% 4.46% 4.67% 5.31% 7.16% 7.67% 6.68% 
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 45.13% 40.98% 38.04% 41.86% 34.28% 36.67% 35.49% 
Other Services 10.79% 8.38% 11.19% 11.44% 9.91% 8.40% 7.48% 








Table XII. Summary Statistics 
The table show basic statistics about the firms in the sample. The number of observations in the sample, N, corresponds to observations with non-missing 
values of total assets. Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, October 2006, November 
2007, October 2008 and October 2009. Please refer to Appendix B for a description of the variables reported in the table.  
  One Owner One Family Multiple Families 







Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ASSETS (M £) 288 35 444 60 848 95 5,670 329 23,762 3,474 65,642 4,597 563,216 39,394 
AT 2.98 2.25 2.74 2.11 2.80 2.13 2.08 1.41 1.94 1.36 1.70 1.35 1.10 0.91 
OPEXP 0.52 0.40 0.50 0.38 0.53 0.39 0.67 0.38 0.57 0.30 0.73 0.33 2.18 0.44 
EBITD 0.66 0.34 0.56 0.27 0.32 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.09 
T. 
LIABILITIES 
0.81 0.71 0.77 0.69 0.88 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.73 0.75 0.65 0.56 0.52 
BANKLOAN 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.03 
AGE (Years) 7.05 4.09 10.69 6.48 10.54 6.04 13.34 7.98 20.4 14.28 21.41 15.92 25.97 11.97 
QUISCORE 47 45 52 48 51 49 58 58 71 77 75 85 77 85 
ACI -0.12 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.56 0.25 
Concentration 0.81 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.46 0.50 . . . . . . 









Table XIII. Relationship Between ACI and Governance Indices 
This table presents results of a regression analysis relating the agency cost index ACI to corporate 
governance index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003), labeled here the GIM-Index, and the 
Entrenchment index proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), labeled here the E-Index.  Governance data 
used in the construction of the indices are from the Riskmetrics Group. „Company Specific Controls‟ 
include: company size (log of annual sales and its square), company age, bank debt scaled by total 
assets, total liabilities scaled by total assets,  likelihood of company failure (dummy variables for high 
risk, normal, stable and secure into which the Quiscore of a company falls with the „caution‟ band 
being the excluded group), dummy variables based on the type of financial statements filed (small 
company statements , medium company statements, total exemption small, total exemption full, 
partial exemption , full accounts and group accounts with small company statements being the 
excluded group), the number of subsidiaries and number of holding companies.  „Industry 
Affiliations‟ are dummy variables based upon the industry sectors presented in Table II with the 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded industry.  'Year Fixed Effects' are 
dummies for each year, with the first year indicator (2006) being the excluded dummy variable. 
Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering as described by Petersen (2009). Statistical 






(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.9664 0.8137 0.1343 0.8505 
 
(0.000)*** (0.039)** (0.004)*** (0.038)** 








   
(0.059)* (0.072)* 
Company Specific Controls No Yes No Yes 
Industry Affiliations No Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Firm Level Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters 424 386 424 386 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.171 0.321 0.004 0.317 







Table XIV. Agency Costs in Owner-Managed and Non Owner-Managed Firms: Multivariate 
Analysis 
The dependent variable proxying for agency costs in Panels A and B is the agency cost index ACI. Panel A presents results 
using the full sample. Panel B presents results using two sub-samples. Model specification 1 presents results using a sample of 
firms that are not exempt from auditing requirements or accountants' certification while filing their financials with the 
Companies House. Model specification 2 presents results using a sample of firms with a high probability of default as indicated 
by the QuiScore (i.e., QuiScore less than 20). Panel C presents results using alternate proxies for agency costs. The dependent 
variables proxying for agency costs in Model specification 1 and 2 of Panel C are the operating expenses to sales ratio and ACI-
2 respectively. NOM is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is not managed by the owners and 0 otherwise. Governance 
data used in the construction of the indices are from the Riskmetrics Group. „Company Specific Controls‟ include: company 
size (log of annual sales and its square), company age, bank debt scaled by total assets, total liabilities scaled by total assets,  
likelihood of company failure (dummy variables for high risk, normal, stable and secure into which the Quiscore of a company 
falls with the „caution‟ band being the excluded group), dummy variables based on the type of financial statements filed (small 
company statements , medium company statements, total exemption small, total exemption full, partial exemption , full 
accounts and group accounts with small company statements being the excluded group), the number of subsidiaries and number 
of holding companies.  „Industry Affiliations‟ are dummy variables based upon the industry sectors presented in Table II with 
the Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded industry.  'Year Fixed Effects' are dummies for each year, 
with the first year indicator (2006) being the excluded dummy variable. Please refer to Appendix B for a description of all 
variables.  Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, October 
2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and 
management data. Standard errors in model specifications 1 and 2 of Panel are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's 
(1980) methods. Standard errors in all remaining models are adjusted for firm-level clustering as described by Petersen (2009). 
Statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent levels are respectively denoted by * and **. 





  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 















































          












Table XV.  Agency Costs Across Firms with Different Ownership Structures 
The dependent variable proxying for agency costs in Panels A and B is the agency cost index ACI. Panel A presents 
results using the full sample. Panel B presents results using two sub-samples. Model specification 1 presents results 
using a sample of firms that are not exempt from auditing requirements or accountants' certification while filing their 
financials with the Companies House. Model specification 2 presents results using a sample of firms with a high 
probability of default as indicated by the QuiScore (i.e., QuiScore less than 20). Panel C presents results using alternate 
proxies for agency costs. The dependent variables proxying for agency costs in Model specification 1 and 2 of Panel C 
are the operating expenses to sales ratio and ACI-2 respectively. Firms with different ownership structures are indicated 
by dummy variables ONE FAM, MUL FAM, INDI_FAM, WO, PUBLICNQ and PUBLICQ. „Company Specific 
Controls‟ include: company size (log of annual sales and its square), company age, bank debt scaled by total assets, total 
liabilities scaled by total assets,  likelihood of company failure (dummy variables for high risk, normal, stable and 
secure into which the Quiscore of a company falls with the „caution‟ band being the excluded group), dummy variables 
based on the type of financial statements filed (small company statements , medium company statements, total 
exemption small, total exemption full, partial exemption , full accounts and group accounts with small company 
statements being the excluded group), the number of subsidiaries and number of holding companies.  „Industry 
Affiliations‟ are dummy variables based upon the industry sectors presented in Table II with the Agriculture, Hunting 
and Forestry industry being the excluded industry.  'Year Fixed Effects' are dummies for each year, with the first year 
indicator (2006) being the excluded dummy variable. Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced 
by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. We use 
current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and management data. Standard errors in model specifications 1 and 
2 of Panel are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) methods. Standard errors in all remaining models are 
adjusted for firm-level clustering as described by Petersen (2009). Statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent levels are 





  Panel A Panel B Panel C 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.679 0.688 0.670 0.532 1.308 1.353 0.470 
 
(0.006)** (0.009)** (0.015)** (0.024)** (0.148)** (0.020)** (0.015)** 
ONE FAM 0.030 0.029 0.024 0.010 0.017 0.015 0.026 
 
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.004)** -0.012 -0.023 (0.003)** (0.0041)** 
MUL FAM 0.102 0.102 0.094 0.010 0.104 0.058 0.108 
 
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.0041)** -0.012 (0.0225)** (0.0041)** (0.0042)** 
INDI_FAM 0.194 0.196 0.178 0.062 0.274 0.095 0.181 
 
(0.005)** (0.005)** (0.0076)** (0.0154)** (0.0538)** (0.0102)** (0.0077)** 
WO 0.177 0.178 0.170 0.071 0.294 0.115 0.165 
 
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.0055)** (0.0104)** (0.0808)** (0.0071)** (0.0054)** 
Public NQ 0.206 0.209 0.196 0.118 0.469 0.173 0.203 
 
(0.005)** (0.0055)** (0.0084)** (0.0140)** (0.1750)** (0.0124)** (0.0079)** 
Public Q 0.359 0.365 0.348 0.348 0.418 0.394 0.309 
 
(0.009)** (0.0096)** (0.0155)** (0.0715)** (0.1082)** (0.0267)** (0.0159)** 
Company Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Affiliations No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Level Clustering No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters - - 112,061 35,762 5,133 112,061 112,061 
Adj R2 0.185 0.187 0.18 0.196 0.298 0.215 0.172 




Table XVI. Magnitude of Agency Costs in Private Firms: Full Sample Multivariate Analysis 
The dependent variable proxying for agency costs in Panels A and B is the agency cost index ACI. Panel A presents results using the full sample. Panel B 
presents results using two sub-samples. Model specification 1 presents results using a sample of firms that are not exempt from auditing requirements or 
accountants' certification while filing their financials with the Companies House. Model specification 2 presents results using a sample of firms with a 
high probability of default as indicated by the QuiScore (i.e., QuiScore less than 20). Panel C presents results using alternate proxies for agency costs. The 
dependent variables proxying for agency costs in Model specification 1 and 2 of Panel C are the operating expenses to sales ratio and ACI-2 respectively.  
Firms with different ownership structures are indicated by dummy variables ONE FAM, MUL FAM, INDI_FAM, WO, NS, PUBLICNQ and PUBLICQ. 
Owner managed firms are those that are completely managed by shareholders. They are indicated by OM next to each ownership structure. Non owner 
managed firms are indicated by NOM.  „Company Specific Controls‟ include: company size (log of annual sales and its square), company age, bank debt 
scaled by total assets, total liabilities scaled by total assets,  likelihood of company failure (dummy variables for high risk, normal, stable and secure into 
which the Quiscore of a company falls with the „caution‟ band being the excluded group), dummy variables based on the type of financial statements filed 
(small company statements , medium company statements, total exemption small, total exemption full, partial exemption , full accounts and group 
accounts with small company statements being the excluded group), the number of subsidiaries and number of holding companies.  „Industry Affiliations‟ 
are dummy variables based upon the industry sectors presented in Table II with the Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded 
industry.  'Year Fixed Effects' are dummies for each year, with the first year indicator (2006) being the excluded dummy variable. Please refer to 
Appendix B for a description of all variables.  Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, 
October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and management data. 
Standard errors in model specifications 1 and 2 of Panel are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) methods. Standard errors in all remaining 














Table XVI - Continued 
  Panel A   Panel B Panel C 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.6368 0.6434 0.6252 0.8058 0.4654 1.2848 1.3311 0.4207 
 
(0.0061)** (0.0095)** (0.0152)** (0.0155)** (0.0284)** (0.1480)** (0.0207)** (0.0154)** 
Concentration 
   
-0.1253 
    
    
(0.0042)** 
    
One Owner NOM 0.1229 0.1235 0.1219 
 
0.1103 0.1219 0.057 0.1354 
 
(0.0038)** (0.0038)** (0.0059)** 
 
(0.0202)** (0.0305)** (0.0059)** (0.0061)** 
ONEFAM  0.053 0.0518 0.0459 
 
0.0563 0.0415 0.0252 0.0505 
 
(0.0027)** (0.0027)** (0.0044)** 
 
(0.0202)** (0.0249) (0.0038)** (0.0046)** 
ONEFAM NOM 0.1174 0.1182 0.1174 
 
0.0627 0.0653 0.0614 0.1297 
 
(0.0053)** (0.0053)** (0.0080)** 
 
(0.0144)** (0.0597) (0.0089)** (0.0082)** 
MULFAM  0.1253 0.125 0.1168 
 
0.0567 0.1236 0.0649 0.1348 
 
(0.0030)** (0.0030)** (0.0048)** 
 
(0.0192)** (0.0252)** (0.0045)** (0.0049)** 
MULFAM NOM 0.0553 0.0572 0.0576 
 
0.0493 0.0518 0.0424 0.0558 
 
(0.0042)** (0.0042)** (0.0062)** 
 
(0.0112)** (0.0403) (0.0069)** (0.0062)** 
INDI_FAM 0.2366 0.2393 0.2209 
 
0.1318 0.3056 0.1154 0.229 
 
(0.0055)** (0.0055)** (0.0079)** 
 
(0.0210)** (0.0547)** (0.0104)** (0.0080)** 
WO 0.2272 0.2298 0.2212 
 
0.1405 0.3276 0.1402 0.2214 
 
(0.0038)** (0.0038)** (0.0059)** 
 
(0.0176)** (0.0812)** (0.0074)** (0.0059)** 
Public NQ 0.2591 0.2633 0.2499 
 
0.1876 0.5058 0.1996 0.2622 
 
(0.0057)** (0.0057)** (0.0087)** 
 
(0.0199)** (0.1749)** (0.0126)** (0.0083)** 
Public Q 0.4145 0.4219 0.4046 
 
0.4183 0.4558 0.4223 0.3712 
 
(0.0097)** (0.0097)** (0.0157)** 
 
(0.0728)** (0.1081)** (0.0268)** (0.0161)** 
Company Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Affiliations No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Level Clustering No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters - - 112,061 109,073 35,762 5,133 112,061 112,061 
         Adjusted R-squared 0.189 0.191 0.184 0.174 0.197 0.3 0.216 0.176 











Table XVII.  Minority Expropriation and Shared Control: Multivariate Analysis 
The dependent variable proxying for agency costs in Panels A and B is the agency cost index ACI. Panel A 
presents results of three model specifications using the full sample. Panel B presents results using two sub-
samples. Model specification 1 presents results using a sample of firms that are not exempt from auditing 
requirements or accountants' certification while filing their financials with the Companies House. Model 
specification 2 presents results using a sample of firms with a high probability of default as indicated by the 
QuiScore (i.e., QuiScore less than 20). Panel C presents results using alternate proxies for agency costs. The 
dependent variables proxying for agency costs in Model specification 1 and 2 of Panel C are the operating 
expenses to sales ratio and ACI-2 respectively. The variables LOW CONC and HIGH CONC are dummy 
variables that are set to 1 if the largest shareholder owns less than 50% or above 75% of the firm respectively and 
zero otherwise. Governance data used in the construction of the indices are from the Riskmetrics Group. 
„Company Specific Controls‟ include: company size (log of annual sales and its square), company age, bank debt 
scaled by total assets, total liabilities scaled by total assets,  likelihood of company failure (dummy variables for 
high risk, normal, stable and secure into which the Quiscore of a company falls with the „caution‟ band being the 
excluded group), dummy variables based on the type of financial statements filed (small company statements , 
medium company statements, total exemption small, total exemption full, partial exemption , full accounts and 
group accounts with small company statements being the excluded group), the number of subsidiaries and 
number of holding companies.  „Industry Affiliations‟ are dummy variables based upon the industry sectors 
presented in Table II with the Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded industry.  'Year 
Fixed Effects' are dummies for each year, with the first year indicator (2006) being the excluded dummy variable. 
Please refer to Appendix B for a description of all variables.  Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data 
base produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and 
October 2009. We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and management data. Standard errors 
in model specifications 1 and 2 of Panel are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) methods. 
Standard errors in all remaining models are adjusted for firm-level clustering as described by Petersen (2009). 
Statistical significance at 5 and 1 percent levels are respectively denoted by * and **. 
 
  Panel A Panel B Panel C 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.9455 0.9422 0.9328 0.9146 1.6071 1.5975 0.6888 
 
(0.020)** (0.0207)** (0.0330)** (0.0686)** (0.2189)** (0.0516)** (0.0335)** 
LOW CONC -0.0292 -0.0297 -0.0271 -0.0311 -0.0842 -0.0367 -0.0256 
 
(0.004)** (0.0047)** (0.0076)** (0.0138)* (0.0470) (0.0079)** (0.0077)** 
HIGH CONC 0.0219 0.0784 0.0586 0.0406 0.1657 0.0443 0.0554 
 
(0.006)** (0.0098)** (0.0142)** (0.0224) (0.0984) (0.0178)* (0.0142)** 
HIGH CONC * OM 
 
-0.0934 -0.0774 -0.0668 -0.1996 -0.0635 -0.071 
  
(0.0112)** (0.0162)** (0.0262)* (0.1111) (0.0203)** (0.0163)** 
Company Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Affiliations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Level Clustering No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters - - 23,348 3,233 1,325 23,348 23,348 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.212 0.213 0.205 0.305 0.312 0.245 0.169 





Table XVIII. Minority Expropriation and Contestability: Multivariate Analyses Using 
Ownership Stake of the Second Largest Shareholder  
The dependent variable proxying for agency costs in Panels A and B is the agency cost index ACI. Panel A presents 
results using the full sample. Panel B presents results using two sub-samples. Model specification 1 presents results 
using a sample of firms that are not exempt from auditing requirements or accountants' certification while filing their 
financials with the Companies House. Model specification 2 presents results using a sample of firms with a high 
probability of default as indicated by the QuiScore (i.e., QuiScore less than 20). Panel C presents results using alternate 
proxies for agency costs. The dependent variables proxying for agency costs in Model specification 1 and 2 of Panel C 
are the operating expenses to sales ratio and ACI-2 respectively. SECOND refers to the ownership stake of second 
largest shareholder. Please refer to Appendix B for a description of all variables.  Governance data used in the 
construction of the indices are from the Riskmetrics Group. „Company Specific Controls‟ include: company size (log of 
annual sales and its square), company age, bank debt scaled by total assets, total liabilities scaled by total assets,  
likelihood of company failure (dummy variables for high risk, normal, stable and secure into which the Quiscore of a 
company falls with the „caution‟ band being the excluded group), dummy variables based on the type of financial 
statements filed (small company statements , medium company statements, total exemption small, total exemption full, 
partial exemption , full accounts and group accounts with small company statements being the excluded group), the 
number of subsidiaries and number of holding companies.  „Industry Affiliations‟ are dummy variables based upon the 
industry sectors presented in Table II with the Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded industry.  
'Year Fixed Effects' are dummies for each year, with the first year indicator (2006) being the excluded dummy variable. 
Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, October 
2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and 
management data. Standard errors in model specifications 1 and 2 of Panel are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using 
White's (1980) methods. Standard errors in all remaining models are adjusted for firm-level clustering as described by 






  Panel A Panel B Panel C 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.049 1.0735 1.0582 1.0039 1.8191 1.6489 0.807 
 
(0.021)** (0.0213)** (0.0337)** (0.0704)** (0.2259)** (0.0527)** (0.0237)** 
SECOND -0.0035 
      
 
(0.000)** 
      
LOW CONC * SECOND 
 
-0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0028 -0.0071 -0.0023 -0.0036 
  
(0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0005)** (0.0014)** (0.0003)** (0.0002)** 
MED CONC * SECOND 
 
-0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0027 -0.0066 -0.0019 -0.0039 
  
(0.0002)** (0.0003)** (0.0008)** (0.0020)** (0.0004)** (0.0002)** 
HIGH CONC * SECOND 
 
-0.0039 -0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0104 -0.0024 -0.0045 
  
(0.0005)** (0.0008)** (0.0013) (0.0054) (0.0009)** (0.0006)** 
Company Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Affiliations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Level Clustering Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters 
  
23,315 3,217 1,324 23,315 23,315 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.211 0.309 0.32 0.246 0.174 








Table XIX. Minority Expropriation and Contestability: Multivariate Analyses Using the 
Difference in Ownership Stakes of the Two Largest Shareholders  
The dependent variable proxying for agency costs in Panels A and B is the agency cost index ACI. Panel A presents 
results using the full sample. Panel B presents results using two sub-samples. Model specification 1 presents results 
using a sample of firms that are not exempt from auditing requirements or accountants' certification while filing their 
financials with the Companies House. Model specification 2 presents results using a sample of firms with a high 
probability of default as indicated by the QuiScore (i.e., QuiScore less than 20). Panel C presents results using alternate 
proxies for agency costs. The dependent variables proxying for agency costs in Model specification 1 and 2 of Panel C 
are the operating expenses to sales ratio and ACI-2 respectively. DIFF refers to the difference between the ownership 
stakes of the two largest shareholders. Please refer to Appendix B for a description of all variables.  Governance data 
used in the construction of the indices are from the Riskmetrics Group. „Company Specific Controls‟ include: company 
size (log of annual sales and its square), company age, bank debt scaled by total assets, total liabilities scaled by total 
assets,  likelihood of company failure (dummy variables for high risk, normal, stable and secure into which the Quiscore 
of a company falls with the „caution‟ band being the excluded group), dummy variables based on the type of financial 
statements filed (small company statements , medium company statements, total exemption small, total exemption full, 
partial exemption , full accounts and group accounts with small company statements being the excluded group), the 
number of subsidiaries and number of holding companies.  „Industry Affiliations‟ are dummy variables based upon the 
industry sectors presented in Table II with the Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry industry being the excluded industry.  
'Year Fixed Effects' are dummies for each year, with the first year indicator (2006) being the excluded dummy variable. 
Please refer to Appendix B for a description of all variables.  Data are obtained from updates of the FAME data base 
produced by Bureau Van Dijk dated October 2005, October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009. 
We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and management data. Standard errors in model 
specifications 1 and 2 of Panel are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) methods. Standard errors in all 
remaining models are adjusted for firm-level clustering as described by Petersen (2009). Statistical significance at 5 and 






  Panel A Panel B Panel C 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.9054 0.9014 0.8942 0.8839 1.5299 1.5485 0.6511 
 
(0.020)** (0.0202)** (0.0320)** (0.0675)** (0.2152)** (0.0503)** (0.0323)** 
DIFF 0.001       
 
(0.000)** 
      
LOW CONC * DIFF  
0.0043 0.004 0.0017 0.0071 0.0021 0.0039 
 
 
(0.0003)** (0.0004)** (0.0008)* (0.0031)* (0.0005)** (0.0004)** 
MED CONC * DIFF  
0.0016 0.0015 0.0012 0.0029 0.0013 0.0015 
 
 
(0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0004)** (0.0014)* (0.0002)** (0.0002)** 
HIGHT CONC * DIFF  
-0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0008 
  
(0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0002)** (0.0002)** 
Company Specific Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Affiliations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Level Clustering Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Clusters - - 23,315 3,217 1,324 23,315 23,315 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.213 0.214 0.206 0.304 0.313 0.245 0.17 








Table XX. Description of Variables for the 2000-2009 U.K sample 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on key variables for our sample of firm years from the 
2000-2009 sample of U.K. based firms. Data are obtained from update 260 (February 2011) of the 
FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk. Cash is defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by 
total assets. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets deflated using the CPI into 2005 
pound sterling. Cash flow (CF) is defined as profit after tax plus depreciation and amortization less 
common dividends scaled by total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is calculated without cash. Cash 
flow volatility (CF Volatility) is defined as the standard deviation of cash flows for the prior three 
years.  Total debt is defined as the sum of short term and long term debt scaled by total assets. Tax 
rate is defined as tax expense scaled by earnings before tax. Industry sigma is a measure of the 
volatility of an industry's cash flow for a 3 year period. Capital expenditures (Capex) are calculated as 
the change in total assets plus depreciation scaled by total assets. Cash conversion cycle (CCC) is 
given by the inventory conversion period plus the receivable's collection period minus the payment 
period for the accounts payable. Div dummy is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm pays 
dividend in a given year or 0 otherwise. Company count is the number of years a firm with non 
missing cash data is included in the sample. Quiscore, produced by CRIF Decision Solutions Ltd, is a 
measure of the likelihood of company failure in the year following the date of calculation. A higher 
score indicates lower probability of default. N is the number of non-missing observations in the 
sample for each variable. 
 
Private Firms   Public Firms 
Variable Mean 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile N 
 
Mean Median N 
Cash 0.235 0.024 0.122 0.363 284,082 
 
0.139 0.08 3,817 
Size 6.902 4.689 7.01 8.941 284,082 
 
10.99 11.116 3,817 
Firm Age 20.8 7.4 14.2 26.6 284,082 
 
33.4 18.8 3,817 
CF 0.036 -0.002 0.043 0.111 281,584 
 
-0.01 0.041 3,817 
NWC -0.09 -0.25 -0.029 0.163 283,269 
 
0.007 0.002 3,817 
CF Volatility 0.434 0.022 0.057 0.144 210,793 
 
0.099 0.035 2,930 
Total debt 0.408 0.079 0.259 0.548 221,631 
 
0.23 0.191 3,277 
Tax rate 0.166 0 0.19 0.278 275,915 
 
0.184 0.229 3,815 
Industry 
Sigma 
0.013 0.006 0.009 0.018 235,882 
 
0.014 0.012 3,074 
Capex 0.015 -0.06 0.043 0.152 280,962 
 
0.023 0.053 3,783 
Div Dummy 0.389 0 0 1 284,082 
 
0.639 1 3,817 
CCC 85.7 10.5 47.7 97.9 120,218 
 
104.1 54.7 2,613 
Quiscore 69 52 73 90 280,418 
 
79 89 3,766 





Table XXI. Cash Holdings by Industry  
This table presents the median cash holdings by industry for the full sample period and for the years 
2001 and 2009. Cash is defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. Proportion is the 
percentage of observations in each industry. 














Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 0.072 1.50% 0.046 1.71% 0.098 1.40% 
Fishing 0.140 0.13% 0.097 0.13% 0.246 0.13% 
Manufacture of Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 0.040 1.23% 0.033 1.40% 0.049 1.15% 
Manufacture of Textiles and Textile Products 0.071 0.77% 0.048 0.86% 0.075 0.71% 
Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products 0.154 0.15% 0.103 0.18% 0.221 0.13% 
Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products 0.066 0.36% 0.054 0.40% 0.062 0.35% 
Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products Publishing 0.094 2.84% 0.074 3.24% 0.105 2.68% 














Manufacture of Metallic and Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.075 4.79% 0.053 5.56% 0.099 4.48% 
Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.096 2.62% 0.074 3.20% 0.124 2.39% 
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 0.069 0.80% 0.059 0.95% 0.074 0.73% 
Manufacturing Not Elsewhere Classified 0.074 1.85% 0.056 2.03% 0.092 1.75% 
Construction 0.187 9.56% 0.161 8.50% 0.209 10.03% 
Wholesale Trade 0.094 10.48% 0.080 11.97% 0.102 9.77% 
Retail Trade 0.117 6.23% 0.103 5.99% 0.129 6.28% 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.056 4.13% 0.039 3.79% 0.054 4.27% 
Transport, Storage and Communication 0.133 6.27% 0.108 6.50% 0.141 6.20% 
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 0.163 33.56% 0.131 30.88% 0.170 34.89% 











Table XXII. Time Series Analysis of Cash Holdings 
This table presents results of regressions examining whether firms have target cash levels. The sample 
includes data on U.K. based private firms the 2000-2009 period. Data are obtained from update 260 
(February 2011) of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk. The dependent variable is the 
change in cash where cash is calculated as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. Target cash 
level is estimated as the average of the prior three years of cash. FFD is the flow of funds deficit 
defined as cash dividends plus capital expenditures, change in net working capital (less cash) less 
operating cash flow, where all variables are scaled by total assets. Columns 3, 5 and 7 present 
regression results using a sub-sample of firms for which data are available for at least 8 years during 
2000-2009. Standard errors, show in parenthesis, are corrected for heteroskedasciticy using the 






(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) (7) 











Target Cash -0.0649 -0.0594 




    
(0.0017)** (0.0036)** 
FFD 








         












Table XXIII. Firm characteristics by cash quartiles 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on key variables for our sample of firm years from the 
2000-2009 sample of U.K. based firms divided into cash quartiles. Data are obtained from update 260 
(February 2011) of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk. Quartiles for cash are 
determined each year. Cash is defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. Size is defined 
as the natural logarithm of total assets deflated using the CPI into 2005 pound sterling. Cash flow 
(CF) is defined as profit after tax plus depreciation and amortization less common dividends scaled by 
total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is calculated without cash. Cash flow volatility (CF 
Volatility) is defined as the standard deviation of cash flows for the prior three years.  Total debt is 
defined as the sum of short term and long term debt scaled by total assets. Tax rate is defined as tax 
expense scaled by earnings before tax. Industry sigma is a measure of the volatility of an industry's 
cash flow for a 3 year period. Capital expenditures (Capex) are calculated as the change in total assets 
plus depreciation scaled by total assets. Cash conversion cycle (CCC) is given by the inventory 
conversion period plus the receivable's collection period minus the payment period for the accounts 
payable. Div dummy is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm pays dividend in a given year or 0 
otherwise. Company count is the number of years a firm with non missing cash data is included in the 
sample. Quiscore, produced by CRIF Decision Solutions Ltd, is a measure of the likelihood of 
company failure in the year following the date of calculation. A higher score indicates lower 
probability of default. N is the number of non-missing observations in the sample for each variable. 
Quartile 4 variables that are statistically different from quartile 1 variables at 5% level or better are 
indicated in bold. Significance levels are determined by employing t-tests for differences in mean and 
Wilcoxon tests for differences in medians. 
 
    First Quartile   Second Quartile   Third Quartile   Fourth Quartile 
Quartile Range 
 
0 to 0.0267 
 
0.018 to 0.135 
 
0.096 to 0.400 
 
0.299 to 1.00 





























































































































Table XXIV. Regressions Predicting Private Firm Liquidity Levels, 2000-2009 
The sample includes data on U.K. based private firms the 2000-2009 period. Data are obtained from 
update 260 (February 2011) of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is cash defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. Cash is 
defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of 
total assets deflated using the CPI into 2005 pound sterling. Net working capital (NWC) is calculated 
without cash. Total debt is defined as the sum of short term and long term debt scaled by total assets. 
Tax rate is defined as tax expense scaled by earnings before tax. Industry sigma is a measure of the 
volatility of an industry's cash flow for a 3 year period. Capital expenditures (Capex) are calculated as 
the change in total assets plus depreciation scaled by total assets. Div dummy is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if a firm pays dividend in a given year or 0 otherwise. Column 2 presents Fama-MacBeth 
regression. The Fama-MacBeth model gives the average of the time series of coefficients from annual 
cross-sectional regressions. Columns 3 presents pooled cross-sectional time-series regression with 
standard errors clustered by firm and year. Column 4 presents a cross-sectional regression using the 
means of all variables for each firm. Only firms for which data for all years between 2001 and 2009 
are available are used in the cross-sectional specification. Column 5 presents regressions using firms 
belonging to the first three cash quartiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Significance 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.3862 0.3759 0.419 0.1702 
 
(0.0047)** (0.0114)** (0.0100)** (0.0084)** 
Size -0.0249 -0.0274 -0.0323 -0.0096 
 
(0.0002)** (0.0007)** (0.0007)** (0.0005)** 
Firm Age -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Capex 0.0114 0.0155 -0.1089 0.0074 
 
(0.0064) (0.0077)* (0.0103)** (0.0020)** 
Total debt -0.1256 -0.1266 -0.1264 -0.0325 
 
(0.0029)** (0.0042)** (0.0036)** (0.0016)** 
Taxrate 0.0214 0.0192 0.0589 0.0102 
 
(0.0013)** (0.0019)** (0.0070)** (0.0008)** 
NWC -0.1577 -0.1577 -0.1497 -0.0317 
 
(0.0045)** (0.0058)** (0.0038)** (0.0019)** 
Industry Sigma 0.7392 0.293 1.2121 0.1158 
 
(0.3606) (0.0855)** (0.4679)** (0.0533)* 
Div Dummy 0.0452 0.047 0.0731 0.0164 
 
(0.0026)** (0.0033)** (0.0032)** (0.0015)** 
Industry Affiliations Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7 177,929 36,749 144,667 






Table XXV. Modified Regressions Predicting Firm Liquidity Levels, 2000-2009 
The dependent variable in all regressions is cash defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total 
assets. Cash is defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. Size is defined as the natural 
logarithm of total assets deflated using the CPI into 2005 pound sterling. Cash flow is defined as 
profit after tax less interest, taxes, and common dividends scaled by total assets. Net working capital 
is calculated without cash. Total debt is defined as the sum of short term and long term debt scaled by 
total assets. Tax rate is defined as tax expense scaled by earnings before tax. Industry sigma is a 
measure of the volatility of an industry's cash flow for a 3 year period. Capital expenditures are 
calculated as the change in total assets plus depreciation scaled by total assets. Dividend dummy is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm pays dividend in a given year or 0 otherwise. Delta Cash is 
the difference in cash holdings calculated as in cash from year t to t+1. Columns 2 and 3 present 
Fama-MacBeth regressions. The Fama-MacBeth model gives the average of the time series of 
coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions. Columns 4 and 5 present pooled cross-sectional 
time-series regression with standard errors clustered by firm and year. Columns 6 and 7 present cross-
sectional regressions using the means of all variables for each firm. Only firms for which data for all 
years between 2001 and 2009 are available are used in the cross-sectional specification. Significance 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 0.4635 0.3946 0.3548 0.3796 0.38 0.4165 
 
(0.0082)** (0.0058)** (0.0107)** (0.0102)** (0.0102)** (0.0101)** 
Size -0.0374 -0.026 -0.0333 -0.0281 -0.0398 -0.0321 
 
(0.0004)** (0.0002)** (0.0006)** (0.0006)** (0.0007)** (0.0007)** 
Firm Age -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0 -0.0003 
 
(0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0001) (0.0000)** (0.0001) (0.0000)** 
Taxrate 0.0673 0.0223 0.0661 0.0202 0.217 0.0604 
 
(0.0023)** (0.0008)** (0.0029)** (0.0014)** (0.0075)** (0.0071)** 
NWC -0.0834 -0.1452 -0.0823 -0.1456 -0.0704 -0.1479 
 
(0.0049)** (0.0028)** (0.0057)** (0.0044)** (0.0030)** (0.0038)** 
Industry Sigma 0.8179 0.7334 0.2741 0.0076 1.6618 1.3138 
 





















































Industry Affiliations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7 6 228,514 147,961 41,188 36,610 







Table XXVI. Distribution of Sample Across Owner/Manager Classifications 
Panel A presents the distribution of the sample based upon five different ownership structures. Panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics on key variables Owner managed firms (OM) are those where all directors are shareholders. NOM 
indicates firms that are not owner-managed. Data are obtained from updates 196, 208, 221, 233, and 244 of the FAME 
data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk. These updates correspond to October 2005, October 2006, November 2007, 
October 2008 and October 2009 respectively. We use current year‟s financial data and lagged ownership and 
management data.  
 
Panel A 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 
Row Total 
  OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM OM NOM 
One Owner 3,296 1,577 3,605 1,709 3,706 1,764 3,822 1,702 21,181 
One Family 4,734 683 5,233 764 5,364 748 5,206 676 23,408 
Multiple Families 3,209 1,222 3,744 1,446 3,736 1,541 3,433 1,323 19,654 
Families and  
Holding Companies 






















Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Cash 0.373 0.286 0.346 0.256 0.278 0.177 0.235 0.132 0.158 0.074 0.155 0.076 
Size 4.495 4.1525 4.864 4.5824 5.629 5.3965 7.038 7.2675 8.674 8.7094 8.860 8.605 
Firm 
Age 
12.8 9.0 16.3 11.2 18.1 12.6 21.9 16.5 26.3 19.7 25.7 20 
CF 0.020 0.033 0.021 0.032 0.027 0.036 0.028 0.035 0.026 0.041 0.025 0.034 
CF 
Volatility 
0.200 0.115 2.737 0.093 0.142 0.067 0.113 0.041 0.146 0.050 0.082 0.037 
Industry 
Sigma 
0.016 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.010 
NWC -0.194 -0.118 -0.177 -0.104 -0.128 -0.048 -0.081 -0.021 -0.004 0.057 0.037 0.026 
Capex -0.010 0.022 -0.009 0.021 -0.003 0.023 0.007 0.032 0.010 0.043 0.021 0.043 
Div 
Dummy 
0.559 1 0.601 1 0.489 0 0.332 0 0.232 0 0.379 0 
CCC 103.7 40.6 88.6 37.3 70.8 35.5 101.4 43.6 85.0 54.2 119.7 49.1 
Total 
debt 
0.376 0.2222 0.34 0.2044 0.356 0.1935 0.413 0.2588 0.484 0.312 0.317 0.216 
Taxrate 0.160 0.194 0.167 0.197 0.162 0.195 0.161 0.194 0.175 0.213 0.192 0.215 
Quiscore 52.1 49.0 55.6 53.0 61.7 60.0 72.6 76.0 83.2 89.0 86.6 91 






Table XXVII. Cash Holdings and Governance Variables Relative to Firm Size 
This table shows means and medians of cash holdings and governance variables sorted by size and 
governance characteristics. Data are obtained from updates 196, 208, 221, 233, and 244 of the FAME 
data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk. These updates correspond to October 2005, October 2006, 
November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009 respectively. We use current year‟s financial data 
and lagged ownership and management data. Cash is defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by 
total assets. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets deflated using the CPI into 2005 
pound sterling. Inside ownership represents equity ownership of directors. Concentration is defined as 
the ratio of shareholders who are directors to total number of directors. Owner managed (OM) is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is managed by owners or 0 otherwise. Standalone is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a firms is owned by a single individual, single family or multiple families. 
Otherwise, this variable equals 0. In Panel A, we examine the relation between cash holdings and the 
governance metrics based on firm size. We sort firms into size quintiles each year. We report the 
mean and median levels of cash holdings and the governance variables within the 1st, 3rd, and 5th 
size quintiles. In Panel B, we sort the data within each size quintile based on the Agency Cost Index 
(ACI) quartiles. We report the mean and median levels for the 1st (low agency costs) and 4th quartiles 
(high agency costs) of the ACI within each size quintile. In both panels, we use the t-test and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test to examine whether the means and medians are significantly different 
between the 1st and 5th quintiles for Panel A, and the 1st and 4th quartiles in Panel B. Data in bold 
represent statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Panel A 
Variable   Cash 
Insider 
Ownership Concentration  
Owner 
Managed  Standalone 
Size Quintile = 1 (Smallest) Mean 0.42 79.54 0.87 0.81 0.96 
 
Median 0.38 100.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Size Quintile = 3 Mean 0.23 48.83 0.51 0.42 0.56 
 
Median 0.12 50.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Size Quintile = 5 (Largest) Mean 0.12 11.43 0.09 0.05 0.11 






Table XXVII - (Continued) 
Panel B 
    
Cash Insider Ownership Concentration 
Owner 
Managed Standalone 
Size Quintile 1 
      
Low ACI (lower agency costs) 
Mean 0.43 80.36 0.90 0.86 0.97 
Median 0.40 100.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
High ACI (higher agency costs) 
Mean 0.41 76.52 0.82 0.75 0.93 
Median 0.33 100.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Size Quintile 2 
      
Low ACI (lower agency costs) 
Mean 0.36 73.89 0.81 0.75 0.87 
Median 0.29 100.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
High ACI (higher agency costs) 
Mean 0.31 65.39 0.70 0.61 0.81 
Median 0.16 99.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Size Quintile 3 
      
Low ACI (lower agency costs) 
Mean 0.25 47.63 0.49 0.40 0.54 
Median 0.19 50.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
High ACI (higher agency costs) 
Mean 0.20 45.37 0.47 0.39 0.53 
Median 0.08 45.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Size Quintile 4 
      
Low ACI (lower agency costs) 
Mean 0.18 24.42 0.21 0.13 0.25 
Median 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High ACI (higher agency costs) 
Mean 0.15 20.39 0.20 0.13 0.21 
Median 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Size Quintile 5 
      
Low ACI (lower agency costs) 
Mean 0.14 13.61 0.11 0.06 0.13 
Median 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High ACI (higher agency costs) 
Mean 0.11 8.38 0.07 0.03 0.08 






Table XXVIII. Multivariate Analysis of Cash Holdings and Governance Variables 
The dependent variable in all regressions is cash defined as cash plus bank deposits scaled by total assets. Size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets deflated using the CPI into 2005 pound sterling. Net working capital 
(NWC) is calculated without cash. Total debt is defined as the sum of short term and long term debt scaled by total 
assets. Tax rate is defined as tax expense scaled by earnings before tax. Industry sigma is a measure of the volatility of 
an industry's cash flow for a 3 year period. Capital expenditures (Capex) are calculated as the change in total assets plus 
depreciation scaled by total assets. Inside ownership represents equity ownership of directors. ACI is the agency cost 
index described in Gogineni, Linn and Yadav (2011). Larger values of ACI indicate higher agency costs. ACI 4th 
Quartile (ACI 1st Quartile) is a dummy variables that equal 1 if a firm belongs to 4th (1st) quartile when sorted by ACI. 
NOM is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is not managed by owners and 0 otherwise. Data are obtained from 
updates 196, 208, 221, 233, and 244 of the FAME data base produced by Bureau Van Dijk. These updates correspond to 
October 2005, October 2006, November 2007, October 2008 and October 2009 respectively. We use current year‟s 
financial data and lagged ownership and management data. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.3937 0.3936 0.4126 0.4044 
 
(0.0115)** (0.0116)** (0.0119)** (0.0118)** 
ACI -0.0146 
   
 
(0.0035)** 
   






















   
-0.0086 
    
(0.0039)* 
Size -0.0279 -0.0277 -0.0296 -0.0282 
 
(0.0008)** (0.0008)** (0.0009)** (0.0008)** 
Firm Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(0.0001)* (0.0001) (0.0001)* (0.0001)** 
Capex 0.0259 0.0256 0.0289 0.0261 
 
(0.0040)** (0.0040)** (0.0041)** (0.0040)** 
Total debt -0.1431 -0.1428 -0.1484 -0.1456 
 
(0.0042)** (0.0042)** (0.0042)** (0.0041)** 
Taxrate 0.0283 0.0274 0.0307 0.0296 
 
(0.0027)** (0.0026)** (0.0028)** (0.0027)** 
NWC -0.1678 -0.1679 -0.1695 -0.1683 
 
(0.0042)** (0.0042)** (0.0043)** (0.0042)** 
Industry Sigma -0.0717 -0.0675 -0.0722 -0.0778 
 
(0.0606) (0.0606) (0.0625) (0.0606) 
Industry Affiliations Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accounting Quality Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 88,554 88,554 84,913 88,554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.239 0.238 0.238 
 
 
 
 
